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FROM COOPERATIVE TO INOPERATIVE FEDERALISM:  THE PERVERSE 
MUTATION OF ENVIRONMENTAL LAW AND POLICY 
by Robert L. Glicksman?
I. INTRODUCTION
 In the foreword to a symposium on “Cooperative Federalism” published in the 
Iowa law Review in 1938, the unnamed author asserted “that federalism is in flux and 
that no balance has yet been struck between state and nation.”1  The same statement 
clearly still holds true, at least in the area of environmental law.  The symposium 
foreword attributed the uncertainty about the appropriate realms of federal and state 
power to “experimentation in federalism” reflected in recent federal and state legislation 
that was “characterized by the participation of several governments in cooperative 
legislative or administrative action.”2
 Beginning in 1970, Congress embarked upon a new experiment in cooperative 
federalism in the field of environmental law.  In a rash of legislation adopted over the 
next decade, Congress established a framework in which the federal and state 
governments would work together to protect health, the environment, and natural 
resources such as wildlife from the adverse effects of pollution-generating and 
developmental activities by both private and public entities.  Under this new regime of 
federal environmental law, each level of government had a particular role to play.  Under 
many of the federal pollution control laws, the federal government was responsible for 
promulgating standards to protect health and the environment.  Congress gave states the 
option of administering the programs necessary to achieve the federally promulgated 
standards by, for example, developing implementation plans3 or issuing permits to 
individual polluters,4 although the federal government typically retained veto power over 
state decisions.  Both levels of government shared the power to enforce applicable 
controls,5 supplemented by private enforcement initiatives.6  In most instances, the 
statutes explicitly delegated to the states the authority to adopt standards that were more 
stringent than applicable federal standards.7  Under this model, both levels of government 
would thus contribute to the common goal of minimizing the degree to which human 
activities threaten harm to health and to valuable natural resources. 
? Robert W. Wagstaff Professor of Law, University of Kansas.  The author thanks Ashlea Schwarz, 
University of Kansas School of Law, Class of 2007, for her valuable research assistance.  He also thanks 
the organizers of and participants in the 19th Annual Business Law Symposium held by the Wake Forest 
Law Review in Winston-Salem on April 7, 2006 for their useful input. 
1 Symposium on Cooperative Federalism:  Foreword, 23 IOWA L. REV. 455, 455 (1938).  This symposium 
was brought to my attention through the scholarship of Professor Rob Fischman.  See Robert L. Fischman, 
Cooperative Federalism and Natural Resources Law, 14 N.Y.U. ENVTL. L.J. 179, 185-87 (2005). 
2 Symposium on Cooperative Federalism, supra note 1, at 456. 
3 See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 7410(a)(2) (Clean Air Act (CAA)). 
4 See, e.g., 33 U.S.C. § 1342(b) (Clean Water Act (CWA)). 
5 See, e.g., 33 U.S.C. § 1319 (CWA); 42 U.S.C. § 7413 (CAA). 
6 See, e.g., 33 U.S.C.§ 1365 (CWA); 42 U.S.C. § 7604 (CAA). 
7 See, e.g., 33 U.S.C. § 1370 (CWA); 42 U.S.C. § 7416 (CAA). 
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 This model of environmental statutory cooperative federalism is nominally still in 
place today.  The on-the-ground operation of environmental cooperative federalism 
nevertheless looks distinctly different today than it did for much of the period following 
the enactment of the Clean Air Act (CAA),8 the first major modern federal pollution 
control statute.  Federal power to prevent environmental harm is in some respects more 
limited today than it has been for most of the modern environmental era.  This 
contraction of federal power has resulted from a combination of judicial, legislative, and 
administrative activity.  Many state and local governments have reacted to the shackles 
imposed on federal authority to protect the environment and conserve natural resources 
by engaging in the kind of experimentation referred to in the Iowa Law Review 
symposium introduction.  Perhaps more than at any time in the last thirty-five years, the 
states and localities have begun to fulfill their potential as “laboratories” of 
experimentation9 in achieving environmental protection goals.  Instead of welcoming this 
development, however, the federal government, acting again through all three branches, 
has recognized or imposed limitations on state and local authority to continue with these 
endeavors.  Thus, both levels of government have been subjected to constraints on the 
authority to pursue many of the statutory goals established during the 1970s.  Congress’s 
decision in a few instances to delegate (or consider delegating) to the states the authority 
to grant exemptions from federally established environmental requirements provides the 
final component of the inversion of the manner in which federalism operates in the 
context of environmental law. 
 This article discusses the transformation of environmental law from a set of rules 
and doctrines that used to enable federal and state governments to cooperate in the quest 
for environmental protection to a revised system that, at least in some respects, restrains 
both levels of government from the vigorous pursuit of that goal.  Part II of the article 
discusses the origins of the concept of cooperative federalism and the application of that 
concept to environmental law.  It explores the rationale for increased federal involvement 
in establishing limitations on activities with the potential to harm the environment.  It 
also provides a description of the characteristics of cooperative federalism initially built 
into the federal pollution control and natural resource management statutes.  These 
statutes reflect the understanding that, despite the creation of an extensive body of federal 
environmental restrictions, the states would continue to play an important role in the 
adoption and implementation of environmental policy and that, in particular, they would 
remain free to supplement or exceed federally established goals or standards.
The next two parts address the manner in which the original model of cooperative 
federalism as it applies to environmental law has shifted.  Part III examines the 
contraction of federal power to regulate activities that are potentially harmful to the 
environment.  It explores the manner in which each branch of the federal government has 
contributed to that retrenchment.  Part IV details the extent to which state and local 
authorities have reacted by establishing programs to fill the vacuum created by the 
8 Pub. L. No. 91-604, 84 Stat. 1676 (1970) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 7401-7671g). 
9 In New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262, 311 (1932), Justice Brandeis remarked that “[i]t is one 
of the happy incidents of the federal system that a single courageous state may, if its citizens choose, serve 
as a laboratory; and try novel social and economic experiments without risk to the rest of the country.”  
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disappearance of federal power or by the unwillingness of the federal government to 
exercise the power it retains to promote environmental protection.  Part IV also explores 
recent developments, at both the federal and state levels, that have resulted in the 
fettering of state power to combat environmentally destructive activities.  Finally, it 
considers a few circumstances in which the federal government has delegated enhanced 
authority to the states, but to carve loopholes in federal environmental protection 
measures that otherwise would apply, rather than to exceed minimal federal safeguards.  
The upshot of all these developments has been a federal system that hinders the capacity 
of both levels of government to pursue environmental protection initiatives, thereby 
constraining the force of environmental law by pushing both levels toward the lowest 
common denominator. 
II. THE HISTORICAL BASELINE:  COOPERATIVE FEDERALISM
 Federalism issues derive from the Constitution’s treatment of the states as 
sovereign entities that are distinct from the federal government.10  The Supreme Court 
has described federalism as “the unique contribution of the Framers to political science 
and to political theory.”11  It also has characterized “our federalism” as “requir[ing] that 
Congress treat the States in a manner consistent with their status as residuary sovereigns 
and joint participants in the governance of the Nation.”12  As the Supreme Court 
conceives of it, federalism entails neither “blind deference to ‘States’ Rights’” nor 
“centralization of control over every important issue in our National Government and its 
courts,” but rather 
a system in which there is sensitivity to the legitimate interests of both State and 
National Governments, and in which the National Government, anxious though it 
may be to vindicate and protect federal rights and federal interests, always 
endeavors to do so in ways that will not unduly interfere with the legitimate 
activities of the States.13
 The existence of a system of government based on dual sovereignty has generated 
debate over “how power, resources, and responsibility should be divided among different 
government entities.”14  One of the ways in which the federal government may pursue its 
10 LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 114 (1978).  See also William B. Buzbee, 
Brownfields, Environmental Federalism, and Institutional Determinism, 21 WM. & MARY ENVTL. L. & 
POL’Y REV. 1, 20 (1997) (describing federalism in general as “a system of governance with a central 
government authority and regional governments with at least some areas of policymaking autonomy” and 
federalism under the U.S. Constitution as “a legal system recognizing the United States federal government 
and state governments as entities with areas of autonomous political authority and areas of overlapping or 
delegated authority”). 
11 United States v. Lopez, 115 S. Ct. 1624, 1633 (1995).  For a less charitable view, see Edward L. Rubin & 
Malcolm Feeley, Federalism:  Some Notes on A National Neurosis, 41 UCLA L. REV. 903 (1994) (arguing 
that federalism does not secure citizen participation, make government more responsive, encourage 
experimentation, diffuse power, or secure community). 
12 Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706, 748 (1999). 
13 Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37, 44 (1971). 
14 Robert V. Percival, Environmental Federalism:  Historical Roots and Contemporary Models, 54 MD. L. 
REV. 1141, 1143 (1995). 
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objectives without running roughshod over state sovereignty is to enlist the assistance of 
state governments in the pursuit of federal goals and to allow the states to pursue 
supplementary or alternative goals, as long as such state efforts do not frustrate 
achievement of the federal purposes.  Congress has a long history of creating regulatory 
program that rely upon such cooperative ventures between the federal government and 
the states to attain goals common to both sovereigns.  One of areas in which this tradition 
of cooperative federalism has been richest is environmental law and policy. 
A. The Origins of Cooperative Federalism
 The 1938 Iowa Law Review Symposium foreword characterized cooperative 
legislation involving federal and state governments as still in an “experimental stage” and 
speculated that it might constitute “a temporarily significant phase in the development of 
the federal system of government.”15  The articles in the symposium discussed the 
relationship of federal and state regulatory authority in areas that included efforts to 
provide safe food and drugs,16 regulate the consumption of alcohol,17 solve fiscal 
problems,18 restrict the use of child labor,19 and require collective bargaining.20  The 
authors of the symposium articles gathered underneath the umbrella of cooperative 
federalism various programs under which Congress provided grants to the states “to 
encourage the states in enlarged activity,”21 required states to pursue policies they might 
themselves have endorsed but for the existence of strong political opposition at the state 
level, 22 allowed states to determine the degree to or the manner in which they were 
willing to pursue federal policy endeavors,23 depended upon state implementation to 
achieve federal statutory objectives, 24 and prevented destructive interstate competition or 
efforts by the states to protect themselves or profit at the expense of neighboring 
jurisdictions.25  Congress later resorted to all of these techniques in the federal 
environmental legislation that it adopted beginning in 1970. 
The symposium articles describing the emerging cooperative federalism regimes 
did not focus primarily on environmental protection (which none of the authors most 
likely would have recognized as an ongoing function of government, certainly not at the 
15 Symposium on Cooperative Federalism, supra note _, at 458.  Earlier articles had explored the 
dimensions of federal-state cooperation.  See, e.g., Edwin S. Corwin, National-State Cooperation — Its 
Present Possibilities, 46 YALE L.J. 599 (1937). 
16 Frank R. Strong, Cooperative Federalism, 23 IOWA L. REV. 459, 479-82 (1938). 
17 W. Brooke Graves, Influence of Congressional Legislation in the States, 23 IOWA L. REV. 519, 521-22 
(1938); Jane Perry Clark, Interdependent Federal and State Law as a Form of Federal-State Cooperation,
23 IOWA L. REV. 539, 543, 549-52 (1938). 
18 Graves, supra note 17, at 523-28. 
19 Strong, supra note 16, at 483-87; Clark, supra note 17, at 563-64; John B. Cheadle, Cooperation in 
Reverse:  A Natural State Tendency, 23 IOWA L. REV. 586, 601 (1938). 
20 Strong, supra note 16, at 489-93; Graves, supra note 17, at 530-32. 
21 Id. at 502. 
22 Id. at 504. 
23 Id. at 512-15.  According to Strong, these types of initiatives allow ‘the registered will of a preponderant 
majority [to become], without operation of the amendment process, the national will.”  Id. at 515. 
24 Clark, supra, at 539. 
25 Cheadle, supra note 19. 
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federal level) or natural resource management.  Neither did they ignore the problems, 
however, that we would today call environmental law problems.  Thus, the symposium 
authors referred to the influence of federal legislation on state efforts to engage in natural 
resource conservation and planning.26  Indeed, an entire article was devoted to a 
discussion of cooperative federalism in drainage basin-wide water use planning.27  One 
of the symposium pieces discussed federal regulation of navigable waterways that 
required pilots to conform to existing or future state laws and federal legislation 
conditioning the issuance of federal licenses to operate hydropower facilities on 
compliance with state water power laws.28  The same piece mentioned federal legislation 
governing use of the national parks, which required compliance with state fish licensing 
laws.29  Another piece analyzed federal initiatives to control commerce in natural 
resources following failed state initiatives in this area.30  One author noted the intrusion 
of the federal government into an area traditionally regarded as an appropriate (if not 
exclusive) prerogative of the states — fish and wild game conservation.31
These initiatives amounted to a kind of “hybrid federal legislation positing 
cooperation through interacting state and federal consent.”32  The symposium authors 
tended to view these developments in a positive light.  One argued for example, that: 
The acceptance by the state legislatures of the leadership of Congress . . . appears 
to provide at least as good, if not a better solution of one of the major problems of 
cooperative federalism, than any that has yet been tried.  It brings into existence a 
considerable measure of uniformity without . . . doing violence to the principles 
upon which the federal system has long endured.33
The author added that, while the transfer of power to the federal government that the 
states are unable or unwilling to use is unobjectionable, “it is quite as reasonable to insist 
that the states ought to be permitted to retain all the powers that they do or can use 
effectively.”34
26 Graves, supra note 17, at 535-37. 
27 William E. Warner, The Drainage Basin Studies:  Cooperative Federalism in Practice, 23 IOWA L. REV.
565 (1938). 
28 Clark, supra note 17, at 539-40. 
29 Id. at 540. 
30 Id. at 546-49. 
31 Id. at 545-46.  See also Cheadle, supra note 19, at 598.  Professor Clark devoted particular attention to 
the cooperative efforts of federal and state authorities in enforcing the Migratory Bird Treaty Act, 40 Stat. 
755 (1918) (codified at 16 U.S.C. § 703), and related state laws.  See Clark, supra note 17, at 559-61.  The 
articles also discussed the use of interstate compacts as a method of cooperative federalism, with one of the 
authors concluding that “[w]ithin limits,” the creation of interstate agencies “makes for better methods of 
conserving natural resources.”  Cheadle, supra, at 615.  Interstate compacts are beyond the scope of this 
article.
32 Strong, supra note 16, at 504. 
33 Graves, supra note 17, at 537.  See also Warner, supra note 27, at 572 (quoting water resource planning 
official who stated that “mutually helpful negotiations of the Federal and State groups, if continued, should 
produce the sanest ultimate plans, with that strengthening of local autonomy and responsibility which all of 
us believe is the key to our successful democratic processes”). 
34 Graves, supra note 17, at 538. 
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 The earliest appearance of the term “cooperative federalism” in a reported 
decision handed down by a federal court was in 1950, when, in a case involving the 
validity of an Alaska income tax statute, the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit cited 
a law review article by that name.35  Today, the rhetoric of “cooperative federalism” is 
routinely invoked by the courts in a variety of regulatory and other contexts.  During the 
last thirty years, the Supreme Court alone has characterized as “cooperative federalism” 
endeavors programs relating to educational programs for handicapped children,36
financial aid for needy families with dependent children,37 telecommunications facility 
siting requirements,38 health insurance,39 financial security in old age,40 interstate efforts 
to fight crime,41 and, of course, environmental law.42
The Supreme Court’s multifarious exposure to cooperative federalism ventures 
has provided it with the occasion to describe what it thinks cooperative federalism entails.  
In a recent opinion, Justice Breyer identified some of the attributes of a typical 
cooperative federalism program, regarding it as one that rejects a nationally uniform 
approach to problem solving in which Congress preempts state authority, and that instead 
allows state and local authorities to make at least some decisions, subject to minimum 
federal standards.43  In an earlier environmental case, the Court described a “program of 
cooperative federalism” as one “that allows the States, within limits established by 
federal minimum standards, to enact and administer their own regulatory programs, 
structured to meet their own particular needs.”44  Similarly, in a 1992 case raising a Tenth 
Amendment challenge to a federal statute creating processes for the disposal of low-level 
radioactive waste, the Court used the term “program of cooperative federalism” to 
describe instances in which, although “Congress has the authority to regulate private 
activity under the Commerce Clause,” it has chosen “to offer States the choice of 
35 Alaska Steamship Co. v. Mullaney, 180 F.2d 805, 816 (9th Cir. 1950) (citing Mermain, “Cooperative 
Federalism” Again:  State and Municipal Regulation Penalizing Violation of Existing and Future 
Requirements:  I, 57 YALE L.J. 1, 18 (1947)).  Earlier decisions had described efforts on the part of federal 
and state governments to cooperate with one another in areas such as flood control, reclamation, and 
navigation improvement.  See, e.g., United States v. West Virginia Power, 122 F.2d 733, 738 (4th Cir. 
1941); Overton v. United States, 45 Ct. Cl. 17, 1909 WL 872 (1909).  Cf. United States v. New York, 310 
U.S. 516, 517 (1942) (describing “scheme” pursued under the Bankruptcy Act “to encourage the States to 
establish and maintain unemployment insurance funds and thus to cooperate with the federal government in 
meeting a common problem”). 
36 Schaffer ex rel. Schaffer v. West, 126 S. Ct. 528, 531 (2005); id. at 541 (Breyer, J., dissenting). 
37 Bowen v. Gilliard, 483 U.S. 587, 589 n.1 (1987) (quoting King v. Smith, 392 U.S. 309 (1968)); 
Batterson v. Francis, 432 U.S. 416, 431 (1977). 
38 City of Rancho Palos Verdes v. Abrams, 125 S. Ct. 1453, 1463 (2005) (Breyer, J., concurring). 
39 Wisconsin Dep’t of Health and Family Serv. v. Blumer, 534 U.S. 473, 485 (2002) (Medicaid). 
40 Chapman v. Houston Welfare Rights Org., 441 U.S. 600, 645 (1979) (Powell, J., concurring); Quern v. 
Mandley, 436 U.S. 725 (1978).  See generally MARTHA DERTHICK, THE INFLUENCE OF FEDERAL GRANTS:
PUBLIC ASSISTANCE IN MASSACHUSETTS (1970) (analyzing cooperative federalism in the implementation 
of the Social Security Act). 
41 United States v. Balsys, 524 U.S. 666, 694 (1998). 
42 Alaska Dep’t of Envtl. Conservation v. EPA, 540 U.S. 461, 518 (2004) (Kennedy, J., dissenting).  Cf.
Fischman, supra note 1, at 187 (arguing that “[t]hough cooperative federalism is a term that retains some 
currency outside of environmental law, it does not play as central a role in any other field”). 
43 City of Rancho Palo Verdes, 125 S. Ct. at 1462-63 (Breyer, J., concurring). 
44 Hodel v. Virginia Surface Mining & Reclamation Ass’n, 452 U.S. 264, 289 (1981). 
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regulating that activity according to federal standards or having state law pre-empted by 
federal regulation.”45  In the same opinion, it swept within the rubric of cooperative 
federalism a statutory program that “anticipates a partnership between the States and the 
Federal Government, animated by a shared objective” or that employs “any other 
permissible method of encouraging a State to conform to federal policy choices.”46
The Supreme Court has even created special guidelines for interpreting federal 
statutes that reflect Congress’s intent to embark on a cooperative federalism venture.  It 
has stated, for example, that “[w]hen interpreting . . . statutes so structured, we have not 
been reluctant to leave a range of permissible choices to the States, at least where the 
superintending federal agency has concluded that such latitude is consistent with the 
statute’s aims.”47  Similarly, the court has invoked a “presumption in favor of 
‘cooperative federalism.’”48
B. Cooperative Federalism and Environmental Law
 Both the federal government and the states have ample authority to take actions 
that are designed to protect human health and the environment from the adverse effects of 
industrial and developmental activity.  The federal government may rely upon its 
authority to regulate interstate and foreign commerce49 to restrict pollution-generating 
activities, for example,50 and it may rely upon its power to “make all needful Rules and 
Regulations respecting” property that it owns51 to manage the federal public lands and 
resources and protect them from damage caused by activities on adjacent private land.52
Beginning in the nineteenth century, the federal government frequently resorted to its 
authority under the Property Clause by enacting statutes that authorized federal agencies 
such as the National Forest Service53 and the National Park Service54 to protect federal 
45 New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 167 (1992).  The Court cited several examples of such 
programs created by environmental and health and safety statutes. 
46 Id.  “If federal preferences are to prevail, . . . the core of shared values and goals that federal and state 
administrators derive from the sharing of a function must be elaborated and perfected, in ways of federal 
choosing, until a high degree of congruence has been achieved.”  DERTHICK, supra note 40, at 203-04.  
Derthick describes cooperative federalism as “a system in which . . . divided authority is brought together 
again,” in a way that “enables the cooperating governments to benefit from one another’s special capacities 
while still preserving the value of political pluralism.”  Id. at 220. 
47 Wisconsin Dep’t of Health and Family Serv., 540 U.S. at 495. 
48 New York Tel. Co. v. New York State Dep’t of Labor, 440 U.S. 519, 539 n.41 (1979). 
49 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3. 
50 An additional source of federal authority to take action to protect the environment is the Treaty Clause, 
U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2. 
51 U.S. CONST. art IV, § 3, cl. 2. 
52 For a discussion of the scope of the federal government’s authority under the Property Clause to protect 
federal lands and resources from such external threats, see 1 GEORGE CAMERON COGGINS & ROBERT L.
GLICKSMAN, PUBLIC NATURAL RESOURCES LAW § 3:14 (1990); 2 COGGINS & GLICKSMAN, supra, § 14:5. 
53 See the Organic Act of 1897, 16 U.S.C. §§ 473-482 (repealed in part in 1976). 
54 See the National Park System Act of 1916, 16 U.S.C. §§ 1-20g.  Congress formally changed the name of 
the statute to the National Park System General Authorities Act in 2004.  See Pub. L. No. 108-352, § 10(b), 
118 Stat. 1395, 1397 (2004) (codified at 16 U.S.C. § 1 note). 
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lands and resources from being adversely affected by private use and exploitation.55
Until 1970, however, the federal government did little to regulate activities responsible 
for causing pollution.  Instead, state governments, acting pursuant to their inherent police 
powers, and local governments, to whom the states sometimes delegated the authority to 
regulate to protect the public health, the public safety, and the general welfare, took 
primary responsibility for that kind of regulation.56
Beginning in 1970, Congress adopted a series of statutes that dramatically altered 
the relative responsibilities of the federal and state governments to restrict polluting 
activities with the potential to harm public health and the environment.  Through statutes 
such as the CAA and the CWA, Congress asserted its authority to regulate such activities 
by both private and public entities.  The federal government, however, did not completely 
divest the states and localities of their pre-existing regulatory authority.  Instead, many of 
the statutes that Congress adopted during the 1970s and 1980s created cooperative 
partnerships between federal and state governments whose aim was to protect the 
environment. 
  1. Responsibility for Environmental Regulation Before 1970
 Throughout the nineteenth century and the first half of the twentieth century, the 
federal government had little involvement in protecting public health and the 
environment from pollution.  Congress enacted occasional statutes such as the River and 
Harbors Act of 189957 that would later be enlisted in the fight against pollution,58 but it 
did so to promote commerce, such as by preserving navigability of rivers, rather than to 
abate activities generating harmful pollution.59
It was the state and local governments that first took the initiative in restricting 
polluting and land development activities with the potential to harm the environment.  
Common law litigation sounding in causes of action such as nuisance, trespass, 
negligence, and strict liability provided one forum in which those injured by pollution 
55 See, e.g., 16 U.S.C. § 475 (requiring that the national forests be established “to improve and protect the 
forest within the boundaries” and “for the purpose of securing favorable conditions of water flows, and to 
furnish a continuous supply of timber for the use and necessities of citizens of the United States); 16 U.S.C. 
§ 1 (authorizing the National Park Service to regulate the national parks and monuments “to conserve the 
scenery and the natural and historic objects and the wild life therein” so as to “leave them unimpaired for 
the enjoyment of future generations”).  See also Percival, supra note 14, at 1147 (asserting that “[the early 
history of federal environmental policy was dominated by disputes over development of the public lands”). 
56 See Percival, supra note 14, at 1148 (stating that by the mid-19th century, “the Supreme Court had 
confirmed that states had broad police powers that could be used to regulate business’). 
57 33 U.S.C. § 407 (prohibiting the discharge of “refuse matter” without a permit from the Secretary of the 
Army). 
58 See, e.g., United States v. Pennsylvania Industrial Chem. Corp., 411 U.S. 655 (1973); United States v. 
Standard Oil Co., 384 U.S. 224 (1966).  See generally William H. Rodgers, Jr., Industrial Water Pollution 
and the Refuse Act:  A Second Chance for Water Quality, 119 U. PA. L. REV. 761 (1971). 
59 See ROBERT V. PERCIVAL ET AL., ENVIRONMENTAL REGULATION:  LAW, SCIENCE, AND POLICY 102 (3d 
ed. 2000); Percival, supra note 14, at 1149. 
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could seek monetary redress for past injury and injunctive relief to prevent future harm.60
Local land use regulations such as zoning laws were used to segregate incompatible uses 
such as residential uses and industrial uses whose pollution could harm them.61  Local 
governments also enacted rudimentary pollution control legislation such as smoke control 
ordinances and more sophisticated ordinances authorizing municipal officials to require 
the use of specified pollution control equipment.62
 In the middle of the twentieth century, the federal government moved haltingly to 
establish a presence in the pollution control field.63  As pollution continued to increase 
despite the efforts of state and local governments to abate it, Congress enacted legislation 
that sponsored research into the causes and effects of pollution64 and provided technical 
and financial assistance to state regulatory efforts.65  By the 1960s, Congress was ready 
to take the next step by adopting legislation that authorized federal administrative 
agencies to impose substantive controls on industry to avert harm to public health and the 
environment.  Paradoxically, some of this legislation was supported by the regulated 
entities themselves — the automobile and coal producing industries.  They feared that, in 
the absence of federal regulation, they would be subject to a multiplicity of potentially 
inconsistent and rigorous state and local measures.66  Another important spur to the 
adoption of more substantive federal legislation was the recognition that interstate 
pollution, which was becoming a more obvious problem, could be dealt with more 
60 See, e.g., WILLIAM H. RODGERS, JR., ENVIRONMENTAL LAW 125 (2d ed. 1994); Daniel C. Esty, 
Revitalizing Environmental Federalism, 95 MICH. L. REV. 570, 600 (1996); Percival, supra note 14, at 
1152 (stating that, “[i]n the absence of regulatory standards, the common law was the principal legal 
instrument for addressing pollution problems”).  See generally Robert L. Glicksman, A Guide to Kansas 
Common Law Actions Against Industrial Pollution Sources, 33 U. KAN. L. REV. 621 (1985); Robert L. 
Glicksman, Federal Preemption and Private Legal Remedies for Pollution, 134 U. PA. L. REV. 125, 171-
222 (1985). 
61 See, e.g., Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365, 388 (1926), where the Court stated: 
There is no serious difference of opinion in respect of the validity of laws and regulations fixing 
the height of buildings within reasonable limits, the character of materials and methods of 
construction, and the adjoining area which must be left open, in order to minimize the danger of 
fire or collapse, the evils of overcrowding and the like, and excluding from residential sections 
offensive trades, industries and structures likely to create nuisances. 
62 See ROBERT L. GLICKSMAN ET AL., ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION:  LAW AND POLICY 326 (4th ed. 2003) 
(citing Jan G. Laitos, Legal Institutions and Pollution:  Some Intersections Between Law and History, 15 
NAT. RESOURCES J. 423 (1975)); FRANK P. GRAD, ENVIRONMENTAL LAW 8 (3d ed. 1985); Esty, supra note 
60, at 600. 
63 One author has referred to the process as “creeping federalization.”  Percival, supra note 14, at 1155 
(quoting J. William Futrell, The History of Environmental Law, in SUSTAINABLE ENVIRONMENTAL LAW 12 
(1993)). 
64 E.g., An act to improve, strengthen, and accelerate programs for the prevention and abatement of air 
pollution, Pub. L. No. 88-206, 77 Stat. 392 (1963); An act to provide research and technical assistance 
relating to air pollution control, Pub. L. No. 84-159, 69 Stat. 322 (1955). 
65 See GLICKSMAN ET AL., supra note 62, at 507 (describing federal legislation to subsidize construction of 
municipal sewage treatment works); GRAD, supra note 62, at 8-9; Percival, supra note 14, at 1155-57. 
66 See E. Donald Elliott et al., Toward A Theory of Statutory Evolution:  The Federalization of 
Environmental Law, 1 J. L., ECON. & ORG. 313, 326-27 (1985).  See also GLICKSMAN ET AL., supra note 
62, at 507 (citing GABRIEL KOLKO, THE TRIUMPH OF CONSERVATISM:  A REINTERPRETATION OF 
AMERICAN HISTORY, 1900-1916 (1963); WILLIAM TUCKER, PROGRESS AND PRIVILEGE:  AMERICA IN THE 
AGE OF ENVIRONMENTALISM (1982)). 
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effectively by the federal government than by the states.67  The Water Quality Act of 
1965,68 for example, created a mechanism, albeit a cumbersome and ultimately 
ineffective one, for the abatement of interstate water pollution.69  Within a few years, 
however, these modest programs would mushroom through the enactment of a series of 
statutes that vested in federal agencies such as the federal Environmental Protection 
Agency (EPA) expansive authority to regulate virtually every corner of the United States 
economy to prevent pollution from harming public health and the environment. 
  2. Environmental Law and Cooperative Federalism After 1970 
   a. The Rationales for Federal Environmental Law 
 Even before 1970, Congress had begun to adopt new legislation, such as the 
Wilderness Act of 1964,70 which was designed to enhance the protection of the federal 
lands and resources.71  The environmental decade kicked off with the passage of the 
National Environmental Policy Act of 1969 (NEPA),72 which President Nixon signed 
into law on New Year’s Day 1970.73  NEPA’s principal provision aims at forcing federal 
agencies to consider the potential adverse environmental effects of proposed actions and 
disclose those effects to the public before committing to take those actions.74
It was not until 1970 that Congress began to alter the landscape of pollution 
control law.  The proliferation of federal environmental legislation75 that began in that 
year was the product at least in part of the perception that a system in which state and 
local efforts took the lead in adopting and enforcing measures to protect the environment 
had not been effective.76  Moreover, the national dimensions of a variety of 
67 See PERCIVAL ET AL., supra note 59, at 103-04; ZYGMUNT J.B. PLATER, ENVIRONMENTAL LAW AND 
POLICY:  NATURE, LAW, AND SOCIETY 295-96 (3d ed. 2004). 
68 Pub. L. No. 89-234, 79 Stat. 903 (1965). 
69 See GLICKSMAN ET AL., supra note 62, at 508.  Similar federal efforts to abate interstate air pollution 
worked no better.  See Percival, supra note 14, at 1157. 
70 Pub. L. No. 88-577, 78 Stat. 890 (1964) (codified as amended at 16 U.S.C. §§ 1131-1136)). 
71 See also Multiple-Use Sustained-Yield Act, Pub. L. No. 86-517, 74 Stat. 215 (1960) (codified as 
amended at 16 U.S.C. §§ 528-531); Wild and Scenic Rivers Act, Pub. L. No. 90-542, 82 Stat. 906 (1968) 
(codified as amended at 16 U.S.C. §§ 1271-1287). 
72 Pub. L. No. 91-190, 83 Stat. 852 (1970) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 4321-4370f). 
73 See Percival, supra note 14, at 1159. 
74 42 U.S.C. § 4332(2)(C). 
75 In addition to the federal pollution control statutes adopted during the 1970s, Congress refined, 
sometimes dramatically, the legislation that authorized federal agencies, such as the National Forest Service 
and the Bureau of Land Management (BLM), to manage the federal public lands.  See, e.g., the National 
Forest Management Act, 16 U.S.C. §§ 1600-1687 (adopted in 1976); the Federal Land Policy and 
Management Act, 43 U.S.C. §§ 1701-1785 (also adopted in 1976).  These statutes are sometimes referred 
to as the organic acts for the Forest and the BLM, respectively.  Congress also enacted the Endangered 
Species Act in 1973.  Pub. L. No. 93-205, 87 Stat. 884 (1973) (codified as amended at 16 U.S.C. §§ 1531-
1544). 
76 See Douglas Kendall, Redefining Federalism, 35 ENVTL. L. REP. (ENVTL. L. INST.) 10445, 10447-48 
(2005) (arguing that “[t]he federal environmental laws of the early and mid-1970s were premised, at least 
in part, on the notion that state and local governments were unable or unwilling to take responsibility for 
safeguarding natural resources”); Percival, supra note 14, at 1144 (arguing that “environmental law became 
federalized only after a long history of state failure to protect what had come to be viewed as nationally 
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environmental problems were becoming increasingly clear to many, including federal 
legislators.77  If the states and localities were not capable of adopting and implementing 
an effective set of programs to protect the public health and the environment, it would be 
necessary and advisable for the federal government to step into the breach, 78 particularly 
because “many Americans regard environmental quality as an important national good 
that transcends individual or local interest.”79
 One possible explanation for the states’ failure to provide effective environmental 
regulation was their lack of scientific expertise and their inability to provide the resources 
needed to implement such regulation.80  Similarly, federal environmental legislation 
arguably permits environmental policymakers to take advantage of the economies of 
scale that result from the adoption of national standards.81  As John Dwyer has explained, 
“[i]n terms of efficiency, it makes little sense for each state to duplicate the underlying 
research and collection of data necessary to regulate air pollution.  There are also 
important interests”); John Dwyer, The Practice of Federalism Under the Clean Air Act, 54 MD. L. REV.
1183, 1221 (1995) (stating that “[t]he principal justification for federal air pollution regulation has been 
that environmental protection is of great national importance and that states have been unwilling or unable 
to deal with pressing air pollution problems”). 
The Supreme Court described the adoption of the 1970 version of the CAA as Congress’s 
response to the states’ “disappointing” performance under earlier versions of the statute in which the 
federal government played a smaller regulatory role.  In the Court’s terminology, “Congress reacted by 
taking a stick to the States in the form of the Clean Air Amendments of 1970,” which “sharply increased 
federal authority and responsibility in the continuing effort to combat air pollution.”  Train v. Natural 
Resources Defense Council, Inc., 421 U.S. 60, 64 (1975). 
77 See Percival, supra note 14, at 1157.  Part of the increasing visibility of environmental problems was due 
to the publication of books such as RACHEL CARSON, SILENT SPRING (1962). 
78 See Dwyer, supra note 76, at 1220 (explaining that one of the justifications for “a dominant federal role 
in environmental regulation” was the “need to replace unduly weak state regulation”).  An additional 
justification for centralized federal environmental regulation is the claim that “public choice pathologies 
cause environmental interests to be systematically underrepresented at the state level relative to business 
interests.”  Richard L. Revesz, Federalism and Environmental Regulation:  A Public Choice Analysis, 115 
HARV. L. REV. 553, 555-56 (2001).  Professor Revesz’s article disputes that assertion, claiming instead that 
“differences in preferences for environmental improvements across the states more plausibly explains why 
certain states adopt more stringent regulations than others.”  Id. at 558.  Cf. Tom Laughlin, Note, 
Evaluating New Federalism Arguments in the Area of the Environment:  The Search for Empirical 
Measures, 13 N.Y.U. ENVTL. L.J. 481, 483 (2005) (claiming that empirical data based on evaluation of the 
League of Conservation Voter scorecards that rate the environmental voting records of federal and state 
legislators support the conclusion “that state governments do not appear to be captured by public choice 
pathologies and that a system concentrating authority in the states may produce more stringent 
environmental regulation than a system emphasizing a stronger federal role”). 
79 Richard B. Stewart, Environmental Quality as A National Good in A Federal State, 1997 U. CHI. LEGAL 
F. 199, 210 (1997) [cited hereinafter as Stewart, National Good]. 
80 See Dwyer, supra note 76, at 1221 (“Lack of adequate state administrative resources and systematic 
problems in state policy-making processes prevented states from adopting needed environmental 
programs.”); Percival, supra note 14, at 1178 (arguing that “history demonstrates that state and local 
officials generally are too vulnerable to local economic and political pressures favoring development to be 
given exclusive responsibility for environmental protection”). 
81 See Percival, supra note 14, at 1172; id. at 1174 (stating that “[t]e cooperative federalism model seeks to 
exploit economies of scale by establishing national environmental standards while leaving their attainment 
to state authorities subject to federal oversight”). 
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economies of scale in standard setting when the standards are nationally uniform.”82
Daniel Esty has elaborated on this rationale: 
It makes no sense to ask every state, city, or town to measure the level, size, and 
type of particulates in its air, determine their connection to respiratory failure and 
other health problems, identify the safe level of emissions, and design cost-
effective policy responses.  Data collection and quality control, fate and transport 
studies, epidemiological and ecological analyses, and risk assessments all 
represent highly technical activities in which expertise is important and scale 
economies are significant.  In addition, the core variables within these functions 
do not vary spatially, and thus diversity claims hold little sway.  Absent 
centralized functions, independent state regulators will either duplicate each 
other's analytic work or engage in time-consuming and complex negotiations to 
establish an efficient division of technical labor.  The poorer the jurisdiction, 
moreover, the more likely its regulators will lack basic technical competence.  
Likewise, the smaller the regulating entity, the more likely it is to suffer from the 
absence of scientific scale economies.  Both of these dimensions of technical 
failure are recognized as significant obstacles to good regulation in many states.83
The federal government was thus better equipped to develop the necessary expertise to 
formulate effective environmental regulatory standards as well as to implement and 
enforce those standards in an efficient manner. 
Another possible explanation for the federal government’s ability to generate 
more effective environmental legislation is the relatively greater difficulty of capturing 
the federal as compared to the state and local governments.84  Moreover, as Bill Buzbee 
has pointed out, “[s]tate and local governments, due to tax and employment goals, will be 
82 Dwyer, supra note 76, at 1220. 
83 Esty, supra note 60, at 614-15.  See also Kirsten Engel, State Environmental Standard-Setting:  Is There 
A “Race” and Is It “to the Bottom”?, 48 HASTINGS L.J. 271, 287 (1997) [cited hereinafter as Engel, Is
There A Race] (stating that Congress “saw federal involvement in environmental regulation as necessary to 
realize certain benefits for both states and regulated entities that accrue from centralized administration of 
environmental law,” including “realization of economies of scale in scientific research”).  But cf. Stewart, 
National Good, supra note 79, at 206 (contending that, even if economies of scale justify a lead federal role 
in the generation of information about the effects of pollution and resource development, they “do not 
necessarily justify centralized standards and regulations”).  Douglas Williams has responded to arguments 
such as the one Professor Stewart has made by contending that any effort to draw a distinction between 
“fact-based inquiries” such as information gathering and assessment (for which economies of scale justify 
centralized effort) and “value-based judgments” such as those involved in standard-setting (for which 
economies of scale may not exist) is problematic.  Douglas R. Williams, Cooperative Federalism and the 
Clean Air Act:  A Defense of Minimum Federal Standards, 20 ST. LOUIS U. PUB. L. REV. 67, 88 (2001).  
Professor Engel identifies a “second efficiency-related benefit of centralized regulation” — “the ability to 
lower the potential barriers to interstate trade that might otherwise be posed by non-uniform state product 
regulation.”  Engel, supra, at 288. 
84 See William W. Buzbee, Contextual Environmental Federalism, 14 N.Y.U. ENVTL. L.J. 108, 112 (2005) 
[cited hereinafter as Buzbee, Contextual Environmental Federalism] (repeating argument that “larger units 
of government are less susceptible to regulatory surrender”). 
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more growth oriented than federal policymakers.”85  In testifying before Congress, EPA’s 
first Administrator gave credence to that justification for a strong federal government 
presence in environmental law and policymaking.86
 Another justification for the adoption of federal environmental legislation was the 
inability of the states to provide effective constraints on transboundary pollution, 
pollution with interstate or international effects.87  One observer described this 
justification as follows: 
The need for the federal government to regulate interstate pollution is fairly self-
evident.  As environmentalists are fond of saying, pollution knows no boundaries, 
and it seems unlikely that upwind states would ever adequately take into account 
the concerns of downwind states.  The upwind states lack any incentive to 
cooperate with the downwind states, and the transactional costs of establishing 
interstate regulation are too high for the states, except in special cases.  The 
federal legislature, by contrast, has a national focus and is a natural forum to 
establish regulations and procedures to resolve interstate conflicts. Consequently, 
it should be better able to regulate interstate pollution.88
According to Richard Stewart, “spillover effects among the states create the strongest 
justification for federal intervention.”89
 One final justification for the enactment of federal environmental regulation is the 
perception that, in the absence of uniform national minimum environmental standards, 
the states are likely to compete with one another to attract new business by adopting 
increasingly lenient controls on activities with potentially damaging environmental 
85 Id. at 121 (quoting PAUL E. PETERSON, CITY LIMITS 69 (1981)) (arguing that state and local governments 
often wind up being “growth machines”). 
86 Specifically, EPA Administrator William Ruckelhaus testified that “[v]arying local revenue capabilities, 
economic pressures, and citizen interest have often stagnated community and State initiative.”  
Weyerhaeuser Co. v. Costle, 590 F.2d 1011, 1043 (D.C. Cir. 1978) (citing A LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE 
WATER POLLUTION CONTROL ACT AMENDMENTS OF 1972, at 156 (1973)). 
87 See Percival, supra note 14, at 1147 (stating that “[m]ost existing federal regulatory programs were not 
created until after a long history of state failures to cope with problems that became increasingly interstate 
in scope”); Esty, supra note 60, at 601 (listing interstate spillovers as one of the three main reasons 
advanced during congressional hearings in the late 1960s and 1970s for centralizing environmental 
regulation at the federal level).; Robert H. Kuehn, The Limits of Devolving Enforcement of Federal 
Environmental Laws, 70 TUL. L. REV. 2373, 2375 (1996) (finding the rationale for federal regulation to 
prevent interstate and international spillovers to have retained its validity). 
88 Dwyer, supra note 76, at 1220. 
89 Richard B. Stewart, Pyramids of Sacrifice?:  Problems of Federalism in Mandating State Implementation 
of National Environmental Law, 86 YALE L.J. 1196, 1264 (1977) [hereinafter cited as Stewart, Pyramids].  
See also William A. Butler, The “New Federalism”— Can It Really Work in Implementing Environmental 
Statutes?, 12 ENVTL. L. REP. (ENVTL. L. INST.) 15,095, 15,096 (1982) (arguing that federal statutes are 
required to resolve interstate environmental problems because “states are either unable or unwilling” to do 
so); Christopher K. Leman & Robert H. Nelson, The Rise of Managerial Federalism:  An Assessment of 
Benefits and Costs, 12 ENVTL. L. 981, 999 (1982) (claiming that “[e]environmental spillovers across state 
lines require regional, interstate, or federal action”). 
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effects.90  Thus, Professor Stewart, in a seminal 1977 article describing the various 
rationales for the adoption of a federal body of environmental law, described the problem 
this way: 
Given the mobility of industry and commerce, any individual state or community 
may rationally decline unilaterally to adopt high environmental standards that 
entail substantial costs for industry and obstacles to economic development for 
fear that the resulting environmental gains would be more than offset by the 
movement of capital to other areas with lower standards.91
The advocates of federal legislation argued that minimum federal standards could combat 
this “race to the bottom” by guaranteeing a minimum level of environmental protection to 
all Americans, regardless of their state of residence, and a minimum level of 
environmental restraints for businesses, regardless of where they decide to locate or 
relocate.92
The law reviews are filled with articles debating the validity of the race-to-the 
bottom theory.93  Whether or not the perception that, absent federal intervention, the 
states would participate in an environmentally destructive race-to-the-bottom was 
accurate at the time or remains so today, many federal legislators acted on the assumption 
that it was accurate.94  As John Dwyer reports: 
90 See, e.g., Esty, supra note 60, at 601 (identifying “interstate competitiveness effects arising from 
different environmental standards” as one of the justifications for federal environmental regulation in the 
1970s). 
91 Stewart, Pyramids, supra note 89, at 1212.  See also Engel, Is There A Race, supra note 83, at 286 
(stating that “[t]he interstate spillover rationale is the classic economic efficiency argument that federal 
intervention is necessary to prevent the environmental, social, and economic losses that accrue when air 
and water pollution originating in one state are carried by natural forces into other states” because the state 
of the pollution’s origin has little incentive to abate activities that generate economic benefits for its 
residents and environmental harms for the residents of other states). 
92 See Percival, supra note 14, at 1172 (stating that “[w]hile the ‘race-to-the-bottom’ rationale for federal 
regulation has been criticized on theoretical grounds, it is still widely believed that federal standards can 
help states resist industry pressures to relax regulatory standards”). 
93 Among those who question the validity of the race-to-the-bottom rationale for federal environmental 
regulation are Richard L. Revesz, Rehabilitating Interstate Competition:  Rethinking the “Race-to-the-
Bottom” Rationale for Federal Environmental Regulation, 67 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1210 (1992); Richard L. 
Revesz, The Race to the Bottom and Federal Environmental Regulation:  A Response to Critics, 82 MINN.
L. REV. 535 (1997).  Among those who contend that states have indeed engaged in a race-to-the-bottom , 
and would do so to an even greater extent absent federal environmental legislation are Engel, Is There A 
“Race”, supra note 83; Scott R. Saleska & Kirsten H. Engel, “Facts Are Stubborn Things:  An Empirical 
Reality Check in the Theoretical Debate Over the Race-to-the-Bottom in State Environmental Standard-
Setting, 8 CORNELL J.L & PUB. POL’Y 55 (1998); Joshua D. Sarnoff, A Reply to Professor Revesz’s 
Response in the “Race to the Bottom and Federal Environmental Legislation,” 8 DUKE ENVTL. L. & POL’Y
F. 295 (1998); Peter P. Swire, The Race to Laxity and the Race to Undesirability:  Explaining Failures in 
Competition Among Jurisdictions in Environmental Law, 14 YALE J. ON REG. 67 (1996). 
94 See, e.g., Weyerhaeuser Co. v. Costle, 590 F.2d 1011, 1043 (D.C. Cir. 1978) (stating that “Congress 
considered uniformity vital to free the states from the temptation of relaxing local limitations in order to 
woo or keep industrial facilities”).  The court quoted from a floor statement by a member of the House of 
Representatives, who asserted that “the greatest political barrier to effective pollution control is the threat 
by industrial polluters to move their factories out of any State that seriously tries to protect its 
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In floor debates and legislative reports, members of Congress repeatedly stated 
their belief that the states had failed to adopt effective air pollution programs 
because they were engaged in a “race-to-the-bottom.”  States that were eager to 
attract and keep economic development purportedly competed against each other 
by relaxing environmental regulations below some optimal level.95
 The shift in focus from state and local to federal regulation of environmentally 
damaging activities was the product of a series of arguments that federal legislators 
apparently found persuasive.  The remaining question was what the resulting federal 
environmental law would look like. 
   b. Adoption of the Cooperative Federalism Model 
 One terse definition of cooperative federalism is “shared governmental 
responsibilities for regulating private activity.”96  That is an apt description of many of 
the federal environmental statutes adopted since 1970.  In adopting the federal pollution 
control statutes, Congress has taken care to stress that it does not intend to oust the states 
from their traditional role as guardians of the public health and safety.  The CWA 
provides, for example, that “[i]t is the policy of Congress to recognize, preserve, and 
protect the primary responsibilities and rights of States to prevent, reduce, and eliminate 
pollution [and] to plan the development and use (including restoration, preservation, and 
enhancement) of land and water resources.”97  Similarly, the CAA provides “that air 
pollution prevention . . . and air pollution control at its source is the primary 
environment.”  Id. at 1043 n.46 (quoting A LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE WATER POLLUTION CONTROL 
ACT AMENDMENTS OF 1972, at 577 (1973)). 
95 Dwyer, supra note 76, at 1221-22.  See also Esty, supra note 60, at 628 (asserting that “[f]ears of a 
welfare-reducing race to the bottom represent one of the central underpinnings of federal environmental 
regulation in the United States”); Stewart, National Good, supra note 79, at 207-08 (stating that “many 
political actors, including industry and environmental representatives, apparently believe, or in any event 
assert, that environmental regulation significantly affect[s] industry decisions about investment and 
location”).  
96 1 COGGINS & GLICKSMAN, supra note 52, at § 5:3 (citing Susan Rose-Ackerman, Cooperative 
Federalism and Co-Optation, 92 YALE L.J. 1344 (1983); Corwin, supra note 15).  Cf. Adam Babich, Our 
Federalism, Our Hazardous Waste, and Our Good Fortune, 54 MD. L. REV. 1516, 1532-33 (1995) 
(describing cooperative federalism as a concept “based on federal incentives for state regulation” which 
“holds the promise of allowing states continued primacy and flexibility in their traditional realms of 
protecting health and welfare, while ensuring that protections for all citizens meet minimum federal 
standards” and which “allows states to experiment and innovate, but not to sacrifice public health and 
welfare in a bidding war to attract industry”); id. at 1534 (stating that “[t]he essence of cooperative 
federalism is that states take primary responsibility for implementing federal standards, while retaining the 
freedom to apply their own, more stringent standards”).  Babich contends that a program of cooperative 
federalism should (1) provide for state implementation, (2) set clear standards, (3) respect state autonomy, 
(4) provide mechanisms to police the exercise of state power, and (5) apply the same rules to government 
and private parties.  Id. at 1534. 
97 33 U.S.C. § 1251(b).  See also id. § 1251(g) (declaring a policy “that the authority of each State to 
allocate quantities of water within its jurisdiction shall not be superseded, abrogated, or otherwise impaired 
by” the CWA). 
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responsibility of States and local governments.”98  In the Resource Conservation and 
Recovery Act (RCRA), Congress recognized that “the collection and disposal of solid 
wastes should continue to be primarily the function of State, regional, and local 
agencies.”99
Congress has explicitly staked out a primary role for the federal government in 
some areas.  The CAA, for example, asserts “that Federal financial assistance and 
leadership is essential for the development of cooperative Federal, State, regional, and 
local programs to prevent and control air pollution.”100  The CWA declares it to be “a 
national policy that Federal financial assistance be provided to construct” municipal 
sewage treatment facilities.101  One of the stated objectives of RCRA is to “provide[ ] 
technical and financial assistance to State and local governments . . . for the 
development” of plans to promote improved solid waste management techniques.102
Indeed, federal funding “is the chief incentive for states to participate in cooperative 
federalism.”103
In other statutory provisions, Congress has identified the creation of federal-state 
partnerships as the means by which it has decided to pursue the relevant environmental 
protection goals.  One of RCRA’s stated objectives is to promote health and 
environmental protection by “establishing a viable Federal-State partnership to carry out 
the purposes of [RCRA] and insuring that [EPA] will “give a high priority to assisting 
and cooperating with States” in their efforts to administer the permit program for 
hazardous waste treatment, storage, and disposal facilities.104  The CWA commits the 
federal government to cooperation with state and local agencies “to develop 
comprehensive solutions to prevent, reduce and eliminate pollution in concert with 
98 42 U.S.C. § 7401(a)(3).  See also id. § 7407(a) (declaring it to be “the primary responsibility” of each 
state to assure air quality within the state by submitting an implementation plan to EPA). 
99 42 U.S.C. § 6901(a)(4). 
100 42 U.S.C. § 7401(a)(4). 
101 33 U.S.C. § 1251(a)(4).  Similarly, the portion of the CWA that governs sewage treatment plant grants 
and loans identifies as the purpose of those provisions “to require and assist the development and 
implementation of waste treatment plans and practices which will achieve” the statute’s water quality goals.  
Id. § 1281(a). 
102 42 U.S.C. § 6902(a)(1). 
103 Fischman, supra note 1, at 190-91 (adding that “[t]he ‘partnership’ rhetoric that is now prevalent in 
environmental law builds on a foundation of cost-sharing for state administration”).  Statutory provisions 
authorizing federal financial assistance to the states and localities is not limited to the pollution control 
laws.  One of the purposes and policies of the Occupational Safety and Health Act is to assure safe and 
healthful working conditions 
by encouraging the States to assume the fullest responsibility for the administration and 
enforcement of their occupational safety and health laws by providing grants to the States to assist 
in identifying their needs and responsibilities in the area of occupational safety and health, to 
develop plans in accordance with the provisions of this chapter, [and] to improve the 
administration and enforcement of State occupational safety and health laws. . . . 
29 U.S.C. § 651(b)(11).  The federal government’s issuance of grants to state and local governments can 
provide a means by which the federal government compensates for its lack of authority to impose directives 
on the states and localities.  “Insofar as the state can be induced to share federal values and objectives and 
act as the agent of the federal will, federal authority can be exercised over local governments by proxy.”  
DERTHICK, supra note 40, at 14-15. 
104 42 U.S.C. § 6901(a)(7). 
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programs for managing water resources.’105  Congress declared in the CAA that one of its 
primary goals was “to encourage or otherwise promote reasonable Federal, State, and 
local government actions . . . for pollution prevention.”106
The terminology of state primacy and of federal-state partnerships is misleading, 
however.  The federal pollution control statutes unquestionably put the federal 
government, acting through authority delegated to EPA, in the driver’s seat.  Under the 
federal pollution control laws, primary-standard setting authority typically has been 
retained by the federal government.  Under the CAA, Congress delegated to EPA the 
responsibility of identifying air pollutants whose emissions are anticipated to endanger 
the public health or welfare107 and the authority to promulgate national ambient air 
quality standards (NAAQS) that establish maximum permissible concentrations of these 
“criteria” pollutants in the ambient air that are requisite to protect the public health and 
welfare.108  EPA also has the power to issue nationally uniform emission standards for 
new stationary sources of air pollution,109 for stationary sources of hazardous air 
pollutants,110 and for tailpipe emissions from new motor vehicles.111  RCRA delegates to 
EPA the power to identify substances which qualify as hazardous wastes112 and to adopt 
standards to govern the activities of those who engage in the generation, transportation, 
treatment, storage, or disposal of such waste.113  Under the CWA, EPA is the agency 
responsible for promulgating technology-based standards to control discharges of 
pollution into waters of the United States by point sources.114  Similar federal standard-
setting authority also exists under statutes such as the Safe Drinking Water Act 
(SDWA)115 and the Toxic Substances Control Act.116
 Under most of these laws, Congress has carved out a significant role for the states 
either in implementing the federal standards or in supplementing federal regulatory 
initiatives.117  Under the CAA, Congress gave the states the task of adopting plans, called 
105 33 U.S.C. § 1251(g). 
106 42 U.S.C. § 7401(c). 
107 42 U.S.C. § 7408(a)(1). 
108 42 U.S.C. § 7409(b). 
109 42 U.S.C. § 7411. 
110 42 U.S.C. § 7412. 
111 42 U.S.C. § 7521. 
112 42 U.S.C. § 6921. 
113 42 U.S.C. § 6922-6924.  RCRA afford the states a much greater role in the management of non-
hazardous solid wastes.  See 42 U.S.C. §§ 6941-6949a; GLICKSMAN ET AL., supra note 62, at 816-17. 
114 33 U.S.C. § 1311(b). 
115 42 U.S.C. § 300g-1(b) (authority to adopt national primary drinking water regulations that contain 
maximum contaminant levels). 
116 15 U.S.C. § 2605.  Under the Federal Insecticide, Fungicide, and Rodenticide Act (FIFRA), EPA is 
responsible for deciding whether or not to register pesticides and to restrict their sale or use.  7 U.S.C. § 
136a. 
117 Professor Fischman identifies two “key elements” to what he calls the “narrow definition of cooperative 
federalism” used to describe the pollution control laws:  “(1) the fostering of state administrative programs, 
and (2) the delegation of tailored standard-setting.”  Fischman, supra note 1, at 190.  Professor Buzbee 
describes cooperative federalism schemes as those in which “federal laws set goals and federal authorities 
provide states with technological and scientific data and oversee state or local government implementation 
decisions.” Buzbee, supra note 10, at 25.  J.B. Ruhl has stated that cooperative federalism is reflected in the 
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state implementation plans (SIPs), to achieve the NAAQS.118  As the Supreme Court has 
recognized, Congress initially intended to afford each state the “liberty to adopt whatever 
mix of emission limitations it deems best suited to its particular situation.”119  Each state 
plan must conform to minimum federal standards,120 however, and EPA retains the 
power to disapprove incomplete or inadequate state plans (such as plans that EPA decides 
are insufficient to meet the NAAQS by the applicable statutory deadlines).121  States need 
not fulfill their SIP preparation responsibilities, but if they fail to do so, EPA has the 
authority to develop, implement, and enforce a federal plan establishing emission 
limitations for sources within the delinquent state.122
 The states’ responsibilities under the CWA are somewhat different from those 
vested in them under the CAA.  The technology-based effluent limitations issued by EPA 
are supposed to serve as the primary mechanism for achieving the statutory goal of 
fishable-swimmable waters.123  The statute also delegates to the states, however, the 
responsibility of adopting water quality standards that act as backstops in the event that 
compliance with the effluent limitations is not sufficient to provide acceptable water 
quality.124  The states must submit their water quality standards for EPA review, 
however, and EPA may disapprove any standards that it finds not to be consistent with 
applicable CWA requirements.125  Once again, the statute does not compel the states to 
do anything, but delegates to EPA the authority to adopt standards that are “necessary to 
meet the requirements” of the CWA if a state fails to do so.126
Under most of the federal pollution control statutes, states have the option of 
applying to EPA for authorization to administer the permit programs that provide the 
principal means of applying emission standards or other regulatory obligations (such as 
monitoring, recordkeeping, and reporting) to individual regulated entities.127  The 
statutes, supplemented by EPA regulations, establish minimum requirements for 
approvable state permit programs, however, and individual permits are typically subject 
to EPA veto.128  EPA may even suspend or withdraw a state’s authority to administer a 
many federal environmental statutes that provide “opportunities for states to implement national goals and 
standards through state-run programs that satisfy certain delegation criteria regarding equivalency to the 
federal regime and adequacy of enforcement, in exchange for which the federal government takes a back 
seat in the particular delegated state.”  J.B. Ruhl, Cooperative Federalism and the Endangered Species Act 
— Is There Hope for Something More?, in STRATEGIES FOR ENVIRONMENTAL SUCCESS IN AN UNCERTAIN 
JUDICIAL CLIMATE 325, 326 (Michael Allan Wolf ed., 2005).  According to Ruhl, however, the ESA is not 
among those statutes and “barely qualifies as an example of cooperative federalism at work.”  Id.
118 42 U.S.C. §§ 7407(a), 7410(a). 
119 Train v. Nat. Resources Defense Council, Inc., 421 U.S. 60, 79 (1975). 
120 42 U.S.C. § 7410(a)(2) (specifying mandatory contents of every SIP). 
121 42 U.S.C. § 7410(k). 
122 42 U.S.C. § 7410(c).  For a description of cooperative federalism under the CAA, see Arnold W. Reitze, 
Federalism and the Inspection and Maintenance Program Under the Clean Air Act, 27 PAC. L.J. 1461, 
1476-86 (1996). 
123 33 U.S.C. § 1251(a)(2). 
124 33 U.S.C. § 1313(c)(1). 
125 33 U.S.C. § 1313(c)(3). 
126 33 U.S.C. § 1313(c)(4). 
127 See, e.g., 33 U.S.C. § 1342(b) (CWA); 42 U.S.C. 6926 (RCRA); id. § 7661-7661f (CAA). 
128 33 U.S.C. § 1342(d)(2) (CWA); 42 U.S.C. § 7661d(b)-(c) (CAA). 
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permit program if the state operates the program in violation of the statute.129  EPA may 
not compel a state to administer a permit program, but states may face sanctions if they 
fail to do so, including forfeiture to EPA of the authority to issue permits to sources 
within the state.130
 The pollution control statutes divide up between the federal and state 
governments the authority to enforce statutory or regulatory obligations.  In some 
instances, states have primary enforcement authority, with EPA having the power to step 
in if the state fails to act.131  Under other statutory provisions, either level of government 
may take the initiative by commencing enforcement action,132 and under still others, only 
EPA may enforce.133
 The final component of the cooperative federalism model that is typically 
reflected in the federal pollution control statutes is an explicit reservation of authority for 
the states to adopt more stringent controls than those adopted or required by EPA.  The 
CWA, for example, provides that nothing in the statute should be interpreted to “preclude 
or deny the right of any State or political subdivision . . . to adopt or enforce” standards 
limiting pollutant discharges or requirements relating to the control or abatement of 
pollution, except that the states and localities may not adopt or enforce standards or 
requirements that are less stringent than applicable federally promulgated standards.134
Similar “savings clauses” appear in other statutes as well.135  In a relatively few 
instances, Congress has completely precluded the adoption of state standards that differ 
in any way from federal standards that apply to the same conduct.136  With these limited 
exceptions, then, the regulatory restrictions adopted by federal agencies serve as floors, 
not ceilings, on the degree of regulation to which the relevant environmentally damaging 
conduct may be subject.  Thus, under statutes such as the CAA, the CWA, and RCRA, 
“[c]onsiderable state autonomy is preserved because most federal environmental 
129 33 U.S.C. § 1342(c) (CWA); 42 U.S.C. § 6926(e) (RCRA); id. § 7661d(e) (CAA). 
130 See, e.g., Virginia v. Browner, 80 F.3d 869 (4th Cir. 1996) (discussing and upholding the validity of 
CAA sanctions for states that fail to adopt adequate permit programs). 
131 See, e.g., 33 U.S.C. § 1319(a)(1) (CWA); 42 U.S.C. §§ 300g-2, 300g-3 (SDWA); 42 U.S.C. § 
7413(a)(1) (CAA). 
132 See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 7413(b) (CAA).  Thorny issues have arisen concerning whether the federal 
government may “overfile” in the event that it is dissatisfied with a state’s enforcement action against a 
particular regulated entity.  See, e.g., United States v. Power Engineering Co., 303 F.3d 1232 (10th Cir. 
2002); Harmon Indus., Inc. v. Browner, 191 F.3d 894 (8th Cir. 1999). 
133 See, e.g., 7 U.S.C. § 136l (FIFRA); 42 U.S.C. § 7413(a)(3) (CAA).  Cf. 29 U.S.C. § 666 (Occupational 
Safety and Health Act).  For a description of the operation of federalism in the context of efforts to enforce 
the CWA, see David R. Hodas, Enforcement of Environmental Law in A Triangular Federal System:  Can 
Three Not Be A Crowd When Enforcement Authority Is Shared by the United States, the States, and Their 
Citizens?, 54 MD. L. REV. 1552 (1995). 
134 33 U.S.C. § 1370(1). 
135 See, e.g., 7 U.S.C. § 136v(a) (FIFRA); 15 U.S.C. § 2617(a)(1) (TSCA); 42 U.S.C. § 6929 (RCRA); id. § 
7416 (CAA). 
136 See, e.g., 7 U.S.C. § 136v(b) (barring states from adopting labeling or packaging requirements that are in 
addition to or different from those required under FIFRA); 42 U.S.C. §§ 7543(a), 7545(c)(4), 7573 (CAA 
provisions barring the adoption of state standards relating to control of motor vehicle emissions, 
specification of permissible fuel additives, and control of aircraft emissions). 
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standards established under this model are minimum standards with state expressly 
authorized to establish more stringent controls if they so desire.”137
 Significantly less attention has been devoted to describing the interplay between 
federal and state authority under the federal land management statutes,138 perhaps 
because the relevant statutes are more diverse in their approaches to dividing up power to 
prevent natural resource degradation than the common approach codified in many of the 
federal pollution control laws.139  The federal government obviously reserves to itself the 
primary responsibility for determining appropriate management standards for federal 
public lands such as the national parks, forests, and national wildlife refuges and the 
public lands administered by the BLM.  Rob Fischman has documented, however, the 
degree to which cooperative federalism has infused implementation of the natural 
resource management statutes through what he calls place-based collaboration,140 state 
favoritism in the federal land management process,141 and federal deference to state 
process.142
137 Percival, supra note 14, at 1175.  The Supreme Court described the cooperative federalism approach 
codified in the CWA in the following terms: 
The Clean Water Act [CWA] anticipates a partnership between the States and the Federal 
Government....  To effectuate this partnership, the CWA authorizes [EPA] to issue pollution 
discharge permits, but provides that a State may “administer” its own permit system if it complies 
with detailed statutory and regulatory requirements.  A State that seeks to “administer” a 
permitting program is required to adopt a system of civil penalties.  Federal regulations establish 
the minimum size of the penalties and mandate how, and when, they must be imposed.   
Even when a State obtains approval to administer its permitting system, the Federal Government 
maintains an extraordinary level of involvement.  EPA reviews state water quality standards.  It 
retains authority to object to the issuance of particular permits, to monitor the state program for 
continuing compliance with federal directives, and even to enforce the terms of state permits when 
the State has not instituted enforcement proceedings. 
United States Dep’t of Energy v. Ohio, 503 U.S. 607, 633-34 (1992).  
138 See Fischman, supra note 1, at 194.  Some statutes are difficult to classify as either pollution control or 
natural resource management statutes because they include components of both regimes.  For a description 
of the cooperative federalism aspects of one such statute, the Surface Mining Control and Reclamation Act 
(SMCRA), 30 U.S.C. §§ 1201-1328, see Patrick C. McGinley, From Pick to Shovel to Mountaintop 
Removal:  Environmental Injustice in the Appalachian Coalfields, 34 ENVTL. L. 21, 51-53 (2004). 
139 Dan Tarlock has argued that “[n]one of the dominant models of federalism are suited to protect 
biodiversity” and may well frustrate it because, among other things, there are no uniform standards that can 
be realistically be applied to biodiversity in different ecosystems the way that uniform federal pollution 
control standards serve as floors.  A. Dan Tarlock, Biodiversity Federalism, 54 MD. L. REV. 1315, 1318 
(1995). 
140 See Fishman, supra note 1, at 196-99.  Fischman includes in this category of cooperative federalism 
relationships the issuance of incidental take permits under the ESA pursuant to negotiations that include not 
only the affected landowner, but also state agencies.  He also describes special management regimes that 
vest decisionmaking authority in agencies, such as the Columbia River Gorge Commission, that include 
state representation. 
141 Id. at 200-03.  This set of cooperative federalism initiatives includes land use planning procedures 
pursuant to which the Forest Service and the BLM place special emphasis on the input of state and local 
governments and statutory provisions that require federal plans, such as those that govern use of the 
national wildlife refuges, that are required to conform to state wildlife conservation plans to the extent 
practicable. See id. at 200 (citing 16 U.S.C. § 668dd(e)(1)(A)(iii)). 
142 See Fischman, supra note 1, at 203-04.  Fischman’s examples include implementation of the Coastal 
Zone Management Act’s requirement that activities conducted or authorized by federal agencies be 
consistent with federally approved state management plans.  16 U.S.C. § 1456(c)(2).  They also include the 
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 Others have described the nature of the cooperative federalism regimes that 
operate under the natural resource management statutes in somewhat different terms.143
From the earliest days of the nation’s history, the states received grants of federal land for 
purposes that included enhanced public education.144  They have long shared in revenues 
received by the federal government under disposition programs for resources such as 
timber, oil and gas, and other minerals, and, under the Payment in Lieu of Taxes Act,145
they continue to receive annual payments based on the acreage owned by the federal 
government within each state.146  They act as favored consultants under some of the 
federal land management planning processes147 and may even be responsible for 
preparing environmental impact statements under NEPA under limited circumstances.148
The states have significant authority to manage wildlife resources, particularly in the 
national forests and on the BLM public lands.149
Finally, the ESA provides opportunities, albeit limited ones, for the states to 
participate in the process of protecting endangered or threatened species.150  The ESA 
mandates that the Secretary of the Interior, in implementing the statute, “cooperate to the 
maximum extent practicable with the States.151  It authorizes the Secretary to enter 
agreements with states for the administration and management of any area established for 
the conservation of listed species and to enter cooperative agreements to establish and 
CWA requirement that any applicant for a federal license or permit (such as a license from the Federal 
Energy Regulatory Commission to operate a hydroelectric facility) which may result in a discharge into 
navigable waters provide a certification from the state in which the discharge will originate that the 
discharge will comply with applicable provisions of the CWA, as well as any other “appropriate” 
requirements of state law.  33 U.S.C. § 1341(a)(1), (d). 
143 See, e.g., 1 COGGINS & GLICKSMAN, supra note 52, at §§ 5:4-5:6, 5:38 (describing statutory programs in 
which state governments act as consultants, active partners, dominant partners, and beneficiaries of federal 
revenue sharing programs). 
144 See id. at § 2:7. 
145 31 U.S.C. §§ 6901-6907. 
146 See 1 COGGINS & GLICKSMAN, supra note 52, at § 5:38. 
147 See id. at § 5:4. 
148 42 U.S.C. § 4332(2)(D) (relating to major federal actions funded under a program of grants to the 
states).
149 See 43 U.S.C. § 1732(b).  See generally 1 COGGINS & GLICKSMAN, supra note 52, at § 5:6; 3 COGGINS 
& GLICKSMAN, supra note 52, at § 18:11; Michael C. Blumm & Lucus Ritchie, The Pioneer Spirit and the 
Public Trust:  The American Rule of Capture and State Ownership of Wildlife, 35 ENVTL. L. 673 (2005) 
(discussing the continuing importance of the concept of state ownership of wildlife in trust). 
150 See generally  2 COGGINS & GLICKSMAN, supra note 52, at § 15C:8. 
151 16 U.S.C. § 1535(a).  Professor Fischman describes § 1535 as a provision that is “the centerpiece of the 
ESA’s longstanding but minor program of cooperative federalism.”  Fischman, supra note 1, at 211.  
Fischman has also asserted that “the ESA program has yet to realize the potential of cooperative 
federalism.”  Robert L. Fischman & Jaelith Hall-Rivera, A Lesson for Conservation from Pollution Control 
Law:  Cooperative Federalism for Recovery Under the Endangered Species Act, 27 COLUM. J. ENVTL. L. 
45, 79 (2002).  Compare Robert L. Fishman, Predictions and prescriptions for the Endangered Species Act,
34 ENVTL. L. 451, 463 (2004) (highlighting the emphasis on cooperative federalism in the ESA’s 
legislative history and concluding that “[c]ooperative programs are bound to play an increasingly important 
role in ESA implementation in the near future”).  J.B. Ruhl, on the other hand, has asserted that, “compared 
to other environmental laws the ESA is remarkably devoid of creative strategies for putting cooperative 
federalism in play.”  Ruhl, supra note 117, at 329.  See also id. at 333 (arguing that “the ESA comes off as 
looking fully incoherent on the topic of cooperative federalism”). 
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maintain “adequate and active” programs for such conservation.152  Like the federal 
pollution control laws, the ESA invalidates state laws or regulations which authorize 
conduct prohibited by the ESA or federal implementing regulations or prohibit conduct 
that the federal government has authorized.  It specifically reserves state authority, 
however, to adopt laws or regulations that are otherwise intended to conserve fish or 
wildlife, and to adopt laws regulating the taking of listed species that are more restrictive 
than the ESA’s provisions.153
 Congress either adopted or revised more than twenty major environmental laws 
during the 1970s.154  By the time Congress had adopted the Comprehensive 
Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act (CERCLA)155 at the end of 
the environmental decade of 1970-1980, the federal government had assumed the 
dominant role in regulating activities that harm the environment.156  It had afforded states 
substantial freedom to participate in the administration and enforcement of the federal 
regulatory programs,157 however, and to adopt and enforce more stringent controls.158
What remained to be seen was whether the courts would regard the shared 
responsibilities for protecting health and the environment established by these laws as 
consistent with the federalism provisions of the United States Constitution.159
c. Judicial Reaction to Environmental Cooperative Federalism 
The cooperative federalism mechanisms described above received a warm judicial 
reception in the early years of the modern environmental era.  The lower federal courts 
during the 1970s consistently rejected constitutional attacks on the environmental statutes 
adopted during that decade.  By the beginning of the next decade, the Supreme Court had 
152 16 U.S.C. § 1535(b)-(c).  The ESA authorizes the Secretary to provide financial assistance to the states 
that are parties to such cooperative agreements.  Id. § 1535(d). 
153 16 U.S.C. § 1535(f).  See, e.g., State v. Billie, 497 So.2d 889, 893-94 (Fla. App. 1986); Moffat County 
Rd. Dep’t, 158 IBLA 221, 231 (2003). 
154 Percival, supra note 14, at 1160. 
155 42 U.S.C. §§ 9601-9675. 
156 Cf. Jonathan H. Adler, The Green Aspects of Printz:  The Revival of Federalism and Its Implications for 
Environmental Law, 6 GEO. MASON L. REV. 573, 625 (1998) (asserting that “[t]he conventional 
presumption is that the federal government has the primary responsibility for environmental protection,” 
and that the presumption “needs to be reconsidered”). 
157 In at least one statute, the CAA, Congress over time significantly scaled back the scope of state freedom 
to determine the appropriate mix of emission controls necessary to meet federally specified environmental 
objectives due to the states’ persistent past failures to achieve those objectives.  See, e.g., GLICKSMAN ET 
AL., supra note 62, at 333-35, 388-89, 420-21; Williams, supra note 83, at 88 (stating that in the 1990 
amendments to the CAA, “[t]he obligations of states containing ozone nonattainment areas were spelled out 
in extraordinary detail in the statute”). 
158 See Percival, supra note 14, at 1146 (stating that “[t]he federal government now plays the dominant role 
in environmental protection policy in the United States”).  According to Professor Stewart, the federal 
pollution control statutes “generally allow states to adopt more stringent standards and requirements, and 
often accord the states a substantial — albeit subsidiary and federally supervised — role in implementation 
and enforcement.”  Stewart, National Good, supra note 79, at 200. 
159 For one assessment of the constitutional validity of various forms of cooperative federalism, see Joshua 
D. Sarnoff, Cooperative Federalism, the Delegation of Federal Power, and the Constitution, 39 ARIZ. L. 
REV. 205 (1997). 
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not only supported those decisions, but had provided an “explicit endorsement” 160 of 
cooperative federalism in the context of environmental law. 
The Court’s first opportunity to address the consistency of the cooperative 
federalism model with the Constitution in the context of environmental law was in 1981, 
when it decided Hodel v. Virginia Surface Mining and Reclamation Association.161  In 
that case, an association of coal producers engaged in surface coal mining in Virginia 
brought suit against the Secretary of the Interior, alleging that certain regulatory 
provisions of the Surface Mining Control and Reclamation Act (SMCRA)162 violated a 
host of constitutional provisions, including the Commerce Clause, the Tenth Amendment, 
and the Takings Clause.  SMCRA follows the typical pattern of environmental statutes 
adopted during the 1970s in the cooperative federalism mode.  It authorizes the Secretary 
of the Interior to establish performance standards for surface coal mining.  States may 
request approval from the Secretary to administer their own programs, but the federal 
program continues to apply in all states without programs approved by the Secretary.  
States with approved programs share enforcement authority with the Interior 
Department.163
The coal companies argued that SMCRA’s principal goal is regulating the use of 
private lands within a single state rather than the interstate effects of coal mining, and 
urged the Court to decide whether land as such can be regulated under the Commerce 
Clause.164  The Court, in an opinion joined by all of the Justices except Justice Rehnquist 
(who concurred in the judgment) stressed initially that the task of a court asked to decide 
whether a federal statute is supported by the Commerce Clause “is relatively narrow,” 
and that it “must defer to a congressional finding that a regulated activity affects 
interstate commerce, if there is any rational basis for such a finding.”165  Moreover, 
judicial review of Commerce Clause challenges “is influenced by the fact that the 
Commerce Clause is a grant of plenary authority to Congress.”166  The Court upheld the 
district court’s decision to defer to Congress’s explicit findings that surface coal mining 
adversely affects interstate commerce, and that “inadequacies in existing state laws and 
the need for uniform minimum nationwide standards made the federal regulations 
imperative.”167  The coal producers urged the Court to abandon the rational basis test to 
assess the constitutionality of the regulation of land use, a local act that does not affect 
interstate commerce.  Citing Wickard v. Filburn,168 however, the Court declined the 
invitation, holding that Congress had rationally determined that regulation of intrastate 
surface coal mining is necessary to protect interstate commerce from the resulting 
adverse effects.169  In doing so, it endorsed Congress’s effort to establish uniform 
160 Adler, supra note 156, at 580.  
161 452 U.S. 264 (1981). 
162 30 U.S.C. §§ 1201-1328. 
163 Hodel, 452 U.S. at 268-72. 
164 Id. at 275-76. 
165 Id. at 276. 
166 Id.
167 Id. at 280. 
168 317 U.S. 111 (1942). 
169 Hodel, 452 U.S. at 281. 
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national standards to prevent destructive interstate competition among the states to attract 
coal mining as a “traditional role for congressional action under the Commerce 
Clause.”170
The Court in Hodel did more than just put its stamp of approval on the challenged 
provisions of SMCRA, however.  It also endorsed a series of lower court decisions that, 
as the Court interpreted them, had “uniformly found the power conferred by the 
Commerce Clause broad enough to permit congressional regulation of activities causing 
air or water pollution, or other environmental hazards that may have effects in more than 
one State.”171  In one sweeping motion, therefore, the Court signaled the futility of 
attacking as an illegitimate exercise of the authority to regulate interstate commerce the 
exercise of federal regulatory power under the cooperative-federalism based 
environmental statutes adopted during the preceding decade.  The Court pointedly 
refused to distinguish SMCRA from statutes that regulate air and water pollution, 
170 Id. at 281-82. 
171 By way of example, the Court cited the following cases:  United States v. Byrd, 609 F.2d 1204, 1209-
1210 (7th Cir.1979) (upholding the constitutional validity of the CWA’s dredge and fill permit program); 
Bethlehem Steel Corp. v. Train, 544 F.2d 657, 663 (3d Cir.1976) (finding that “the federal government's 
power over interstate commerce is sufficiently broad to encompass this effort to confront the pressing 
problem of improving the quality of our nation's waters”); Sierra Club v. EPA, 540 F.2d 1114, 1139 (D.C. 
Cir. 1976) (finding the challenges to the constitutionality of the nondeterioration regulations promulgated 
by EPA under the CAA to be “insubstantial” because “[r]egulation of air pollution clearly is within the 
power of the federal government under the commerce clause,” and rejecting takings challenge because the 
“limitation is not so extreme as to represent an appropriation of the land”); District of Columbia v. Train, 
521 F.2d 971, 988 (D.C. Cir. 1975) (upholding constitutionality of the use of transportation controls under 
the CAA, and finding specifically that “the federal government thus clearly has the power to direct owners 
of motor vehicles to install emission control devices and maintain them in proper adjustment”), vacated 
and remanded on other grounds sub nom. EPA v. Brown, 431 U.S. 99 (1977); United States v. Ashland Oil 
& Transportation Co., 504 F.2d 1317, 1325 (6th Cir. 1974) (endorsing “the wider concept that water 
pollution is subject to Congressional restraint [under the Commerce Clause] because it affects commerce in 
innumerable ways and because it affects the health and welfare of the nation”; concluding that, in enacting 
the CWA, Congress “intended to exercise its full constitutional powers, and we are required to give effect 
to that intention”; and noting that the “generous construction of water pollution laws required by the 
Supreme Court is amply demonstrated in many cases”); Pennsylvania v. EPA, 500 F.2d 246, 259 (3d Cir. 
1974) (refusing to find that federal enforcement of CAA SIP imposing transportation controls “conflicts 
with the proper functioning of the system of federalism embodied in our Constitution” and concluding 
instead that, when Congress “created an interlocking governmental structure in which the Federal 
Government and the states would cooperate to reach the primary goal of the [CAA] — the attainment of 
national ambient air quality standards,” such that “state and local governments retain responsibility for the 
basic design and implementation of air pollution strategies, subject to approval and, if necessary, 
enforcement by EPA,” it used an “approach that represents a valid adaptation of federalist principles to the 
need for increased federal involvement”); S. Terminal Corp. v. EPA, 504 F.2d 646, 677 (1st Cir. 1974) 
(upholding imposition of transportation controls under the CAA because “[m]otor vehicles are indisputably 
in commerce, and “[e]ven though any individual motor vehicle may travel exclusively within one state, 
commerce by motor vehicle sufficiently touches multi-state concerns as to be federally regulable,” and 
concluding that EPA regulations did not usurp state police powers); United States v. Bishop Processing 
Co., 287 F. Supp. 624 (D. Md. 1968) (finding, in rejecting attack on pre-1970 federal air pollution 
legislation, that “[t]he movement of pollutants across a state line . . .  constitutes interstate commerce 
subject to the power granted to Congress by the Constitution to regulate such commerce”), aff'd, 423 F.2d 
469 (4th Cir. 1970). 
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because it found the coal producers’ argument that land use is less susceptible to 
regulation under the Commerce Clause to be without foundation.172
The Court found the coal producers’ Tenth Amendment attacks on SMCRA to be 
no more persuasive.  The plaintiffs argued that the statutory provisions prescribing 
performance standards for surface mining on steep slopes173 impermissibly interfered 
with the traditional state and local power to regulate land use.  The Court disagreed.  
First, the steep slope regulations applied only to private coal mining operations.  Second, 
the statute did not compel the states to enforce the standards, to expend any state funds, 
or to participate in the federal regulatory program in any way.  The federal government 
would take on the burden of implementing and enforcing the regulatory program in any 
state that chose not to adopt its own conforming program.  As a result, “there can be no 
suggestion that the Act commandeers the legislative processes of the States by directly 
compelling them to enact and enforce a federal regulatory program.”174  The Court added 
that “[t]he most that can be said is that [SMCRA] establishes a program of cooperative 
federalism that allows the States, within limits established by minimum federal standards, 
to enact and administer their own regulatory programs, structured to meet their own 
regulatory needs.”175  The Court likened SMCRA in that respect to other federal statutes 
that had survived Tenth Amendment challenges in the lower courts, again citing cases 
rejecting constitutional attacks on the CAA and the CWA.176  The coal producers in 
effect urged the Court to conclude that “the Tenth Amendment limits congressional 
power to pre-empt or displace state regulation of private activities affecting interstate 
commerce,” but the Court refused to do so.177  The Court instead adhered to the well 
established principle that Congress does not invade powers reserved to the states under 
the Tenth Amendment “simply because it exercises its authority under the Commerce 
Clause in a manner that displaces the States’ exercise of their police powers.”178
The SMCRA case was not the only context in which the Supreme Court endorsed 
Congress’s reliance on cooperative federalism as a means of inducing states to contribute 
to the achievement of federal statutory objectives.  In a case decided a year after Hodel,
the court rejected a federalism-based facial attack on the constitutionality of the Public 
172 Hodel, 452 U.S. at 182-83. 
173 30 U.S.C. § 1265(d)-(e). 
174 Hodel, 452 U.S. at 288. 
175 Id. at 289. 
176 Id. (citing Friends of the Earth v. Carey, 552 F.2d 25, 36-39 (2d Cir. 1977) (upholding the CAA); Sierra 
Club v. EPA, 540 F.2d 1114, 1140 (D.C. Cir. 1976) (upholding the CAA)). 
177 Id. at 289-90.  The Court added that “Congress could constitutionally have enacted a statute prohibiting 
any state regulation of surface coal mining” and that it did not understand why SMCRA should be more 
susceptible to constitutional challenge “simply because Congress allowed the States a regulatory role.”  Id.
at 290. 
178 Id. at 291.  The Court also rejected the coal producers’ takings claims on the ground that they were not 
ripe for review.  Id. at 293-97.  In a companion case to Hodel decided on the same day, the Court held that 
the provisions of SMCRA that aimed to protect prime farmland violated neither the Commerce Clause nor 
the Tenth Amendment.  Hodel v. Indiana, 452 U.S. 314 (1981).  Justice Rehnquist, who concurred in the 
judgment, was again the only Justice who did not join the opinion. 
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Utilities Regulatory Policy Act (PURPA).179  Quoting Hodel, the Court found that, like 
SMCRA, PURPA merely “establishe[d] a program of cooperative federalism that allows 
the States, within limits established by federal minimum standards, to enact and 
administer their own regulatory programs, structured to meet their own particular 
needs.”180  Previously, the Court had invoked with apparent approval the terminology of 
“cooperative federalism” in a natural resource management context.  In California v. 
United States,181 the Court interpreted expansively a savings clause in the Reclamation 
Act of 1902 that denied any intention to interfere with state laws “relating to the control, 
appropriation, use, or distribution of water used in irrigation,” and required the Secretary 
of the Interior, in carrying out the Act, to proceed “in conformity with” those state 
laws.182  In particular, the Court held that the state could impose conditions on the 
operation of federal reclamation projects to conserve water, as long as those conditions 
did not conflict with specific congressional directives.183
Thus, in the years following the adoption of the environmental legislation of the 
1970s, the Supreme Court, following the lead of earlier decisions by the lower federal 
courts, respected the congressional policy judgments reflected in the cooperative 
federalism enterprise that Congress constructed to protect public health and the 
environment.184  The courts rejected broad-based constitutional attacks on the federal 
environmental statutes, and they often interpreted the intended sweep of those statutes 
broadly.  Moreover, praise for the cooperative federalism model for achieving 
environmental protection goals was not confined to the courts. Though attacked in some 
quarters as a cumbersome and inefficient approach to achieving environmental quality 
goals, 185 the cooperative federalism mechanisms that Congress built into many of the 
179 FERC v. Mississippi, 456 U.S. 742 (1982).  The challenged provisions directed state public utility 
agencies and nonregulated utilities to “consider” the adoption and implementation of rate design and 
regulatory standards, and required the agencies to comply with certain procedures when acting on proposed 
federal standards.  The statute also sought to encourage the development of cogeneration by directing the 
Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC) to issue regulations to carry out this goal, which the states 
would then be required to implement.  The Court held that these provisions violated neither the Commerce 
Clause nor the Tenth Amendment. 
180 Id. at 767. 
181 438 U.S. 645, 650 (1978) (referring to cooperative federalism). 
182 43 U.S.C. §§ 373, 382. 
183 California, 438 U.S. at ___. 
184 One court described the CAA as the result of Congress having “embarked upon a bold experiment in 
cooperative federalism designed to protect the nation against the grave threat of air pollution.”  Connecticut 
v. EPA, 696 F.2d 147, 151 (2d Cir. 1982).  See also Sweat v. Hull, 200 F. Supp. 2d 1162, 1178 (D. Ariz. 
2001).  More recently, Justice Breyer asserted that “Congress often can better reflect state concerns for 
autonomy in the details of sophisticated statutory schemes than can the Judiciary, which cannot easily 
gather the relevant facts and which must apply more general legal rules and categories,” in resolving 
federalism-based attacks on the constitutionality of federal legislation.  United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 
598, 661 (2000) (Breyer, J., dissenting).  He specifically cited the CAA and the CWA as examples of that 
kind of cooperative federalism. 
185 See Esty, supra note 60, at 605 (stating that, “[f]rom nearly the day that the ink was dry on [Richard 
Stewart’s arguments in his 1977 article, Pyramids, supra note 89]  justifying federal environmental 
regulation, the tides of political thinking and legal scholarship have run the other way”); Stewart, National 
Good, supra note 79, at 213 (arguing that “[t]he existing system of centralized command-and-control 
regulation and liability . . . displays many grievous flaws”); Tarlock, supra note 139, at 1321 (arguing that 
“[c]ooperative federalism has proved better in theory than in practice”); Williams, supra note 83, at 112 
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federal pollution control laws beginning in 1970 were defended by some commentators 
on both practical grounds186 and on the basis of normative political theory.187  More 
recently, both the judiciary and the political branches of government have taken actions 
that have severely undercut the ability of the cooperative environmental federalism model 
to achieve to achieve the nation’s environmental quality goals. 
C. Summary
After the Supreme Court’s decision in Hodel, the validity of the cooperative 
federalism model reflected in many of the federal environmental statutes was firmly 
entrenched.  A decade into the modern era of environmental law, the federal government 
and the states seemed primed to continue to make progress toward the goal of protecting 
the public health, the environment, and the nation’s natural resource base.  The 
momentum that federal agencies and the states had made toward achieving that goal 
would soon be slowed, however.  In the next couple of decades, a series of decisions by 
all three branches of the federal government would raise significant questions about the 
scope of federal power to protect the environment, as well as about the willingness of the 
federal government to exercise the power that it has. 
III. THE CONTRACTION OF FEDERAL POWER
 The operative principle of cooperative federalism is that the federal government 
establishes a policy — such as protection of public health and the environment and 
sustainable natural resource use — and then enlists the aid of the states, through a 
combination of carrots (such as financial aid) and sticks (such as the imposition of 
constraints on private conduct through federal regulation), in pursuing that policy.  The 
result is a system in which both levels of government work together to achieve a common 
(describing claims by supporters of devolution of environmental policymaking authority to state and local 
governments that such an approach will result in a more flexible and efficient system).  Edward Rubin 
claims that cooperative federalism may frustrate accountability because it “tends to obscure any separation 
between state and federal authority, thus demanding even more spectacular levels of sophistication from 
voters if they are to hold state officials accountable within their area of sole authority.”  Edward Rubin, The
Myth of Accountability and the Anti-Administrative Impulse, 103 MICH. L. REV. 2073, 2088 (2005). 
186 See, e.g., Percival, supra note 14, at 1178 (contending that “effective environmental protection policy 
requires some form of cooperative federalism in which federal and state authorities work together to 
achieve national goals” because, among other things, “the federal government simply does not have the 
capacity to regulate effectively without the cooperation of state and local governments”); Williams, supra
note 83, at 118 (arguing that minimum federal standards backed by sanctions for states that fail to achieve 
them can provide important incentives for technological innovation); Babich, supra note 96, at 1518 
(arguing that, despite some failures of cooperative federalism in the hazardous waste field, “the doctrine 
earns its keep by providing a potentially effective structure for enforcing hazardous-waste laws against 
government-owned or operated facilities”). 
187 See, e.g., Percival, supra note 14, at 1179 (arguing that “the focus should be on what works best in 
promoting national interests in environmental protection in a manner that is sensitive to state sovereignty”); 
Kendall, supra note 76, at 10446 (arguing that “[t]he most important neutral value advanced by a federal 
system of government stems from federalism’s ability to allow regional variation and thereby improve 
citizen satisfaction with political outcomes”); Williams, supra note 83, at 97 (arguing that “treating air 
quality as a national good, subject to minimum federal standards[,] is a normatively more attractive 
approach that treating air quality as merely a ‘local’ good”). 
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goal.  Although the goal originated with the federal government, a cooperative federalism 
program affords considerable discretion to the states to decide how to achieve the goal, 
thereby minimizing the extent to which pursuit of the federal goal infringes on state 
sovereignty.  If the process works well, the synergism of related federal and state 
programs will yield more effective results than either level of government would have 
been capable of achieving by itself.188
 Both the pollution control and natural resource management statutes that 
Congress adopted during the 1970s rely heavily on cooperative federalism to achieve the 
environmental policy goals enunciated by Congress.  In the last fifteen years or so, 
however, cooperative federalism in environmental law has been turned on its head.  
Instead of serving as a means of empowering both the federal and state governments to 
pursue environmental protection initiatives, environmental law has to a considerable 
extent become a constraint on the capacity of either level of government to take effective 
steps to protect the environment.  This part examines the contraction of federal power to 
protect the environment that has resulted from a combination of judicial, legislative, and 
executive branch decisions.  The next part explores the fate of efforts by state and local 
governments to respond to this reduction in federal power by pursuing their own, 
innovative environmental protection initiatives. 
 A. Judicial Developments that Reduce Federal Power
 The “new federalism” decisions of the Rehnquist Supreme Court have resulted in 
a narrowing of federal regulatory power.189  The primary instruments of the Court’s new 
federalism agenda have been the Commerce Clause and the Tenth and Eleventh 
Amendments.  All three provisions have provided ammunition for litigants in recent 
years to attack the validity of federal pollution control and natural resource management 
legislation.
  1. The Commerce Clause
Most federal environmental legislation is rooted in Congress’s authority to 
regulate interstate commerce.190  For most of the final three-quarters of the twentieth 
century, the Supreme Court interpreted the scope of Congress’s authority under the 
188 See, e.g., DERTHICK, supra note 40, at 206 (arguing that “[w]hen federal and state agencies work 
together, each reinforces the influence of the other, the state agency gaining as a result of the federal 
partnership, the federal agency being compensated for deficiencies in its ability to exercise influence 
directly in state affairs”). 
189 See generally Stephen R. McAllister & Robert L. Glicksman, Federal Environmental Law in the “New” 
Federalism Era, 30 ENVTL. L. REP. (ENVTL. L. INST.) 11122 (2000) [cited hereinafter as McAllister & 
Glicksman, “New” Federalism Era]; Stephen R. McAllister & Robert L. Glicksman, State Liability for 
Environmental Violations:  The U.S. Supreme Court’s “New” Federalism, 29 ENVTL. L. REP. (ENVTL. L. 
INST.) 10665 (1999) [cited hereinafter as McAllister & Glicksman, State Liability]. 
190 U.S. CONST., art. I, § 8, cl. 3.  Some legislation is premised on the Treaty Clause.  See, e.g., Missouri v. 
Holland, 252 U.S. 416 (1920) (upholding the Migratory Bird Treaty Act of 1918).  Legislation governing 
the management and use of the federal lands and resources is based largely on the Property Clause, U.S. 
CONST. art. IV, § 3, cl. 2.  See generally 1 COGGINS & GLICKSMAN, supra note 52, at §§ 3:13-3:14. 
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Commerce Clause expansively.  In 1995, however, in United States v. Lopez,191 the 
Court, for the first time in decades,192 struck down a federal statute on the ground that it 
exceeded Congress’s authority under the Commerce Clause.  Several years later, the 
Court invalidated another statute on the same ground in United States v. Morrison.193
Although neither of these decisions involved an environmental statute, they spurred a 
renewed series of constitutional attacks on federal environmental legislation. 
Thus far, the courts have shunted aside frontal assaults on both the federal 
pollution control194 and natural resource management195 statutes and regulations issued 
under those statutes as beyond the scope of Congress’s authority to regulate interstate 
commerce.  Some of the cases have been close, however.  Several courts have refused to 
find that the ESA violates the Commerce Clause,196 even as applied to activities alleged 
to result in a taking of a species found solely within one state197 or to activities conducted 
on privately owned land.198  In all four Court of Appeals decisions upholding the ESA, 
however, at least one judge dissented,199 and even the judges who voted to sustain the 
Act could not agree on a uniform rationale for doing so.  The susceptibility of the ESA, 
and particularly of the application of the takings prohibition200 to intrastate activities, to 
attack under the Commerce Clause is thus not yet completely free from doubt.201
191 514 U.S. 549 (1995) (invalidating the Gun-Free School Zones Act). 
192 See 1 COGGINS & GLICKSMAN, supra note 52, at § 3:16. 
193 529 U.S. 598 (2000) (invalidating the Violence Against Women Act). 
194 See, e.g., Nebraska v. EPA, 331 F.3d 995 (D.C. Cir. 2003) (rejecting facial attack on the SDWA rooted 
in the Commerce Clause); United States v. Ho, 311 F.3d 589 (5th Cir. 2002) (rejecting as applied attack on 
work practice standards adopted under CAA to limit emission of hazardous air pollutants); Allied Local & 
Reg’l Mfrs. Caucus, 215 F.3d 61 (D.C. Cir. 2000) (rejecting constitutional attack on EPA regulations 
issued under the CAA that limited content of ozone-producing chemicals in architectural coatings); United 
States v. Olin Corp. 107 F.3d 1506 (11th Cir. 1997) (overturning district court decision holding that 
application of CERCLA to intrastate hazardous substance disposal violated the Commerce Clause); Nova 
Chem. v. GAF Corp., 945 F. Supp. 1098 (D. Tenn. 1996) (rejecting contention that application of 
CERCLA to  contamination that was a byproduct of latex manufacturing and chemical compounding 
violated the Commerce Clause); United States v. NL Indus., Inc., 936 F. Supp. 545 (D. Ill. 1996) (relying 
on Hodel to reject Commerce Clause attack on CERCLA) .  See also Bolin v. Cessna Aircraft Co., 759 F. 
Supp. 692, 706-09 (D. Kan. 1991) (rejecting Commerce Clause attack on provision of CERCLA 
establishing statute of limitations for state personal injury actions related to exposure to hazardous 
substances). 
195 See, e.g., United States v. Bramble, 103 F.3d 1475 (9th Cir. 1996) (rejecting claim that the Eagle 
Protection Act violates the Commerce Clause); United States v. Lundquist, 932 F. Supp. 1237 (D. Or. 
1996) (holding that the Bald and Golden Eagle Protection Act does not violate the Commerce Clause); 
United States v. Romano, 929 F. Supp. 502 (D. Mass. 1997) (same with respect to the Lacey Act). 
196 Rancho Viejo, LLC v. Norton, 323 F.3d 1062 (D.C. Cir.), rehearing en banc denied, 334 F.3d 1158 
(D.C. Cir. 2003). 
197 Nat’l Ass’n of Home Builders v. Babbitt, 130 F.3d 1041, 1049 (D.C. Cir. 1997). 
198 GDF Realty Investments, Ltd. v. Norton, 326 F.3d 622 (5th Cir. 2003), rehearing and rehearing en banc 
denied, 362 F.3d 286 (5th Cir. 2004); Gibbs v. Babbitt, 214 F.3d 483 (4th Cir. 2000). 
199 See, e.g., GDF Realty, 362 F.3d at 286-93 (Jones, J., dissenting from denial of rehearing en banc); 
Rancho Viejo, 334 F.3d at 1059 (Roberts, J., dissenting from denial of rehearing en banc); Gibbs v. Babbitt, 
214 F.3d at 506-10 (Luttig, J., dissenting); Nat’l Ass’n of Home Builders v. Babbitt, 130 F.3d at 1060-66 
(Sentelle, J., dissenting). 
200 16 U.S.C. § 1538(a)(1)(B). 
201 But cf. Michael C. Blumm & George Kimbrell, Flies, Spiders, Toads, Wolves and the Constitutionality 
of the Endangered Species Act’s Take Provision, 34 ENVTL. L. 309 (2004) (predicting that the Supreme 
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Of more immediate consequence is the impact of Lopez and Morrison on judicial 
interpretation of the scope of some of the federal environmental legislation.  The most 
important example involves a series of attacks on the application of the CWA’s dredge 
and fill permit program202 to water bodies and wetlands that are not traditionally 
navigable.  Even before the Supreme Court’s decision in Lopez, the Seventh Circuit 
invalidated as beyond the scope of the Commerce Clause an EPA regulation applying the 
dredge and fill permit program to isolated wetlands, although that the court later reversed 
itself in that same case.203  In 2001, the year after it decided Morrison, the Supreme Court 
addressed a challenge to the constitutionality of the dredge and fill permit program in the 
Solid Waste Agency for Northern Cook County (SWANCC) case.204  The case involved an 
attempt by the Army Corps of Engineers to require a dredge and fill permit for an 
abandoned sand and gravel pit containing both permanent and seasonal ponds that 
provided habitat for migratory birds.  The consortium of local governments that owned 
the regulated property argued that the application of the dredge and fill permit program to 
their land exceeded the scope of federal regulatory power under the Commerce Clause 
and that, even if it did not, Congress did not intend that the program reach nonnavigable, 
isolated, intrastate waters simply because they provide habitat for migratory birds.  The 
Court found it unnecessary to reach the constitutional question because it held, 5-4, that 
Congress did not intend to allow the Corps to apply the dredge and fill permit program to 
the land in question.205
To reach that result, the Court had to distinguish a 1985 decision in which it had 
upheld a Corps of Engineers regulation interpreting the dredge and fill permit program to 
apply to wetlands adjacent to navigable waters and their tributaries.  The Court in United
States v. Riverside Bayview Homes, Inc.206 found the statutory interpretation question 
posed in that case to be “an easy one.”207  Characterizing the CWA as a “comprehensive 
legislative attempt” to maintain and protect water quality, it concluded that “Congress 
chose to define the waters covered by the Act broadly.”208  In particular, the Court 
reasoned that, in defining the “navigable waters”209 to which the dredge and fill permit 
Court will uphold the statute).  See also John Copeland Nagle, The Commerce Clause Meets the Delhi 
Sands Flower-Loving Fly, 97 MICH. L. REV. 174 (1998). 
202 33 U.S.C. § 1344. 
203 Hoffman Homes, Inc. v. EPA, 961 F.2d 1310 (7th Cir.), vacated and rehearing granted, 954 F.2d 1554 
(7th Cir. 1992), on rehearing, 999 F.2d 256 (7th Cir. 1993).  See also Leslie Salt Co. v. United States, 55 
F.3d 1388, 1396 (9th Cir. 1995) (concluding that, although regulation of isolated wetlands used as migratory 
bird habitat “tests the limits of Congress’s commerce powers,” it does not exceed them). 
204 Solid Waste Agency of N. Cook County v. United States Army Corps of Eng’rs, 531 U.S. 159 (2001) 
(SWANCC).
205 Id. at 162. 
206 474 U.S. 121 (1985). 
207 Id. at 129. 
208 Id. at 132-33. 
209 The CWA defines “navigable waters” in relevant part as “the waters of the United States.”  33 U.S.C. § 
1362(7). 
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program applies,210 “Congress evidently intended to repudiate limits that had been placed 
on federal regulation by earlier water pollution control statutes and to exercise its powers 
under the Commerce Clause to regulate at least some waters that would not be deemed 
‘navigable’ under the classical understanding of that term.”211  The Court found it 
reasonable for the Corps to conclude that wetlands adjacent to navigable waters generally 
play an important role in protecting and enhancing water quality.212  In short, the Court 
held that “the language, policies, and history of the [CWA] compel a finding that the 
Corps has acted reasonably in interpreting the Act to require permits for the discharge of 
fill material into wetlands adjacent to the ‘waters of the United States.’”213
The Court in SWANCC found that “[i]t was the significant nexus between the 
wetlands and ‘navigable waters’ that informed our reading of the CWA in Riverside 
Bayview Homes,” and that the Court had left open the question of whether the permit 
program extended to wetlands that are not adjacent to traditionally navigable waters.214
The Court held in SWANCC that the statute does not extend to ponds that are not adjacent 
to open water,215 and declined in particular to take what the Corps regarded “as the next 
ineluctable step after Riverside Bayview Homes:  holding that isolated ponds, some only 
seasonal, wholly located within two Illinois counties, fall under § 404(a)'s definition of 
‘navigable waters’ because they serve as habitat for migratory birds.”216  Responding to 
the Corps’ plea that the Court defer to its interpretation of the statute, the Court invoked 
the principle that “[w]here an administrative interpretation of a statute invokes the outer 
limits of Congress’ power, we expect a clear indication that Congress intended that 
result.”217  The Court explained that: 
This requirement stems from our prudential desire not to needlessly reach 
constitutional issues and our assumption that Congress does not casually authorize 
administrative agencies to interpret a statute to push the limit of congressional 
authority.  This concern is heightened where the administrative interpretation 
alters the federal-state framework by permitting federal encroachment upon a 
traditional state power.218
210 The term “navigable waters” also defines the scope of the CWA’s National Pollutant Discharge 
Elimination System permit program, which applies to point sources discharging pollutants into navigable 
waters.  33 U.S.C. §§ 1311(a), 1342(a). 
211 Riverside Bayview Homes, 474 U.S. at 133.  In particular, the Court stated that “the evident breadth of 
congressional concern for protection of water quality and aquatic ecosystems suggests that it is reasonable 
for the Corps to interpret the term ‘waters’ to encompass wetlands adjacent to waters as more 
conventionally defined.”  Id.
212 Id. See also id. at 134 (concluding that, “[i]n view of the breadth of federal regulatory authority 
contemplated by the Act itself and the inherent difficulties of defining precise bounds to regulable waters, 
the Corps' ecological judgment about the relationship between waters and their adjacent wetlands provides 
an adequate basis for a legal judgment that adjacent wetlands may be defined as waters under the Act”). 
213 Id. at 139. 
214 SWANCC, 531 U.S. at 167. 
215 Id.
216 Id. at 171. 
217 Id. at 172. 
218 Id. at 172-73. 
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The Corps claimed that its rule applying the permit program to isolated waters that serve 
as habitat for migratory birds was a valid exercise of Congress’s power to regulate 
intrastate activities that “substantially affect” interstate commerce, particularly given the 
“national interest” in preserving migratory birds.  But the Court found that the Corps’ 
argument “raise[d[ significant constitutional questions,” and decided, in the absence of a 
clear statement of congressional intent to cover the affected waters, to read the statute 
narrowly “to avoid the significant constitutional and federalism questions raised by [the 
Corps’] interpretation.”219
 The decision in SWANCC prompted a slew of lawsuits in which property owners 
challenged the applicability of the dredge and fill permit program to their land on both 
constitutional and statutory grounds.  Most of the lower courts addressing those attacks 
have interpreted SWANCC narrowly as precluding only the application of the dredge and 
fill permit program to nonnavigable, isolated, intrastate waters solely on the basis of the 
presence of migratory bird habitat.220  In rejecting both the constitutional221 and 
statutory222 arguments raised in these cases, some courts have concluded that SWANCC
did not overrule Riverside Bayview Homes.223  Other courts, however, have read 
SWANCC as signaling a significant shift in the Supreme Court’s approach to the scope of 
the CWA that “call[s] into question the continuing validity of CWA jurisdiction over 
waters which are not either actually navigable or directly adjacent to navigable 
waters.”224  The Fifth Circuit, in particular, has interpreted SWANCC as having imposed 
significant new limits on the scope of CWA jurisdiction and has relied on SWANCC to 
interpret narrowly the scope of the Oil Pollution Act,225 whose jurisdictional scope also 
turns on the meaning of the term “navigable waters.”226  The parameters of SWANCC’s
constriction on Congress’s power to protect water quality in waters and wetlands that are 
not traditionally navigable will have to await further Supreme Court explanation.227
  2. The Tenth Amendment
219 Id. at 174.  The Supreme Court has not always relied on federalism concerns as a justification for 
interpreting narrowly the scope of federal authority under environmental legislation.  See, e.g., Alaska 
Dep’t of Envtl. Conservation v. EPA, 124 S. Ct. 983 (2004) (holding that EPA has the authority under the 
CAA to veto a state-issued permit on the ground that the permit failed to impose emission limitations based 
on the best available control technology). 
220 See, e.g., North Carolina Shellfish Growers Ass’n v. Holly Ridge Assocs., 278 F. Supp. 2d 654, 674 
(E.D.N.C. 2003). 
221 See, e.g., United States v. Gerke Excavating, Inc., 412 F.3d 804, 808 (7th Cir. 2005); United States v. 
Deaton, 332 F.3d 698 (4th Cir. 2003). 
222 See, e.g., United States v. Hubenka, 438 F.3d 1026 (10th Cir. 2006); Treacy v. Newdunn Assocs., LLP, 
344 F.3d 407 (4th Cir. 2003). 
223 See, e.g., United States v. Johnson, 437 F.3d 157, 168 (1st Cir. 2006); United States v. Gerke 
Excavating, Inc., 412 F.3d 804, 808 (7th Cir. 2005). 
224 FD&P Enters., Inc. v. United States Army Corps of Eng’rs, 239 F. Supp. 2d 509, 513 (D.N.J. 2003). 
225 33 U.S.C. §§ 2701-2761. 
226 33 U.S.C. § 2702(a).  See In re Needham, 354 F.3d 340 (5th Cir. 2003); Rice v. Harken Exploration Co., 
250 F.3d 264 (5th Cir. 2001). 
227 Two cases arising under the dredge and fill permit program are currently pending before the Court.  
Carabell v. United States Army Corps of Eng’rs, 391 F.3d 704 (96th Cir. 2004), cert. granted, 126 S. Ct. 
415 (2005); United States v. Rapanos, 376 F.3d 629 (6th Cir. 2004), cert. granted, 126 S. Ct. 414 (2005). 
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As the discussion above indicates,228 the Supreme Court in the Hodel case 
rejected a Tenth Amendment attack on SMCRA’s steep slope mining standards.  In 1992, 
however, the Court struck down as violative of the Tenth Amendment portions of the 
Low-Level Radioactive Waste Policy Act of 1985.229  A previous version of the Act, 
adopted in 1980, was designed to solve the problem of insufficient nationwide capacity 
for the disposal of low-level radioactive wastes.  The 1985 amendments required each 
state either to join an interstate waste compact, which would develop a new low-level 
waste disposal site, or develop its own site.230  A disposal site run by a compact or by a 
so-called stand-alone state would be authorized to prohibit the importation of low-level 
waste generated in a state that neither had its own site nor was a compact member.  The 
host state for a compact-run site also could charge higher disposal fees for waste 
generated in states that were not members of the compact than for waste generated within 
the compact.  Any state that failed to comply with its obligations by the end of 1992 
(either by joining a compact that had developed a site or building its own site) would be 
required to take title to all low-level waste generated within its borders.  The state also 
would assume liability for all damages incurred by the generator as a result of the state's 
failure to take possession of the waste.231  In New York v. United States, the Supreme 
Court held that the “take title” provisions contravened the Tenth Amendment.232  Despite 
concluding that Congress was authorized under the Commerce Clause to regulate the 
interstate market in radioactive waste disposal, and that Congress could have preempted 
all state regulation of radioactive waste,233 the Court held that the take title provisions 
were unconstitutional.234  It characterized those provisions as an effort to offer the states 
the “choice” of accepting ownership of low-level waste or regulating disposal according 
to federal instructions.235  Because Congress lacked the constitutional authority to pursue 
either choice in isolation, it could not pursue them in combination: 
[T]he take title incentive does not represent the conditional exercise of any 
congressional power enumerated in the Constitution.  In this provision, Congress 
has not held out the threat of exercising its spending power or its commerce 
power; it has instead held out the threat, should the States not regulate according 
228 See supra notes 161-78 and accompanying text. 
229 Pub. L. 99-240, 99 Stat. 1842. 
230 See generally Robert L. Glicksman, Interstate Compacts for Low-Level Radioactive Waste Disposal:  A 
Mechanism for Excluding Out-of-State Waste, in LOW-LEVEL RADIOACTIVE WASTE REGULATION:
SCIENCE, POLITICS AND FEAR (Michael E. Burns ed., 1988). 
231 New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 151-54 (1992). 
232 505 U.S. 144 (1992).  See generally Richard E. Levy, New York v. United States:  An Essay on the Uses 
and Misuses of Precedent, History, and Policy in Determining the Scope of Federal Power, 41 U. KAN. L. 
REV. 493 (1993). 
233 New York, 505 U.S. at 160-61. 
234 The Court also held, however, that the surcharge provisions represented “an unexceptionable exercise of 
Congress' power to authorize the States to burden interstate commerce,” id. at 171, and that conditioning 
the receipt of federal funds on compliance with the statute’s milestones for constructing or participating in 
a compact that constructed a waste disposal site was a valid exercise of the Spending Clause.  Id. at 171-72.  
Likewise, Congress’s decision to authorize states and regional compacts with disposal sites to increase the 
cost of access and eventually deny all access to sites for the disposal of radioactive waste generated in 
states that do not meet federal deadlines was also a valid exercise of the Commerce Clause.  Id. at 173-74. 
235 Id. at 175. 
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to one federal instruction, of simply forcing the States to submit to another federal 
instruction.  A choice between two unconstitutionally coercive regulatory 
techniques is no choice at all.  Either way, “the Act commandeers the legislative 
processes of the States by directly compelling them to enact and enforce a federal 
regulatory program,” an outcome that has never been understood to lie within the 
authority conferred upon Congress by the Constitution.236
Thus, New York v. United States established that the federal government may not offer a 
state government “no option other than that of implementing legislation enacted by 
Congress.”237
 Like the Court’s decisions in Lopez, Morrison, and SWANCC, the New York
decision has formed the basis for a renewed series of constitutional attacks on federal 
pollution control and natural resources legislation.  Most of these attacks have not 
succeeded, in either the pollution control238 or federal lands and resources contexts.239
In at least two cases, however, the attacks succeeded in constraining the scope of federal 
regulatory authority.  One case was a pollution control case.  In ACORN v. Edwards, the 
Fifth Circuit held that a provision of the SDWA requiring states to establish remedial 
action plans for the removal of lead-contamination from drinking water facilities in 
schools and day-care centers violated the Tenth Amendment because it amounted to an 
attempt by Congress to force states to regulate pursuant to congressional direction, and 
therefore amounted to an impermissible effort to control state legislative processes.240
The other case was a natural resource management case, in which the Ninth Circuit, 
shortly after the decision in New York, struck down as a violation of the Tenth 
Amendment a federal statute restricting the export of timber harvested on both federal 
and state public lands as a means of conserving timber and increasing timber supplies for 
domestic sawmills.241
236 Id. at 176 (quoting Hodel, 452 U.S. at 288). 
237 Id. at 177.  The Court also stated that “[w]here a federal interest is sufficiently strong to cause Congress 
to legislate, it must do so directly; it may not conscript state governments as its agents.”  Id. at 178. 
238 See, e.g., Nebraska v. EPA, 331 F.3d 995 (D.C. Cir. 2003) (rejecting 10th Amendment attack on the 
SDWA); City of Abilene v. EPA, 325 F.3d 657 (5th Cir. 2003) (conditions on EPA-issued stormwater 
discharge permits did not violate the 10th Amendment); Environmental Defense Ctr. v. EPA, 319 F.3d 398 
(9th Cir. 2003) (holding that EPA regulations under the CWA subjecting discharges from municipal storm 
sewers to discharge permit program did not violate the 10th Amendment); Virginia v. Browner, 80 F.3d 869 
(4th Cir. 1996) (rejecting contention that provisions of CAA authorizing EPA to impose sanctions on states 
with inadequate permit programs violates the 10th Amendment). 
239 See, e.g., Nuclear Energy Inst., Inc. v. EPA, 373 F.3d 1251 (D.C. Cir. 2004) (rejecting 10th Amendment 
attack on designation of federal lands in Nevada as site for radioactive waste disposal repository); 
Wyoming v. United States, 279 F.3d 1214 (10th Cir. 2002) (holding that Fish and Wildlife Service’s refusal 
to permit state to vaccinate elk on national wildlife refuge to prevent brucellosis did not violate 10th
Amendment); Wyoming v. United States, 360 F. Supp. 2d 1214, 1240-42 (D. Wyo. 2005) (holding that 
Interior Department’s rejection of state plan for managing gray wolves as a condition of delisting them 
under the ESA did not violate the 10th Amendment); Gibbs v. Babbitt, 31 F. Supp. 2d 531 (E.D.N.C. 1998) 
(rejecting 10th Amendment attack on Fish and Wildlife Service regulation), aff’d on other grounds, 214 
F.3d 483 (4th Cir. 2000). 
240 ACORN v. Edwards, 81 F.3d 1387, 1394 (5th Cir. 1996). 
241 Bd. of Nat. Resources v. Brown, 992 F.3d 937 (9th Cir. 1993). 
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3. The Eleventh Amendment
Perhaps the most aggressive expansions on the limits that the Constitution’s 
federalism provisions impose on federal legislative power that occurred during the 
Rehnquist Court resulted from the Court’s interpretation of the Eleventh Amendment.  In 
a series of cases decided in the late 1990s, the Court expanded the circumstances in 
which suits may be brought in federal court against a state.242  None of these cases was 
an environmental law case.  The expansive interpretation of the Eleventh Amendment 
they reflect, however, has induced the lower courts on many occasions to block suits 
against states or state agencies seeking compliance with their responsibilities under 
federal environmental legislation. 
Dismissals on the basis of sovereign immunity range across both the geographical 
and statutory landscapes.  In one case, the Fourth Circuit held that sovereign immunity 
preserved by the Eleventh Amendment barred a citizen suit by environmental groups and 
individuals to bar the director of a West Virginia environmental agency from continuing 
to issue permits under SMCRA for mountaintop-removal coal mining.243  In another 
case, the Ninth Circuit held that a suit seeking to compel compliance by a state with its 
environmental assessment responsibilities was barred by the Eleventh Amendment.244
The same court held that the Eleventh Amendment barred a suit against a state agency 
claiming violations of a CWA permit that required the agency to control polluted 
stormwater runoff from roadways and maintenance yards.245  The Second Circuit held 
that the Eleventh Amendment barred a citizen suit under RCRA and CERCLA for 
monetary and injunctive relief relating to contamination allegedly caused by the 
operation of a state prison.246  The Sixth Circuit ordered dismissal of a suit against a state 
in which the state allegedly violated the CWA by imposing improper conditions on a 
dredge and fill permit.247  It also held that a citizen suit against a state natural resource 
management agency alleging violations of RCRA in polluting state-owned land with lead 
242 See, e.g., Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706 (1999); Seminole Tribe of Florida v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44 
(1996).  See also College Savings Bank v. Florida Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd., 527 U.S. 666 
(1999). 
243 Bragg v. West Virginia Coal Ass’n, 248 F.3d 275 (4th Cir. 2001).  See also Pennsylvania Fed’n of 
Sportsmen’s Clubs, Inc. v. Hess, 297 F.3d 310 (3d Cir. 2002) (holding that suit alleging that state officials 
failed to comply with their responsibilities in administering an approved SMCRA program was barred by 
the 11th Amendment).  But cf. West Virginia Highlands Conservancy v. Norton, 137 F. Supp. 2d 687, 695 
(S.D. W. Va. 2001) (holding that suit against state official to maintain mandatory federal performance bond 
requirement was not barred by the 11th Amendment). 
244 City of South Pasadena v. Mineta, 284 F.3d 1154 (9th Cir. 2002).  See also Sweat v. Hull, 200 F. Supp. 
2d 1162, 1173-74 (D. Ariz. 2001) (holding that suit against state official to implement SIP under CAA was 
barred by the 11th Amendment). 
245 Nat. Resources Defense Council, Inc. v. California Dep’t of Transp., 96 F.3d 420 (9th Cir. 1996).  The 
court also held, however, that claims against state officials could proceed.  See also Williams v. Alabama 
Dep’t of Transp., 119 F. Supp. 2d 1249 (D. Ala. 2000) (barring citizen suit under RCRA against state 
Department of Transportation for alleged improper hazardous waste disposal, but not against director of the 
agency). 
246 Burnette v. Carothers, 192 F.3d 52 (2d Cir. 1999).  See also Thomas v. Missouri Dep’t of Nat. 
Resources, 50 F.3d 502 (8th Cir. 1995) (precluding joinder of state natural resources agency in CERCLA 
cost recovery action). 
247 Michigan Peat v. EPA, 175 F.3d 422 (6th Cir. 1999). 
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had to be dismissed.248  While various strategies exist for circumventing state sovereign 
immunity to suits in federal court under the Eleventh Amendment,249 the reinvigoration 
of the Eleventh Amendment during the late 1990s may present an obstacle to the 
enforcement of federal environmental legislation against the states. 
 4. Summary
 The scope of Congress’s constitutional authority to adopt legislation to protect the 
environment and conserve federally owned natural resources is not demonstrably 
narrower as a result of recent court decisions than it was in 1970, at least not yet.
Nevertheless, led by the Supreme Court, the courts have recognized constraints on federal 
power under both the Commerce Clause and the Tenth Amendment that were not 
apparent during the first decade of significant federal environmental protection activity.  
Even when the Constitution itself does not impose such constraints, the courts on 
occasion have interpreted narrowly the scope of agency regulatory authority under the 
environmental statutes in order to avoid the need to address constitutional questions that 
otherwise might have arisen.  The prospect of an expansion, even a considerable one, by 
the courts of these constitutional limits on federal environmental regulatory authority in 
the future is not outside the realm of possibility.  Finally, there is no question that the 
ability of Congress to enforce federal environmental legislation against state governments 
has shrunk as a result of the Supreme Court’s recent expansive interpretations of the 
Eleventh Amendment. 
B. Statutory and Regulatory Developments that Reduce the Federal Role 
in Protecting the Environment
The judiciary has not been the only branch of the federal government that has 
placed shackles on the authority of agencies such as EPA and the federal land 
management agencies to pursue environmental protection measures.  Congress has 
contributed to the weakening of federal environmental law in several ways.  First, it has 
loosened some of the obligations that federal agencies proposing actions with potential 
adverse environmental impacts have to factor those impacts into their decisionmaking 
processes.  Second, it has exempted certain activities by federal agencies from 
substantive environmental constraints.  Third, it has subjected agencies seeking to protect 
the environment, such as EPA, to a series of new obligations that, at a minimum, strain 
the agency’s ability to fulfill their environmental protection function.  The Executive 
248 Rowlands v. Pointe Mouille Shooting Club, 182 F.3d 918 (Table), 49 Env’t Rep. Cas. 1094 (6th Cir. 
1999). 
249 See, e.g., Cox v. City of Dallas, 256 F.3d 281 (5th Cir. 2001) (allowing suit against state agency to 
prohibit further open dumping of solid waste in violation of RCRA to proceed); Committee to Save 
Mokelumne River v. East Bay Mun. Util. Dist., 13 F.3d 305, 309-10 (9th Cir. 1993) (suit seeking only 
prospective equitable relief against further violations of CWA permit program not barred by the 11th 
Amendment); Kentucky Resources Council, Inc. v. EPA, 304 F. Supp. 2d 920 (W.D. Ky. 2004) (allowing 
suit against state official to enforce SIP under CAA to proceed on the basis of Ex parte Young, 209 U.S. 
123 (1908)); Clean Air Council v. Mallory, 226 F. Supp. 705 (E.D. Pa. 2002) (holding that suit against state 
official, rather than against the state itself, was not barred).  See generally McAllister & Glicksman, “New” 
Federalism Era, supra note 189. 
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branch has made its own contributions to the weakening of the federal government’s 
ability to protect the environment, primarily by diluting some of the substantive programs 
designed to protect the public health and to prevent degradation of federal lands and 
resources.
  1. Activities by the Federal Government 
In recent years, Congress has removed both substantive and procedural 
constraints on activities that create risks of damage to public health, the environment, or 
federally owned lands and resources.  Some of these statutes eliminate or weaken 
procedural requirements that were designed to make it more difficult for federal agencies 
to engage in, or authorize others to engage in, environmentally damaging activities.  In 
the Healthy Forests Restoration Act of 2003,250 for example, Congress lightened the 
Forest Service’s obligation under NEPA to consider alternatives to “hazardous fuels 
reduction projects.”251  It also restricted the circumstances in which opponents of those 
projects may challenge in federal court the Forest Service’s decision to authorize timber 
sales and other forms of “fuels reduction projects.”252  Under a host of other 
appropriations bills, Congress also has carved out or authorized federal agencies to create 
categorical exclusions from NEPA environmental assessment responsibilities.253
The federal government also has made efforts to remove substantive constraints 
on the federal government’s ability to pursue activities potentially harmful to the 
environment.  A prominent example has been the consistent efforts by the military and 
some congressional sponsors to exempt activities related to natural security matters from 
250 Pub. L. No. 108-148, 117 Stat. 1887 (codified at 16 U.S.C. §§ 6501-6591). 
251 16 U.S.C. § 6514(c)-(d). 
252 16 U.S.C. § 6515(c).  Jesse B. Davis, Comment, The Healthy Forests Initiative: Unhealthy Policy 
Choices in Forest and Fire Management, 34 ENVTL. L. 1209, 1214 (2004), argues that the Healthy Forests 
Restoration Act was "an irresponsible and ill-considered exercise in land management" that was designed 
to maximize timber harvests, not produce healthier forests.  See also Reda M. Dennis-Parks, Comment, 
Healthy Forests Restoration Act — Will It Really Protect Homes and Communities?, 31 ECOLOGY L.Q. 639 
(2004) (arguing that the Act is incapable of solving the wildfire problem and will instead exacerbate a 
dangerous situation by allowing timber companies to remove large trees that serve as the last line of 
defense for communities at risk of wildfires); Loni Radmall, Comment, President George W. Bush's Forest 
Policy: Healthy Forest Restoration Act of 2003, 24 J. LAND, RESOURCES & ENVTL. L. 511 (2004). 
253 See, e.g., The Safe, Accountable, Flexible, Efficient Transportation Equity Act: A Legacy for Users 
(SAFETEA-LU), Pub. L. No. 109-59, § 6010(a), 119 Stat. 1144, 1877 (2005) (to be codified at 23 
U.S.C.A. § 512 note) (authorizing the Secretary of Transportation to initiate a rulemaking to establish, “to 
the extent appropriate,” categorical exclusions for activities that support the deployment of intelligent 
transportation infrastructure and systems”); 23 U.S.C.A. § 134(p) (SAFETEA-LU provision exempting 
transportation improvement programs developed by metropolitan planning organizations from NEPA by 
declaring that they do not qualify as federal actions); Energy Policy Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-58, § 
390, 119 Stat. 594, 747 (to be codified at 42 U.S.C.A. § 15942(a)) (creating a rebuttable presumption that 
certain oil and gas exploration or development activities authorized by the Secretaries of Interior or 
Agriculture under the Mineral Leasing Act qualify for categorical exclusion from NEPA); Pub. L. No. 108-
447, § 339, 118 Stat. 2209 (2004) (appropriations bill provision excluding certain decisions by the 
Secretary of Agriculture to authorize grazing in the national forests from NEPA evaluation requirements, 
provided that monitoring indicates that current grazing management is meeting, or satisfactorily moving 
toward, objectives in the applicable land and resource management plan). 
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the environmental laws.254  Some of these efforts have borne fruit.  In a fiscal year 2003 
appropriations bill,255 Congress amended the Migratory Bird Treaty Act256 by directing 
the Secretary of the Interior, with the concurrence of the Secretary of Defense, to issue 
regulations that allow the “incidental taking” of migratory birds during “training and 
operations by the Armed Forces that relate to combat” and during the testing of military 
equipment and weapons.257  Congress also has resorted to appropriations legislation to 
water down the application of the ESA to certain military activities258 and to narrow the 
activities deemed to constitute improper harassment of animals under the Marine 
Mammal Protection Act for “military readiness activities.”259
  2. Federal Regulation of Private Activities 
The federal government, acting through Congress, the President, and federal 
agencies, also has subjected environmental agencies to additional procedures that tend to 
make it more difficult for those agencies to abate threats to health, the environment, or 
federal lands and resources created by activities in the private sector.  Some of this 
legislation applies across-the-board in a variety of regulatory contexts, while other 
legislation is more program-specific. 
Both Congress and the Executive Branch have imposed on federal regulatory 
agencies a series of procedural mandates whose practical effect has been to make it more 
burdensome for the government to restrict environmentally damaging activity engaged in 
by others.  As Tom McGarity has explained, beginning in the 1980s, the rulemaking 
process that provides the principal tool by which agencies such as EPA regulate 
environmentally damaging activities became “increasingly rigid and burdensome” 
through the adoption of “an assortment of analytical requirements” such as cost-benefit 
254 One such initiative, sponsored by the Pentagon, was the Readiness and Range Preservation Initiative, 
which included proposals to amend the CAA, RCRA, CERCLA, the ESA, the Marine Mammal Protection 
Act, and the Migratory Bird Treaty Act to exempt certain military activities from those laws.  See Stephen 
Dycus, Osama’s Submarine:  National Security and Environmental Protection After 9/11, 30 WM. & 
MARY ENVTL. L. & POL’Y REV. 1, 1-2 (2005).  See also Ralph Vartabedian, How Environmentalists Lost 
the Battle Over TCE, L.A. TIMES, Mar. 29, 2006, available at
http://www.latimes.com/news/science/environment/la-na-toxic229mar29,0,5610036) (detailing successful 
efforts by the Pentagon, through orchestration of “a withering attack” by the military and its contractors, to 
derail effort by EPA to limit exposure to trichloroethylene, a potential carcinogen that contaminates more 
than 1000 military properties nationwide). 
255 Bob Stump National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2003, Pub. L. No. 107-314, § 315, 116 
Stat. 2458, 2509 (2002) (codified as amended at 16 U.S.C. § 703). 
256 16 U.S.C. §§ 703-711. 
257 Pub. L. No. 107-314, §§ 315(d), (f)(1), 116 Stat. at 2458, 2509-10 (codified at 16 U.S.C. § 703). 
258 See, e.g., Pub. L. No. 108-136, § 318(a)(3), 117 Stat. 1392, 1433 (2003) (codified at 16 U.S.C. § 
1533(a)(3)(B)(i)) (exempting certain areas subject to natural resources management plan from designation 
as critical habitat under the ESA). 
259 The same statute also authorized increased incidental taking of marine mammals in the course of such 
military activities.  National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2004, Pub. L. No. 108-136, § 
319(a), (c) 117 Stat. 1392, 1433, 1435 (2003) (amending 16 U.S.C. § 1362(18)). 
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analysis.260  This phenomenon, dubbed the “ossification” of the rulemaking process by 
former EPA General Counsel Donald Elliott, has been exacerbated by “evolving judicial 
doctrines [that] have obliged agencies to take greater pains to ensure that the technical 
bases for rules are capable of withstanding judicial scrutiny.”261  One example of a statute 
that subjects federal agencies to analytical requirements as a prerequisite to the adoption 
of regulation is the Unfunded Mandates Reform Act of 1994 (UMRA).262  Under the 
UMRA, each federal agency, unless otherwise prohibited by another statute, must assess 
the effects of its regulatory actions on state, local, and tribal governments and the private 
sector.  Before it issues regulations that include any “federal mandate” that may result in 
the expenditure by governments in the aggregate or by the private sector of $100 million 
or more in any one year, the agency must prepare a written statement that includes a 
qualitative and quantitative assessment of the anticipated costs and benefits of the 
mandate.  It also must estimate the future compliance costs of the mandate and any 
disproportionate budgetary effects on particular regions or on particular segments of the 
private sector, and it must estimate the effect of the rule on the national economy if it is 
feasible to do so.263  The UMRA also requires that, before issuing a rule for which a 
written statement is required, the agency identify and consider a reasonable number of 
regulatory alternatives.  It must then select from among them “the least costly, most cost-
effective or least burdensome alternative that achieves the objective of the rule” for state 
and local governments and the private sector.264
Congress has imposed a host of other analytical obligations on federal agencies in 
statutes such as the Regulatory Flexibility Act,265 the Small Business Regulatory 
Enforcement Fairness Act,266 and the Paperwork Reduction Act.267  The most recently 
adopted of these statutory mechanisms is the Information Quality Act (IQA), also known 
as the Data Quality Act.268  Tucked away in a lengthy appropriations bill enacted in 2000, 
the IQA requires the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) to issue guidelines that 
provide “policy and procedural guidance” to federal agencies “for ensuring and 
maximizing the quality, objectivity, utility, and integrity of information (including 
statistical information) disseminated by Federal agencies.”269  The IQA has provided the 
opponents of environmental regulation with a tool to delay its implementation and to 
censor information with which they disagree or which might put their activities in a bad 
light.  Regulated entities have used the IQA to challenge environmentally protective 
decisions by federal agencies in the face of scientific uncertainty by characterizing those 
260 Thomas O. McGarity, Some Thoughts on Deossifying the Rulemaking Process, 41 DUKE L.J. 1385, 1385 
(1992) [cited hereinafter as McGarity, Deossifying].  See also Thomas O. McGarity, The Courts and the 
Ossification of Rulemaking:  A Response to Professor Seidenfeld, 75 TEX. L. 525 (1997). 
261 McGarity, Deossifying, supra note 260, at 1385-86. 
262 Pub. L. No. 104-4, 109 Stat. 48 (1995).  For criticism of the assumptions underlying adoption of the 
Unfunded Mandates Reform Act, see David A. Dana, The Case for Unfunded Environmental Mandates, 69 
S. CAL. L. REV. 1 (1995). 
263 2 U.S.C. § 1532. 
264 2 U.S.C. § 1535. 
265 5 U.S.C. §§ 601-612. 
266 Pub. L. No. 104-121, 110 Stat. 847, 857-74 (1996). 
267 44 U.S.C. §§ 3501-3520. 
268 Pub. L. No. 106-554, § 515, 114 Stat. 2763, 2763A-153 (2000) (codified at 44 U.S.C. § 3516 note). 
269 44 U.S.C. § 3516 note. 
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decisions as based on “bad science.”270  As Lisa Heinzerling has asserted, the IQA 
“threatens to divert precious agency resources, requiring them to respond to petty and 
self-interested complaints from the industries regulated by the agencies.”271
The ossification of the regulatory process that has slowed down the output by 
federal agencies of environmentally protective regulations and other measures is a 
product of actions by the Executive Branch as well as Congress.  Beginning early in 
Ronald Reagan’s administration, various Presidents have signed Executive Orders 
requiring agencies to engage in cost-benefit analysis as a prerequisite to issuing 
regulations with significant impacts on the economy.272  Other Executive Orders have 
required federal agencies engaged in environmental protection initiatives to avoid 
regulatory actions that would amount to takings of private property without just 
compensation273 and consider principles of federalism in regulatory decisionmaking 
processes,274 among other things.  Regulations, directives, policy statements, and the like 
issued by the OMB have elaborated on these and related requirements,275 often making 
the statutory or presidentially imposed requirements even more onerous.276
Even assuming that each of these analytical requirements was adopted as part of a 
sincere effort to improve the federal government’s capacity to make well informed and 
rational decisions about the environment277 — a premise with which not all observers 
270 For criticism of the IQA, see generally Sidney A. Shapiro, OMB's Dubious Peer Review Procedures, 34 
ENVTL. L. REP. (ENVTL. L. INST.) 10064 (2004) (arguing that the IQA creates a procedural apparatus that is 
likely to stifle the government’s efforts to provide useful information to the public about their safety and 
health risks and about risks to the environment); Sidney A. Shapiro, The Information Quality Act and 
Environmental Protection: The Perils of Reform by Appropriations Rider, 28 WM. & MARY ENVTL. L. & 
POL'Y REV. 339 (2004); Sidney A. Shapiro, The Case Against the IQA, 22 ENVTL. F. # 4 (July/August 
2005), at 26; Wendy E. Wagner, Importing Daubert to Administrative Agencies Through the Information 
Quality Act, 12 J.L. & POL’Y 589 (2004); Stephen M. Johnson, Ruminations on Dissemination:  Limits on 
Administrative and Judicial Review Under the Information Quality Act, 55 CATH. U. L. REV. 59 (2005); 
Michelle V. Lacko, Comment, The Data Quality Act: Prologue to A Farce or A Tragedy?, 53 EMORY L.J.
305 (2004). 
271 See also Lisa Heinzerling, Risking It All, 57 ALA. L. REV. 103, 111 (2005).  Cf. Richard J. Lazarus, 
Congressional Descent:  The Demise of Deliberative Democracy in Environmental Law, 94 GEO. L.J. 619, 
648 (2006) (arguing that the IQA may play an “entirely positive” role “by promoting a more rational, 
coherent use of science” or “paralyze agency regulation efforts by encumbering the use of science”). 
272 See, e.g., Exec. Order No. 12,291, 3 C.F.R. 127 (1982), reprinted in 5 U.S.C. § 601 note; Exec. Order 
No. 12,498, 3 C.F.R. 323 (1986), reprinted in 5 U.S.C. § 601 note; Exec. Order No. 12,866, 58 Fed. Reg. 
51,735 (1993), reprinted in 5 U.S.C. § 601 note. 
273 Exec. Order No. 12,630, 53 Fed. Reg. 8859 (1988). 
274 Exec. Order No. 12,612, 52 Fed. Reg. 41,685 (1987). 
275 See, e.g., RICHARD J. LAZARUS, THE MAKING OF ENVIRONMENTAL LAW 241-42 (2004) (describing the 
OMB’s “aggressive” efforts under the George W. Bush Administration to accomplish regulatory reform by 
requiring greater use of techniques such as risk analysis). 
276 See, e.g., Office of Mgmt. & Budget, Circular A-4, at 9 (2003), available at 
http://www.whitehouse.gov/omb/circulars/a004/a-4.pdf (providing guidance to federal agencies on how to 
comply with cost-benefit and other analytical requirements and standardizing the manner in which 
regulatory costs and benefits are computed). 
277 But cf. Amy Sinden, In Defense of Absolutes: Combating the Power of Politics in Environmental Law,
90 IOWA L. REV.1405, 1408 (2005) (arguing that the use of cost-benefit analysis in the context of attempts 
to protect endangered species may provide inadequate protection due to the difficulty of placing a value on 
extinction). 
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would agree278 — the application of this long series of analytical requirements has almost 
certainly played a role in slowing down if not stymieing the efforts of federal agencies to 
pursue environmental protective initiatives.279  By one account, a single agency could be 
subject in theory to some 120 different analytical steps before it may make a decision on 
a regulatory matter that bears on environmental protection.280  It is far from clear that the 
benefits of improved regulation that may be attributable to the use of these analytical 
techniques exceeds the cost in terms of lost lives, illnesses exacerbated, and natural 
resources destroyed as a result of the delays in regulation caused by the statutory and 
regulatory analytical requirements described here.281
 The federal government, particularly during the George W. Bush Administration, 
also has taken steps to weaken federal efforts to protect the environment from pollution 
and the integrity of the federal lands and resources from the adverse effects of mineral 
extraction, timber harvesting, and other potentially detrimental uses.  Some of these steps 
took the form of federal legislation.  The Energy Policy Act of 2005, for example, 
exempted hydraulic fracturing, a process used to enhance the production of coalbed 
methane, from the SDWA’s underground injection controls.282  The same statute 
expanded the scope of an exemption for certain oil and gas drilling activities from the 
CWA’s stormwater permit requirements.283
Other steps that weaken federal environmental protection law have taken the form 
of Executive Branch decisions.  According to one long-time environmental litigator, 
“[f]rom day one, the Bush Administration has set about the task of systematically and 
unilaterally dismantling over thirty years of environmental and natural resources law.”284
The list of examples is lengthy.  In the pollution control arena, the Bush Administration 
278 See, e.g., FRANK ACKERMAN & LISA HEINZERLING, PRICELESS:  ON KNOWING THE PRICE OF 
EVERYTHING AND THE VALUE OF NOTHING 207-08 (2004) (describing the OMB’s “heavy-handed 
intervention in regulatory matters” and the “partisan nature” of its application of cost-benefit analysis). 
279 SIDNEY A. SHAPIRO & ROBERT L. GLICKSMAN, RISK REGULATION AT RISK:  RESTORING A PRAGMATIC 
APPROACH 134 (2003). 
280 See Mark Seidenfeld, A Table of Requirements for Federal Administrative Rulemaking, 27 FLA. ST. L. 
REV. 535, 536 (2000). 
281 SHAPIRO & GLICKSMAN, supra note 279, at 138. 
282 Energy Policy Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-58, § 322, 119 Stat. 594, 694 (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 
300h(d)(1)(B)(ii)). 
283 Energy Policy Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-58, § 323, 119 Stat. 594, 694 (codified at 33 U.S.C. § 
1362(24)); 33 U.S.C. § 1342(l)(2).  See also Amendments to the National Pollutant Discharge Elimination 
System (NPDES) Regulations for Storm Water Discharges Associated With Oil and Gas Exploration, 
Production, Processing, or Treatment Operations, or Transmission Facilities; Notice of Proposed 
Rulemaking, 71 Fed. Reg. 894 (2006) (proposal to implement the statute). 
284 Patrick Parenteau, Anything Industry Wants:  Environmental Policy Under Bush II, 14 DUKE ENVTL. L. 
& POL’Y F. 363, 363 (2004).  See also Robin Kundis Craig, The Bush Administration and the Environment:  
An Overview and Introduction, 25 W. NEW ENG. L. REV. 1, 11-22 (2003) (providing lengthy list of Bush 
Administration decisions criticized by environmental groups).  But see Victoria Sutton, The George W. 
Bush Administration and the Environment, 25 W. NEW ENG. L. REV. 221, 222-23 (2003) (raising the 
possibility that the Bush Administration’s environmental policies represent “concerted efforts designed to 
provide faster and more efficient movements toward environmental protection” and contending that those 
policies seek “to implement new regulatory mechanisms that will lead to environmental progress, 
environmental enforcement, and ultimately a more realistic and more functional approach to environmental 
protection”). 
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has sought to weaken regulatory restrictions that apply to activities that generate both 
air285 and water pollution.286
In the federal lands context, the Administration has displayed a hostility for 
preservation of federal lands such as wilderness areas and an affinity for easing access to 
those lands for resource extractive purposes, such as oil and gas leasing and timber 
harvesting.287  The National Forest Service, for example, revoked regulations it had 
issued at the end of the Clinton Administration288 that prohibited virtually all road 
construction and timber harvesting in roadless areas of the national forests.  The Bush 
Administration’s regulations for management of roadless areas in the national forests, 
adopted in 2005,289 create a process that allows state governors to petition the Secretary 
of Agriculture for the imposition of protective measures on the use of roadless areas.
Because the regulations contain no criteria whatsoever for assessment of state 
petitions,290 the regulations appear to afford the Secretary unconstrained discretion to 
veto state efforts to limit road construction, timber harvesting, and other activities that 
might inflict damage on roadless areas of the national forests.291  Similarly, changes in 
the Forest Service’s planning regulations adopted during the Bush Administration have 
the potential to weaken the agency’s ability to protect plant and animal diversity, as 
285 See, e.g., New York v. EPA, 2006 WL 662746 (D.C. Cir. Mar. 17, 2006) (vacating EPA regulations 
significantly expanding pre-existing exemption from the CAA’s new source review (NSR) program for 
new and modified major stationary sources); New York v. EPA, 413 F.3d 3 (2005) (upholding in part and 
vacating in part other revisions to NSR program); Lisa Heinzerling & Rena I. Steinzor, A Perfect Storm: 
Mercury and the Bush Administration, Part II, 34 ENVTL. L. REP. (ENVTL. L. INST.) 10485 (2004) 
(describing EPA regulations that create the risk of dangerously high levels of mercury); Lisa Heinzerling & 
Rena I. Steinzor, A Perfect Storm: Mercury and the Bush Administration, Part I, 34 ENVTL. L. REP.
(ENVTL. L. INST.) 10297 (2004) (same). 
286 See, e.g., Arsenic and Old Rules:  Bush Rolls Back Clinton Arsenic Standard, ABC News.com, Mar. 21, 
2001, at http://abcnews.go.com/sections/US/DailyNews/bush_ arsenic010321.html (discussing efforts — 
ultimately unsuccessful — to increase limits on presence of arsenic in drinking water); National Primary 
Drinking Water Regulations; Arsenic and Clarifications to Compliance and New Source Contaminants 
Monitoring:  Delay of Effective Date, 66 Fed. Reg. 28,342 (2001) (delaying effective date of arsenic 
regulations issued by the Clinton Administration); Withdrawal of Revisions to the Water Quality Planning 
and Management Regulation and Revisions to the National Pollutant Discharge Elimination System 
Program in Support of Revisions to the Water Quality Planning and Management Regulation, 68 Fed. Reg. 
13,608 (2003) (withdrawing Clinton Administration regulations governing water quality planning under the 
CWA). 
287 See generally John D. Leshy, Natural Resources Policy in the Bush (II) Administration:  An Outsider’s 
Somewhat Jaundiced Assessment, 14 DUKE ENVTL. L. & POL’Y F. 347 (2004). 
288 Special Areas; Roadless Area Conservation; Final rule, 66 Fed. Reg. 3244, 3246 (2001). 
289 Special Areas; State Petitions for Inventoried Roadless Area Management; Final Rule and Decision 
Memo, 70 Fed. Reg. 25,654 (2005). 
290 See USDA responds to Wyo. inquiry on roadless areas, GREENWIRE, Sept. 30, 2005 (describing letter 
from the Agriculture Undersecretary Mark Rey to Wyoming Governor Dave Freudenthal, in which Rey 
stated that the 2005 regulations contain no standards for evaluation of state roadless area management 
petitions). 
291 See generally Robert L. Glicksman, Traveling in Opposite Directions:  Roadless Area Management 
Under the Clinton and Bush Administrations, 34 ENVTL. L. 1143 (2004) [cited hereinafter as Glicksman, 
Roadless Area Management] (comparing the approaches of the two administrations to roadless area 
management and criticizing the Bush Administration’s approach as insufficiently protective ). 
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required by the National Forest Management Act.292  The Bush Administration also has 
supported efforts to reduce the degree to which NEPA constrains the ability of federal 
agencies to engage in or authorize activities with potentially damaging environmental 
effects.293
The actions described above illustrate the procedural and substantive shackles that 
Congress and the Executive Branch have seen fit in recent years to place on federal 
agencies whose mission it is to protect human health and the environment (such as EPA).  
They also illustrate the removal of constraints on agencies whose responsibility it is avoid 
taking actions that damage the environment (including all federal agencies subject to 
NEPA and the ESA).  The inadequacy of the funding made available to environmental 
agencies by Congress and the President also has contributed, albeit more subtly, to the 
federal government’s reduced power to protect the environment.  The During the Bush 
Administration, for example, EPA has experienced significant reductions in its budget.294
One prominent example of the need for environmental agencies to make due with less 
money is the refusal of Congress and the President to reauthorize the corporate tax 
mechanisms previously used to provide funding for remediation of properties 
contaminated with hazardous substances following the expiration of those taxes in 
1995.295  Because federal and state agencies share responsibility for protecting the 
environment under many of the federal environmental statutes, a reduced federal 
presence might provide opportunities for enhanced state activity.  At the same time, 
however, that Congress and the President have reduced funds for federal agencies to use 
in protecting the environment, they have made less money available to the states to 
implement their responsibilities under the environmental cooperative federalism 
statutes.296  Indeed, the funding cuts have been so extensive that some states have 
292 16 U.S.C. § 1604(g)(3)(B).  See generally Robert L. Glicksman, Bridging Data Gaps through Modeling 
and Evaluation of Surrogates:  Use of the Best Available Science to Protect Biological Diversity Under the 
National Forest Management Act (forthcoming). 
293 See, e.g., Margaret Kriz, Bush’s Quiet Plan, NAT’L J. 3472, 3472, Nov. 23, 2002 (asserting that “[t]he 
Bush Administration is quietly but systematically working to make the 32-year old environmental law 
that’s considered the Magna Carta of national environmental policy less of an impediment to 
development”). 
294 See, e.g., Robert H. Cutting & Lawrence B. Cahoon, Thinking Outside the Box:  Property Rights as a 
Key to Environmental Protection, 22 PACE ENVTL. L. REV. 55, 62 (2005); Clifford Rechtschaffen, 
Enforcing the Clean Water Act in the Twenty-First Century: Harnessing the Power of the Public Spotlight,
55 ALA. L. REV.  775, 790 (2004); Clifford Rechtschaffen, Promoting Pragmatic Risk Regulation:  Is 
Enforcement Discretion the Answer?, 52 U. KAN. L. REV. 1327, 1347-48 (2004) [cited hereinafter as 
Rechtschaffen, Promoting Regulation]. 
295 Amy Pilat McMorrow, Note and Comment, CERCLA Liability Redefined:  An Analysis of the Small 
Business Liability Relief and Brownfields Revitalization Act and its Impact on State Voluntary Cleanup 
Programs, 20 GA. ST. U. L. REV. 1087, 1092 (2004).  See also William W. Buzbee et al., Regulatory 
Underkill: The Bush Administration's Insidious Dismantling of Public Health and Environmental 
Protections, Center for Progressive Reform White Paper 503 (February 2005), at 13-15, available at
http://www.progressivereform.org/articles/Underkill_503.pdf. 
296 See Percival, supra note 14, at 1175 (stating that, “[w]hile the federal government increasingly has 
delegated responsibility for the operation of environmental programs to the states, federal financial 
assistance for administering these programs has been reduced sharply and most states have failed to replace 
lost federal funds for environmental programs with funds of their own”); Johnson Pledges to Review State 
Governments’ Regulatory Costs, INSIDE EPA WEEKLY, Aug. 5, 2005, 1, 8 (indicating that “[s]tates say they 
have borne the brunt of the funding cuts in EPA appropriations bills in recent years”); Congress Faces 
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considered giving up their right to administer federal regulatory programs under laws 
such as the CAA, the CWA, and RCRA and relying instead on EPA to fulfill the 
regulatory responsibilities that the states can no longer afford.297
Finally, the efficacy of federal regulatory limitations on potentially damaging 
activities has been impaired by the federal government’s inability or unwillingness to 
enforce regulatory requirements rigorously.  Funding cuts have hindered EPA’s capacity 
to pursue alleged violations of the pollution control statutes in recent years.298  In 
addition, however, EPA, as a matter of policy, refused to seek sanctions for certain 
categories of violations.  The best example is the agency’s decision under the Bush 
Administration to short-circuit a vigorous enforcement effort undertaken under the 
Clinton Administration against alleged violators of the CAA’s new source review 
requirements.299  In the natural resource management context, the Bush Administration 
has settled lawsuits against the United States on terms favorable to extractive industries 
in which commodity interests have challenged restrictions on their ability to use the 
federal lands and resources.300
C. The Anemic Federal Leadership in Environmental and Natural 
Resource Protection 
The federal government embarked in 1970 on a mission to protect public health 
and the environment from pollution and to preserve the rich stock of public natural 
resources so that they would be available for use by future generations of Americans.  In 
both the pollution control and federal lands management statutes, Congress vested federal 
agencies with ample authority to move the nation toward these goals.  In recent years, 
through a combination of actions by all three branches of the federal government, this 
authority has been significantly constrained, both legally and practically. 
The federal courts, led by the Supreme Court, have interpreted the Constitution in 
ways that narrow the scope of federal power to protect the environment, even if only at 
the margins.  Even when they have not invalidated federal statutes or implementing 
regulations on constitutional grounds, they have relied on doubts about the constitutional 
validity of the exercise of federal power to interpret the scope of environmental 
legislation narrowly. 
Growing Pressure to Boost EPA Funds for PM Monitors, INSIDE EPA WEEKLY, Mar. 17, 2006, at 14 
(describing proposed cuts by the Bush Administration in funds for state and local governments to monitor 
air pollution). 
297 See Inhofe Concerned Over State Threats to Return Programs to EPA, INSIDE EPA WEEKLY, Mar. 17, 
2006, at 10. 
298 See Rechtschaffen, Promoting Regulation, supra note 294, at 1347. 
299 See, e.g., Craig, supra note 84, at 14; Buzbee et al., supra note 10, at 9-10; R.T. Pierrehumbert, Climate 
Change:  A Catastrophe in Slow Motion, 6 CHI. J. INT’L L. 573, 589 & n. 38 (2006). 
300 See generally Michael C. Blumm, The Bush Administration’s Sweetheart Settlement Policy:  A Trojan 
Horse Strategy for Advancing Commodity Production on Public Lands, 34 ENVTL. L. REP. (ENVTL. L. 
INST.) 10397 (2004) (describing the Bush Administration’s “get sued and supply a sweetheart settlement” 
policy). 
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Congress and the Executive Branch also have contributed to the decline in federal 
authority to protect the environment.  The assault on federal power has come from many 
directions.  Congress has narrowed the responsibilities of some federal agencies to 
consider the adverse environmental implications of their decisions by creating categorical 
exclusions from NEPA.  It also has exempted some federal activities, primarily military 
activities, from pre-existing statutory constraints on their ability to pollute.  In addition, 
Congress has made it more difficult for federal agencies such as EPA to restrict 
environmentally damaging conducted by others, in part by burying those agencies under 
a mountain of analytical paperwork and by requiring agencies to employ analytical 
techniques that are inherently inimical to the protection of environmental values that are 
difficult to quantify.  The Bush Administration has pursued a series of initiatives in both 
the pollution and federal lands contexts that make it more difficult for the federal 
government to prevent environmental harm, including the adoption of weaker 
regulations, the reduction of funds for environmental protection purposes, and a failure to 
enforce environmental laws and regulations against alleged violators. 
The combined effect of these developments has been to leave a gap in the nation’s 
environmental efforts.  One way to fill that gap would be for state and local governments 
to enhance their role in implementing the shared responsibility of the federal and state 
governments under cooperative federalism regimes to protect the environment.  In fact, in 
many instances, the states and localities have done just that.  As the next part indicates, 
however, the federal government has not been satisfied with a reduction in its own efforts 
to protect the environment.  Instead, all three branches of the federal government have 
contributed to a reduction of the capacity of these other levels of government to pick up 
the federal government’s slack. 
IV. THE BATTLE TO FILL THE VOID WITH INCREASED STATE AND LOCAL ACTIVITY
 The recent reduction in federal authority to take actions to protect the 
environment that has resulted from the decisions of the federal courts, Congress, and the 
Executive Branch has created a partial vacuum.  Some state and local governments, 
dissatisfied with the level of environmental protection being provided at the federal level, 
have taken steps to supplement federal environmental protection measures with their own 
initiatives.  To some, this increase in state and local activity may have come as a surprise, 
given the conventional wisdom that states engaged in a race to the bottom to attract 
business have strong disincentives to adopt environmental protection measures that are 
more stringent than minimum federal requirements.  Section A of this part briefly 
explores why the states and localities may have engaged in a flurry of environmental 
protection activity and provides examples of that activity.  Section B analyzes actions by 
all three branches of the federal government, as well as by the states themselves, that 
have the potential to frustrate state and local environmental protection measures that go 
beyond minimum federal requirements 
A. Innovative State or Local Efforts to Move Beyond Federal Law
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 Although state and local governments have the opportunity to serve as 
“laboratories” for social and economic experimentation,301 Congress adopted the federal 
environmental laws at least in part based on the belief that those levels of government 
had neither the ability nor the inclination to provide adequate levels of environmental 
protection.  Indeed, Congress relied on the states’ past failures as a justification for 
shifting the federal government’s role from a mere provider of technical and financial 
assistance to that of the primary body responsible for the establishment of environmental 
policy goals and the legal frameworks necessary to achieve them.302  With the partial 
withdrawal of the federal government from this latter role, the states and local 
governments have reemerged as vehicles for the adoption of ambitious and innovative 
environmental programs. 
  1. The Reasons for State and Local Environmental Activism
 Various explanations have been offered for recent state environmental activism.  
Professor Bill Buzbee asserts that the federal government long had the advantages of 
being the “first mover” in the development of environmental law and policy, including 
the development of expertise and the accumulation of qualified and dedicated 
employees.303  Under the cooperative federalism programs that Congress began to 
establish in the 1970s, however, the states gradually closed this “institutional 
competence” gap in the course of exercising delegated authority to engage in activities 
such as crafting and enforcing SIPs under the CAA and administering the NPDES permit 
program under the CWA.304  According to Buzbee, increasing bureaucratization and 
inflexibility on the part of federal regulators provided further opportunities for the states 
to make inroads into the federal government’s previous predominance.305
 But why were the states even interested in challenging the federal government’s 
leadership role?  In some instances, state initiatives have been the product of
environmental activism, ideological commitment by politicians, and the responsiveness 
of state politicians to their constituents’ demands for greater environmental protection.306
301 See supra note 9 and accompanying text. 
302 See supra notes 80-86 and accompanying text. 
303 Buzbee, supra note 10, at 35. 
304 Id. at 39.  Professor Buzbee has referred to the “learning function” that allows federal and state 
regulators to learn from each other.  Buzbee, Contextual Environmental Federalism, supra note 84, at 122.  
See also Kuehn, supra note 87, at 2379 (discussing the development of strong federal programs as models 
for the states, coupled with past technical and financial assistance from the federal government, as 
explanations for increased state environmental protection activity).  According to Professor Adler, the 
states today “spend more money on environmental matters and employ more environmental bureaucrats 
than does the federal government.”  Adler suggests that the economies of scale argument in favor of federal 
environmental regulation is no longer persuasive because, among other things, “[r]esearch on 
environmental issues has proliferated and is easily available through research libraries and the Internet,” 
and because the local and regional nature of many environmental problems requires local knowledge and 
expertise to solve them.  Adler, supra note 156, at 628-29. 
305 Buzbee, supra note 10, at 41-42. 
306 Id. at 48-49.  Professor Buzbee has argued, however, that “[p]articular moments of political zeal or 
innovation may reveal little” and that “[r]ecent occasional state and local activism during a period of 
Republican ascendancy and arguable environmental retrenchment cannot establish that a federal 
environmental role is unnecessary.”  Buzbee, Contextual Environmental Federalism, supra note 84, at 113.
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State and local governments may pursue environmental protection initiatives as a means 
of attracting new residents who place a high value on environmental amenities.307  In 
other cases, however, state initiatives “cannot be assumed to reflect independent or 
durable state commitment to environmental protection.”308  A state may be interested in 
establishing programs for the remediation of brownfields sites, for example, if the 
existence of such programs qualifies the state for additional federal financial assistance 
under statutes such as CERCLA.309  Similarly, state and local governments may support 
environmental requirements in areas such as hazardous waste cleanups as providing 
opportunities to accelerate the placement of low-value, contaminated sites back on the 
local real estate tax rolls.310  Those results are likely to be of less concern to federal 
officials.311
Still another incentive for the adoption of stringent state environmental protection 
measures is the avoidance of penalties for failing to meet the requirements of federal 
legislation.312  Regulated entities may support state environmental initiatives if they 
perceive their adoption as likely to minimize federal intervention and believe that the 
states are more likely to provide flexible regulatory treatment in the form of variances, 
waivers, deadline extensions, and the like.  Politicians may support such initiatives if they 
are convinced that state regulators will be more receptive to local conditions and that they 
can take political credit for adopting controls that would have been imposed by the 
federal government in the absence of state action.313  Finally, state and local entities may 
adopt environmental protection measures in the hopes of forestalling the imposition of 
more rigorous federal controls.314
  2. Examples of State and Local Environmental Activism
 The potential for state and local governments to serve as “laboratories” for 
experimentation with innovative environmental protection policies has perhaps never 
been as close to realization as it has during the last several years. 315  Along many fronts, 
307 See Barry G. Rabe et al., State Competition As a Source Driving Climate Change Mitigation, 14 N.Y.U. 
ENVTL. L.J. 1, 21-22 (2005). 
308 Buzbee, supra note 10, at 55.  David A. Dana, State Brownfields Programs As Laboratories of 
Democracy?, 14 N.Y.U. ENVTL. L.J. 86 (2005), argued that state brownfields programs amount to a “lost 
opportunity . . . to empirically test different approaches to real property remediation.”  Id. at 86. 
309 Buzbee, supra note 10, at 50-51. 
310 Cf. Rabe et al., supra note 307, at 18 (arguing that states may pursue programs to restrict emissions of 
greenhouse gases as a way of inducing greater use of renewable resources and providing protection against 
energy price fluctuations). 
311 Buzbee, supra note 10, at 54. 
312 Id. at 51 (citing as an example the sanctions states face for failure to meet the NAAQS under the CAA). 
313 Id. at 52-53.  Professor Buzbee also posits that the natural tendency of bureaucracies to expand their 
budgets and turfs may be responsible for state environmental activism.  Id. at 53-54. 
314 See Rabe et al., supra note 307, at 19. 
315 See, e.g., David L. Markell & Martha F. Davis, A Conversation on Federalism and the States:  The 
Balancing Act of Devolution, 64 ALB. L. REV. 1087, 1087 (2001) (contending that, in recent years, the 
pendulum of environmental law and policymaking power “has swung decisively back toward the states”); 
Buzbee, Contextual Environmental Federalism, supra note 84, at 116 (arguing that “underkill” by federal 
regulators “creates opportunities for . . . state actors (such as state attorneys general) to supplement federal 
enforcement or challenge the legal adequacy of the newly relaxed regulatory environment”). 
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the states and localities have provided concrete manifestations of their dissatisfaction 
with the efficacy of federal environmental protection measures.  These governments have 
sought through legislation, administrative regulation, and litigation to supplement federal 
environmental protection laws with their own, more extensive or rigorous endeavors.
Most of these efforts have been geared to restrict harm to human health and the 
environment caused by pollution. 
 State and local governments have made efforts to move beyond federal regulatory 
requirements through the adoption of legislation, the issuance of environmental 
regulations by state environmental agencies, and the pursuit of litigation by state 
attorneys general and similar officials.316  The most prominent examples of such efforts 
relate to global climate change.317  The United States is not a signatory to the Kyoto 
Protocol, the most significant international effort to curb greenhouse gas emissions that 
contribute to global warming.318  Carbon dioxide is not currently regulated by EPA under 
the CAA.319  State and local governments, however, have taken a variety of actions to 
address the potential adverse climatic changes that may result from continued greenhouse 
gas emissions. 
One of the most ambitious of the recent state efforts to combat global warming 
has been the one involving a group of northeastern and mid-Atlantic states.  These states 
signed a Memorandum of Agreement in December 2005 that committed them to develop 
a regional cap-and-trade program, known as the Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative 
(RGGI), to help control CO2 emissions from power plants.
320  Shortly thereafter, the 
states issued a draft “model rule.”321  The RGGI program is not the only regional global 
warming initiative.  Legislators from six Midwestern states — Illinois, Iowa, Michigan, 
316 See generally Symposium:  The Role of State Attorneys General in National Environmental Policy, 30 
COLUM. J. ENVTL. L. 335 (2005). 
317 See generally John C. Dernbach, Facing Climate Change:  Opportunities and Tools for States, 14 
WIDENER L.J. 1 (2004). 
318 GLICKSMAN ET AL., supra note 62, at 488. 
319 See, e.g., Massachusetts v. EPA, 415 F.3d 50 (D.C. Cir.), rehearing en banc denied, 433 F.3d 66 (D.C. 
Cir. 2005) (upholding EPA’s refusal to regulate emissions of greenhouse gases from new motor vehicles 
under the CAA, 42 U.S.C. § 7521(a)(1)). 
320 See Regional Greenhouse gas Initiative, An Initiative of the Northeast & Mid-Atlantic States of the U.S.,  
available at http://www.rggi.org/; Resources for the Future, Resources for the Future’s work on the 
Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative, available at
http://www.weathervane.rff.org/solutions_and_actions/United_States/rggi; Administration to Focus on 
Voluntary Efforts As More States Move to Regulate Emissions, ENV’T REP. (BNA) S-11, Jan. 20, 2006; 
Barclay G. Jones, CHICAGO SUN TIMES, Mar. 25, 2006, at 16; Conservation Law Foundation, Regional 
Greenhouse Gas Initiative, available at http://www.clf.org/programs/cases.asp?id=341.  Some states 
debated whether to join RGGI or adopt their own greenhouse gas controls.  See, e.g., Maryland legislators 
push carbon rules if state does not join regional system, ELEC. UTIL. WEEKLY, Jan. 30, 2006, at 16.  See 
generally Kirsten H. Engel, Mitigating Global Climate Change in the United States:  A Regional Approach,
14 N.Y.U. ENVTL. L.J. 54 (2005) (favoring a regional approach). 
321 Northeast states ready to release draft rule on regional emissions pact, 10 GREENWIRE # 9, Mar. 22, 
2006; Work Nearly Complete on Draft Model Rule for Northeast States to Reduce Emissions, 37 ENV’T
REP. (BNA) 335, Feb. 17, 2006. 
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Minnesota, Ohio, and Wisconsin — also have initiated a regional effort to reduce 
greenhouse gas emissions.322
Other state actions have been unilateral in nature. At least seven states, led by 
California, have adopted regulations requiring reductions in greenhouse gas emissions 
from automobiles.323  In 2005, New Mexico signed onto the Chicago Climate Exchange, 
which operates the only emission trading market in the United States to induce reductions 
in greenhouse gas emissions.324  Illinois has offered farmers and other landowners the 
opportunity to earn and sell greenhouse gas emission credits by adopting conservation 
practices that reduce those emissions.325 The state of Washington ordered a twenty 
percent reduction in state vehicles’ petroleum use.326  Some local governments also have 
made efforts to reduce greenhouse gas emissions through actions such as switching to 
biodiesel fuels to run city-owned vehicles and retrofitting municipal buildings to make 
them more energy-efficient.327
 Another area in which the states have pursued more stringent pollution control 
measures than EPA relates to the control of emissions of other kinds of air pollutants 
from motor vehicles.328  The CAA generally prohibits the states or their political 
subdivisions from adopting any standards for controlling emissions from new motor 
322 Midwest lawmakers move to reduce greenhouse gases, ELEC. POWER DAILY, Feb. 8, 2006, at 1.  The 
constitutional validity of state cap-and-trade programs has been questioned.  See, e.g., Yvonne Gross, Note, 
Kyoto, Congress, or Bust:  The Constitutional Invalidity of State CO2 Cap-and-Trade Programs, 28 T. 
JEFFERSON L. REV. ___ (2005) (forthcoming). 
323 See, e.g., Maine becomes 6th state to impose Calif. emission standards, GREENWIRE, Dec. 1, 2005; 
Report:  New rules will slash car pollution, THE REGISTER-GUARD, Oct. 5, 2005 (discussing Oregon 
regulations); Gov. Carcieri Announces Plans to Adopt New California Vehicle Emissions Standards, US 
STATES NEWS, Oct. 13, 2005; State air officials, auto industry battle over Clean Air Act provision, INSIDE
ENERGY WITH FEDERAL LANDS, Dec. 19, 2005 (discussing industry’s opposition to state adoption of 
California standards for controlling greenhouse gas emissions); Final Approval Given for California Rules 
to Cut Greenhouse Gases From Vehicles, 36 ENV’T REP. (BNA) 2367, Nov. 18, 2005 (discussing New 
York rules).  A bill was introduced in the California legislature in April 2006 that would require reductions 
in emissions of all greenhouse gases by 25 percent from 1990 levels by 2020.  If the bill is adopted, 
California would become the first state to impose limits on the emission of all greenhouse gases.  John 
Holusha, California Bill Calls for Cuts in Emissions, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 4, 2006, at A16. 
324 See Tania Soussan, N.M. Seeks Energy Policy Blueprint; Governor Touts Renewable Power,
ALBUQUERQUE J., Feb. 24, 2006, at B3.  See also Susan Diesenhouse, Cleaning up the air one trade at a 
time, CHIC. TRIBUNE, Feb. 23, 2006 (describing voluntary trading of air pollution reduction credits through 
the Chicago Climate Exchange).  Members of the Exchange reduced their emissions eight percent below 
the amounts to which they committed themselves in the first two years of the program.  Jill Schachner 
Chanen, Ideas From the Front, 91 A.B.A. J. 26, Oct. 2005. 
325 See Farmers can earn, sell greenhouse-gas emission credits, THE STATE J.-REG., Jan. 27, 2006, at 23; 
Illinois Dep’t of Agric., Illinois Launches First State Program To Offer Greenhouse Gas Emissions 
Credits, Jan. 27, 2006, available at http://www.agr.state.il.us/newsrel/r0127061.html. 
326 “Patchwork” of state GHG curbs emerging in the West, 10 GREENWIRE # 9, Sept. 21, 2005. 
327 See, e.g., Berkeley Reports 14-percent Reduction in Carbon Emissions, GLOBAL WARMING TODAY,
Sept. 28, 2005; Patrick Hoge, Greenhouse emissions reduced by biodiesel, S.F. CHRONICLE, Sept. 13, 2005, 
at B3. 
328 See generally U.S. PIRG Education Fund, Power to Protect:  The Critical Role States Play in Cleaning 
Up Pollution from Mobile Sources (May 2005) (describing importance of retention of state authority under 
the CAA to adopt mobile source controls more stringent than those adopted by EPA). 
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vehicles or motor vehicle engines.329  As early as the 1967 version of the CAA, Congress 
took the position that the existence of a multitude of federal and state standards for 
controlling auto exhaust would result in “increased costs to consumers nationwide, with 
benefit only to those in one section of the country.”330  Congress recognized, however, 
that California faced “unique problems . . . as a result of its climate and topography.”331
In addition, California took steps in the 1960s to control auto emissions even before the 
federal government did.  These factors induced Congress to allow California to apply to 
EPA for a waiver of the CAA’s preemption of state emission control standards that differ 
from the federal standards.332  In 1977, Congress amended the CAA to allow other states 
to adopt and enforce motor vehicle emissions controls that are identical to any California 
standards for which EPA had already granted a waiver.333  Several states, particularly in 
the northeast, have taken advantage of this provision by adopting standards equivalent to 
more stringent California standards approved by EPA.334
Similar state and local efforts to take stronger steps to combat pollution than those 
the federal government has been willing to take have arisen in a variety of other pollution 
control contexts.335  Some states have objected to EPA’s “imprudently” broad proposed 
exemptions from hazardous waste management requirements under RCRA.336  Other 
examples of state rules that either apply to substances not regulated by EPA or impose 
more stringent controls than those reflected in EPA regulatory programs include the 
adoption by various states of controls on emissions of mercury from power plants,337
329 42 U.S.C. § 7543(a). 
330 H.R. Rep. No. 90-278, at 42 (1967). 
331 Id.
332 42 U.S.C. § 7543(b)(1). 
333 42 U.S.C. § 7507. 
334 See, e.g., Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass’n of U.S., Inc. v. New York State Dep’t of Envtl. Conservation, 79 
F.3d 1298 (2nd Cir. 1996) (approving New York standards). 
335 The states also have urged EPA and other federal agencies to adopt more stringent controls on polluting 
activities.  See, e.g., State, local regulators challenge EPA’s soot cleanup strategy, GREENWIRE, Nov. 30, 
2005 (discussing attacks by state and local officials on EPA’s proposed fine particulate matter NAAQS 
under the CAA on the ground that it is insufficiently protective of health); EPA Draws Criticism For 
Failure to Regulate PM2.5 Precursors, INSIDE EPA WEEKLY, Feb. 10, 2006, at 18 (same); States Raise 
Concern Over Possible Elimination of Some Air Toxics Rules, INSIDE EPA WEEKLY, Jan. 13, 2006, at 7 
(discussing state concern that EPA might eliminate controls on some industrial emissions of toxic air 
pollutants). 
336 See Office of the Governor of Illinois, Governor Blagojevich proposes aggressive mercury emission 
controls for Illinois power plants, available at
http://www.illinois.gov/PressReleases/PrintPressRelease.cfm?Subject1; Illinois’ Stringent Mercury 
Proposal May Serve As Model for States, INSIDE EPA WEEKLY, Jan. 13, 2006, at 17; States Vow to Limit 
Adoption of Waste Rule If EPA Backs Broad Waivers, INSIDE EPA WEEKLY, Dec. 2, 2005, at 1, 4-5.  EPA 
published its proposed rules and solicited comments on them in 2003.  Revisions to the Definition of Solid 
Waste; Proposed rule, 68 Fed. Reg. 61,558 (Oct. 28, 2003). 
337 See, e.g., Michael Janofsky, Groups Propose Alternative to E.P.A. Rules on Mercury, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 
14, 2005, at A17; Groups offer states, local governments stricter alternatives to mercury rule, INSIDE
ENERGY WITH FEDERAL LANDS, Nov. 21, 2005 (discussing multi-state, model rule); Jeff Nesmith, Stricter 
rules on mercury pollution proposed: EPA plan called ‘totally inadequate’, ATLANTA J.-CONST., Nov. 15, 
2005 (same); Illinois’ Stringent Mercury Proposal May Serve As Model For States, ENERGY WASH. WEEK,
Jan. 18, 2006; Governor Blagojevich proposes aggressive mercury emission controls for Illinois power 
plants, IGNN:  Environment Press Release, Jan. 5, 2006, available at http://www.ilinois.gov/Press
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efforts by Massachusetts to adopt cleanup and drinking water standards for chemicals that 
exceed EPA standards,338 and the New Mexico Governor’s executive order on 
environmental justice that requires regulators to conduct “community impact 
assessments” before permitting new facilities in “vulnerable” areas.339  EPA actions that 
restrict the scope of federal regulation have sometimes directly prompted efforts to 
strengthen controls at the state level.340
 State and local governments also have resorted to litigation as a means of 
enhancing the levels of environmental protection provided by the federal government.  
North Carolina, for example, filed a common law public nuisance action against the 
Tennessee Valley Authority to force it to reduce its emission of air pollutants that include 
SO2, oxides of nitrogen, and mercury.
341  In addition, the states have filed amicus briefs 
in cases involving the validity or interpretation of the federal environmental statutes in 
which they have supported expansive application of those laws.342
B. Developments that Decrease State or Local Power to Move Beyond 
Federal Law 
Releases/ShowPressRelease.cfm?SubjectI. ..; State Mercury Pact Seeks Midpoint Between EPA Rule, 
Activist Demands, INSIDE EPA WEEKLY, Nov. 18, 2005, at 14.  EPA issued its final mercury rules in 2005.  
Standards of Performance for New and Existing Stationary Sources: Electric Utility Steam Generating 
Units; Final rule, 70 Fed. Reg. 28,606 (May 18, 2005); Pennsylvania Mercury Plan Could Limit Credits for 
EPA Trading, INSIDE EPA WEEKLY, Feb. 24, 2006, at 1. 
338 See, e.g., Massachusetts to Propose Nation’s Strictest Perchlorate Standards, INSIDE EPA WEEKLY,
June 10, 2005, at 11. 
339 Exec. Order 2005-056, Environmental Justice Executive Order (Nov. 18, 2005); New Mexico Moves to 
Implement Landmark Environmental Justice Order, INSIDE EPA WEEKLY, Jan. 6, 2006, at 1, 14; 
Richardson Signs Environmental Justice Executive Order, CCNS, available at
http://nuclearactive.org/news/112305.html; Order Boosts Environmental Justice; Policy gives public  say 
on decisions concerning air, water and noise pollution, ALBUQUERQUE J., Nov. 19, 2005, at E3. 
340 See, e.g., State Lawmaker Plans California TRI Program to Counter EPA Rule, INSIDE EPA WEEKLY,
Feb. 17, 2006, at 3 (describing California legislator’s proposal to establish toxic chemical reporting 
program that is more expansive than EPA’s program under EPCRA). 
341 North Carolina v. Tennessee Valley Auth., Case No. 1:06CV20 (W.D.N.C. filed, Jan. 30, 2006).  See
North Carolina Case Could Test Air Act Preemption of Nuisance Suits, INSIDE EPA WEEKLY, Feb. 10, 
2006, at 1, 8-9; Mounting Global Warming Evidence Bolsters N.C. Suit Against TVA’s Air Pollution,
ASHEVILLE CITIZEN-TIMES, Feb. 1, 2006, at 6A.  See generally Thomas W. Merrill, Global Warming As A 
Public Nuisance, 30 COLUM. J. ENVTL.L. 293 (2005); Jason J. Czarnezki & Mark L. Thomsen, Advancing 
the Rebirth of Environmental Common Law 13-20 (April 2006), available at
http://ssrn.com/abstract=895221. 
342 See, e.g., Brief of Amici Curiae Association of State Wetland Managers, Association of State Floodplain 
Managers, and New England and Interstate Water Pollution Control Commission in Support of Respondent 
United States, Nos. 04-1034, 04-1384 (U.S. Jan. 13, 2006), 2006 WL 139206 (supporting application of 
CWA dredge and fill permit program to wetlands adjacent to navigable waters); Brief Of The States Of 
New York, Michigan, Arizona, Arkansas, California, Connecticut, Delaware, Florida, Hawaii, Illinois, 
Iowa, Kentucky, Louisiana, Maine, Maryland, Massachusetts, Minnesota, Mississippi, Missouri, Montana, 
New Hampshire, New Jersey, New Mexico, North Carolina, Ohio, Oklahoma, Oregon, Rhode Island, South 
Carolina, Tennessee, Vermont, Washington, And Wisconsin, The District Of Columbia, The Pennsylvania 
Department Of Environmental Protection, And The International Association, Nos. 04-1034, 04-1384 (U.S. 
Jan. 13, 2006), 2006 WL 139208 (same). 
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 The catalog of state and local environmental protection initiatives described above 
illustrates the potential benefits of a federal system of government.  In areas in which the 
federal government has adopted environmental and natural resource management policies 
that the states and localities have deemed insufficient, the states and their political 
subdivisions have resorted to a variety of legislative, regulatory, and judicial devices to 
fill in gaps in the coverage of federal environmental law.  At the same time that all three 
branches of the federal government have contributed to a weakening of environmental 
law at the federal level, however, they have also made decisions that hamper the ability 
of state and local governments to adopt measures designed to provide levels of 
environmental protection that exceed those provided by federal regulation.  These 
decisions have prevented the states and localities from achieving their full potential as 
laboratories of environmental policymaking. 
  1. Judicial Developments
 The courts have used various doctrines to restrict the scope of state and local 
authority to control activities with the potential to harm the environment to a degree that 
extends beyond the federal government’s regulatory programs.  These include 
invalidation of state or local environmental regulations that are found to violate the 
dormant Commerce Clause, that are preempted, or that amount to takings without just 
compensation.  In addition, in at least one case, a court dismissed an attempt to pursue 
state common law claims against activities that contribute to environmental damage as a 
nonjusticiable political question. 
   a. The Dormant Commerce Clause 
 One of the constitutional bases for restricting state and local regulatory authority 
is the dormant Commerce Clause, which restricts the ability of states and localities to 
control the flow of interstate commerce or discriminate against out-of-state commerce.  
Beginning in 1976, with its decision in City of Philadelphia v. New Jersey,343 the 
Supreme Court has repeatedly struck down state and local attempts to prohibit the 
importation of wastes generated elsewhere or otherwise to control the flow of waste.344
The lower courts also have struck down other kinds of state and local measures with 
purported environmental protection goals as violations of the dormant Commerce 
Clause.345
343 437 U.S. 617 (1978).   
344 See C&A Carbone, Inc. v. Town of Clarkstown, 511 U.S. 383 (1994); Oregon Waste Sys., Inc. v. 
Oregon Dep’t of Envtl. Quality, 511 U.S. 93 (1992); Fort Gratiot Sanitary Landfill, Inc. v. Michigan Dep’t 
of Natural Resources, 504 U.S. 353 (1992); Chem. Waste Mgmt., Inc. v. Hunt, 504 U.S. 334 (1992).  See
also Waste Mgmt. Holdings, Inc. v. Gilmore, 252 F.3d 316 (4th Cir. 2001) (holding that statute capping 
amount of municipal solid waste that may be accepted by Virginia landfills violated the dormant 
Commerce Clause); Envtl. Tech. Council v. Sierra Club, 98 F.3d 774 (4th Cir. 1996) (striking down laws 
that restricted in-state treatment and disposal of hazardous waste generated in other states). 
345 See, e.g., Wendover City v. West Wendover City, 404 F. Supp. 2d 1324 (D. Utah 2005) (invalidating 
ordinance allegedly enacted to provide healthy and safe water to city’s residents); Biganic Safety Brands, 
Inc. v. Ament, 174 F. Supp. 2d 1168 (D. Colo. 2001) (holding that state statute prohibiting manufacturers 
of pesticides exempt from regulation under FIFRA from making safety claims on labels violated the 
dormant Commerce Clause); Blue Circle Cement, Inc. v. Bd. of County Comm’rs, 917 F. Supp. 2d 1514 
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   b. The Supremacy Clause 
The courts also have invalidated state and local environmental regulations under 
the preemption doctrine.  Unlike the dormant Commerce Clause, which the courts invoke 
in the absence of federal legislation,346 the preemption doctrine provides a basis for 
striking down state and local laws based on judicial interpretation of congressional intent.
State and federal laws do not always fall by the wayside when attacked on preemption 
grounds.  The Supreme Court held in 2005, for example, that FIFRA does not preempt 
state common law claims such as breach of warranty against pesticide manufacturers.347
The courts also have held that federal statutes do not preempt state regulations that seek 
to promote the manufacture and use of fuel-efficient appliances.348
In other cases, however, the courts have concluded that state or local 
environmental protection laws are invalid under the Supremacy Clause.  In Engine
Manufacturers Association v. South Coast Air Quality Management District,349 for 
example, the Supreme Court addressed the validity of fleet rules adopted by the South 
Coast Air Quality Management District, which is responsible for air pollution control in 
the Los Angeles metropolitan area.  Those rules prohibited the purchase or lease by 
various public and private fleet operators of vehicles that did not comply with stringent 
emission requirements.  In particular, they required the purchase or lease of alternative-
fuel vehicles or vehicles that met emission specifications established by the California 
Air Resources Board.  The Court held that section 209(a) of the CAA,350 which bars 
states or local governments from adopting or enforcing “standards” to control auto 
emissions, preempted the fleet rules.  Even though standards typically target vehicle or 
engine manufacturers, the Court reasoned that “[a] command, accompanied by sanctions, 
that certain purchasers may buy only vehicles with particular emission characteristics is 
(N.D. Okla. 1995) (holding that county ordinance restricting hazardous waste treatment and recycling 
violated the dormant Commerce Clause).  But cf. Nat’l Audubon Soc’y v. Davis, 307 F.3d 835 (9th Cir.), 
amended and rehearing denied, 312 F.3d 416 (9th Cir. 2002) (holding that state law restricting the use of 
leghold traps to catch fur-bearing animals did not violate the dormant Commerce Clause); Croplife Am., 
Inc. v. City of Madison, 373 F. Supp. 2d 905 (W.D. Wisc. 2005) (holding that city and county ordinances 
barring sale of commercial fertilizers containing phosphorus did not violate the dormant Commerce 
Clause). 
346 See ZYGMUNT J.B. PLATER, ET AL., ENVIRONMENTAL LAW AND POLICY:  NATURE, LAW, AND SOCIETY
341(3d ed. 2004) (stating that “[w]hen the Commerce Clause has not been used by Congress to pretermit 
state legislation, its power still exists, lying ‘dormant’ until the courts apply it to strike down protectionist 
laws”).  On the Supreme Court’s dormant Commerce Clause jurisprudence, see generally Lisa Heinzerling, 
The Commercial Constitution, 1995 SUP. CT. REV. 217. 
347 Bates v. Dow Agrosciences LLC, 125 S. Ct. 1788 (2005).  In other cases, the courts have found that 
FIFRA and other federal legislation preempted state common law causes of action.  See, e.g., Wilcox v. 
Homestake Mining Co., 401 F. Supp. 2d 1196 (D.N.M. 2005) (holding that the Price-Anderson Act 
preempted common law strict liability causes of action for groundwater contamination allegedly caused by 
uranium milling facility). 
348 See Air Conditioning and Refrigeration Inst. v. Energy Resources Conservation and Dev. Comm’n, 410 
F.3d 492 (9th Cir. 2004) (holding that California regulations were not preempted by the Energy Policy and 
Conservation Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 6297, 6316), petition for cert. filed, 74 U.S.L.W. 3162 (Sept. 12, 2005). 
349 541 U.S. 246 (2004).  See also Geier v. American Honda Motor Co., 529 U.S. 861 (2000). 
350 42 U.S.C. § 7543(a). 
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as much an ‘attempt to enforce’ a ‘standard’ as a command, accompanied by sanctions, 
that a certain percentage of a manufacturer’s sales volume must consist of such vehicles.
We decline to read into § 209(a) a purchase/sale distinction that is not found in the text of 
§ 209(a) or the structure of the CAA.”351  Similarly, the courts have held that the CAA 
preempted state regulations requiring that minimal percentages of new vehicles certified 
for sale in a state be zero-emission vehicles.352
The courts have found state air pollution protection laws other than those 
applicable to motor vehicles to be violative of the Supremacy Clause.  In one case, for 
example, New York enacted a statute that restricted the ability of New York public 
utilities subject to the CAA’s acid deposition control program to sell their SO2
allowances to utilities located in upwind states.  The state legislature feared that SO2
emissions in upwind states would exacerbate rather than alleviate acid rain in New York.
The Second Circuit held that the CAA preempted New York’s Air Pollution Mitigation 
Law.  It found that the state statute interfered with the nationwide allowance transfer 
system created by Congress for regulating SO2 emissions
353 by effectively banning 
allowance sales to utilities in upwind states.354  The courts also have concluded that other 
federal pollution control laws, including RCRA,355 the Hazardous Materials 
Transportation Act,356 and CERCLA, preempted state and local pollution control laws.357
EPA is not the only federal agency whose organic statutes and implementing 
regulation have had preemptive effect.  In one case, for example, the D.C. Circuit 
concluded in affirming the district court’s denial of a preliminary injunction that a rail 
carrier was substantially likely to succeed in its argument that regulations issued by the 
Department of Transportation under the Federal Rail Carrier Safety Act358 preempted 
351 Engine Mfrs. Ass’n, 541 U.S. at 255. 
352 Ass’n of Int'l Auto. Mfrs., Inc. v. Comm’r, Mass. Dep't of Envtl. Protection, 208 F.3d 1 (1st Cir. 2000); 
Am. Auto. Mfrs. v. Cahill, 152 F.3d 196 (2d Cir. 1998).  Compare Am. Auto. Mfrs. Ass'n v. Mass. Dep't of 
Envtl. Protection, 163 F.3d 74 (1st Cir. 1998) (remanding to EPA under primary jurisdiction doctrine to 
resolve related statutory interpretation questions concerning the validity of the state's zero-emission vehicle 
quota requirement).  Other state and local efforts to protect air quality have survived preemption attacks.  
See, e.g., Oxygenated Fuels Ass’n v. Pataki, 293 F. Supp. 2d 170 (N.D.N.Y. 2003) (upholding state law 
banning use, sale, or importation in New York of fuels containing additive). 
353 42 U.S.C. § 7651b. 
354 Clean Air Markets Group v. Pataki, 338 F.3d 82 (2d Cir. 2003). 
355 See, e.g., Boyes v. Shell Oil Prod. Co., 199 F.3d 1260 (11th Cir. 2000) (holding that state program for 
remediation of contamination from underground storage tanks that had not been approved by EPA was 
preempted by RCRA); Blue Circle Cement, Inc. v. Bd. of County Comm’rs, 917 F. Supp. 2d 1514 (N.D. 
Okla. 1995) (holding that RCRA preempted county ordinance restricting hazardous waste treatment and 
recycling that amounted to a de facto ban on burning of hazardous waste fuels). 
356 See, e.g., New York Dep’t of Envtl. Conservation v. U.S. Dep’t of Transp., 37 F. Supp. 2d 152 
(N.D.N.Y. 1999) (holding that state regulations prohibiting the consolidation and transfer of hazardous 
wastes were preempted). 
357 See, e.g., Fireman’s Fund Ins. Co. v. City of  Lodi, 302 F.3d 928 (9th Cir. 2002) (holding that various 
provisions of local hazardous waste remediation and compensation ordinance were preempted by 
CERCLA); United States v. City and County of Denver, 100 F.3d 1509 (10th Cir. 1996) (holding that local 
zoning ordinance restricting hazardous waste disposal was preempted because it conflicted with remedial 
order issued by EPA under CERCLA). 
358 49 U.S.C. § 20106. 
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more stringent regulations adopted by the District of Columbia that restricted the 
transportation of hazardous materials by rail near the U.S. Capitol Building.359  Some 
state and local efforts to minimize the dangers posed by nuclear waste also have fallen by 
the wayside based on the preemptive effect of the Atomic Energy Act.360
The courts have found that legislation governing management of the federal lands 
preempts some state and local environmental regulation.  The Eighth Circuit, for 
example, held that the General Mining Law preempted a county ordinance prohibiting the 
issuance of new permits for surface metal extraction in the national forests.361  In another 
case, the court held that the Magnuson Fishery Conservation and Management Act362
preempted state regulations that prohibited the use of gill nets to take rockfish in federal 
waters.363
   c. The Takings Clause 
Beginning in the late 1980s, the Supreme Court reinvigorated the takings clause 
as a constraint on the power of all levels of government to regulate the use of private 
property.  In cases such as Lucas,364 Nollan,365 and Dolan,366 the Court found that state 
and local regulations amounted to impermissible takings of private property for a public 
use without just compensation.  Despite more recent Supreme Court decisions rejecting 
takings attacks on state and local environmental regulations,367 the takings clause remains 
a potentially significant obstacle to state and local efforts to control uses of land that 
contribute to public health risks and environmental degradation.368
359 CSX Transp., Inc. v. Williams, 406 F.3d 667 (D.C. Cir. 2005).  
360 See, e.g., Skull Valley Band of Goshute Indians v. Nielson, 376 F.3d 1223 (9th Cir. 2004) (holding that 
state statute regulating storage of spent nuclear fuel was preempted by the Atomic Energy Act); United 
States v. Kentucky, 252 F.3d 816 (6th Cir. 2001) (holding that restrictions imposed by state environmental 
agency on amount of radioactive materials that could be placed in landfill were preempted by the Atomic 
Energy Act); Abraham v. Hodges, 255 F. Supp. 2d 539 (D.S.C. 2002) (holding that state governor’s 
executive order blocking federal shipments of uranium into the state was preempted by the Atomic Energy 
Act).
361 S. Dakota Mining Ass’n v. Lawrence County, 155 F.3d 1005 (8th Cir. 1998).  Compare Mount Olivet 
Cemetery Ass’n v. Salt Lake City, 164 F.3d 480 (10th Cir. 1998) (holding that the BLM’s approval of a 
lease on property in which the federal government owned a possibility of reverter did not preempt a local 
zoning ordinance). 
362 16 U.S.C. §§ 1801-1822.  
363 See Vietnamese Fishermen Ass’n v. California Dep’t of Fish & Game, 816 F. Supp. 1468 (N.D. Cal. 
1993).  See also Southeastern Fisheries Ass’n, Inc. v. Chiles, 979 F.2d 1504, 1509 (11th Cir. 1992) 
(concluding that the Magnuson Act occupied the field of fishery management in the exclusive economic 
zone).  But see Davrod Corp. v. Coates, 971 F.2d 778, 784-87 (1st Cir. 1992) (holding that Magnuson Act 
did not preempt state regulation of squid fishing in off-shore waters).  Noe v. Henderson, 373 F. Supp. 2d 
939 (E.D. Ark. 2005), held that the Migratory Bird Treaty Act, 16 U.S.C. §§ 703-711, did not preempt state 
regulation of captive-reared mallard ducks not covered by the federal statute. 
364 Lucas v. S. Carolina Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003 (1992). 
365 Nollan v. California Coastal Comm’n, 483 U.S. 825 (1987). 
366 Dolan v. City of Tigard, 512 U.S. 374 (1994). 
367 E.g., Tahoe-Sierra Preservation Council v. Tahoe Reg’l Planning Agency, 535 U.S. 302 (2002). 
368 See, e.g., Tarlock, supra note 139, at 1339 (claiming that federal takings law “is insufficiently 
deferential to local situations in a way that impedes the protection of biodiversity”).  State or local 
regulation of activities that pose threats to the public health and the environment in the nature of nuisance-
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d. Article III Justiciability Obstacles 
Some states have resorted to common law litigation to supplement federal 
environmental protection efforts.  In one case, for example, several states filed a common 
law nuisance action against public utilities in which the states sought an order abating the 
utilities’ emissions of greenhouse gases that allegedly contributed to global warming.  A 
federal district court dismissed the action on the ground that the case raised non-
justiciable political questions that federal courts lacked the authority to resolve under 
Article III of the Constitution.369
2. Congressional Efforts to Weaken State Regulatory Authority
Congress can constrain the authority of state and local governments to adopt 
environmental legislation by explicitly barring those governments from doing so.  
Although it has not done so frequently, Congress on occasion has blocked or limited the 
ability of the states to protect the environment in ways that differ from those envisioned 
by regulatory programs.  The CAA, as indicated above,370 preempts state control of 
motor vehicle emissions and fuel additives except in limited circumstances.371  The CAA 
also explicitly preempts state and local standards that control aircraft emissions.372
FIFRA bars the states from imposing any requirements for labeling or packaging of 
pesticides in addition to or different from those required by EPA.373
A more recent example of Congress’s exercise of its authority to preempt state 
authority to adopt measures that go beyond federal regulatory standards appears in the 
Energy Policy Act of 2005.374  That law vests in a federal agency the exclusive power “to 
approve or deny an application for the siting, construction, expansion, or operation of [a 
liquefied natural gas] terminal,”375 thereby preventing state or local governments from 
imposing land use controls or other restrictions they deem more protective of the public 
health and safety and the environment than federal regulatory measures provide.  
Additional legislative proposals to preempt state and local authority to protect health, 
safety, and the environment have proliferated in recent years.  Congress has considered 
legislation, for example, that would curtail the ability of the states to adopt food safety 
regulations that are more stringent than federal standards issued by the Food and Drug 
like uses may be immune from takings attacks.  See generally Robert L. Glicksman, Making A Nuisance of 
Takings Law, 3 WASH. U.J.L. & POL’Y 149 (2000). 
369 Connecticut v. American Elec. Power Co., Inc., 406 F. Supp.2d 265 (S.D.N.Y. 2005).  See generally
Lori R. Baker, Recent Developments, Global Warming:  Attorneys General Declare Public Nuisance, 27 
U. HAW. L. REV. 525 (2005). 
370 See supra notes 330-34 and accompanying text. 
371 42 U.S.C. §§ 7543(a), 7545(c)(4). 
372 42 U.S.C. § 7573. 
373 7 U.S.C. § 136v(b). 
374 Pub. L. No. 109-58, § 311(c)(2), 119 Stat. 594, 686 (2005).   
375 15 U.S.C. § 717b(e)(1).  The federal government is required to consult with state officials, however. Id.
§ 717b-1. 
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Administration.376  Congress has considered but not yet acted upon legislation that would 
bar the states from regulating chemicals not regulated by EPA under TSCA.377
3. Administrative Efforts to Weaken State Regulatory Authority
 Efforts to preempt state and local measures to protect the environment have not 
been confined to Congress.  EPA and other federal agencies also have used their 
regulatory powers to bar states from adopting such measures.  In one instance, a court 
overturned on procedural grounds a regulation issued by EPA under the CAA that 
prohibited state environmental agencies from imposing more rigorous air pollution 
monitoring requirements on power plants holding state-issued permits.378  Within a few 
days, EPA announced that it would propose a new rule to restrict the power of the states 
to impose monitoring requirements that go beyond EPA’s own regulations.379  EPA’s 
efforts to waive environmental requirements as a means of facilitating reconstruction 
along the Gulf Coast in the wake of Hurricanes Katrina and Rita in 2005 raised concerns 
that any such waivers would preclude the affected states from enforcing their own 
environmental rules.380  The states also have expressed concerns that final or proposed 
regulations issued by EPA were drafted in a manner that would preempt more stringent 
state approaches on issues such as the ability of the states to restrict the use of pesticide 
studies conducted on humans.381  EPA has contemplated the adoption of additional 
regulations that would preclude the states from adopting emissions controls for SO2 and 
oxides of nitrogen that are more stringent than those contained in EPA’s Clean Air Act 
Interstate Rule382 and that would restrict state authority to regulate oil and gas industry 
activities that contribute to surface water pollution.383
376 See, e.g., National Uniformity for Food Act, H.R. 2699, 108th Cong. 2d Sess.(2004); Marian Burros, Bill 
May Undo States’ Rules on Food Safety, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 1, 2006, available at
http://www.nytimes/com/2006/03/01/politics/01food.html?_r=1&oref=slogin&pagewanted+. 
377 See House GOP’s Chemical Treaty Bill Faces State Preemption Concerns, INSIDE EPA WEEKLY, Mar. 
3, 2006, at 15; Pat Phibbs, Attorneys General Say Bill to Amend TSCA Would Limit States’ Ability to 
Protect Citizens, 37 ENV’T REP. (BNA) 456, Mar. 3, 2006 (discussing H.R. 4591).  
378 Envtl. Integrity Project v. EPA, 425 F.3d 992 (D.C. Cir. 2005).  Cf. EPA RCRA Burden Reduction Rule 
Falls Short of Key State Requests, INSIDE EPA WEEKLY, Apr. 7, 2006, at 3 (discussing EPA’s rejection of 
state requests that only independent engineers be allowed to certify  compliance with regulatory 
requirements under RCRA for design of drip pads for waste containers); Resource Conservation and 
Recovery Act Burden Reduction Initiative; Final rule, 71 Fed. Reg. 16,862, 16,868-69 (Apr. 4, 2006) 
(explaining EPA’s reasons for rejecting approach favored by the states). 
379 State Monitoring Requirements Preserved Pending New EPA Air Rule, INSIDE EPA WEEKLY, Oct. 14, 
2005), at 9. 
380 See Possible State Preemption Raises New Queries on EPA Waiver Bills, INSIDE EPA WEEKLY, Oct. 21, 
2005, at 14. 
381 EPA Rule on Human Studies Prompts New Concerns Over State Control, INSIDE EPA WEEKLY, Jan. 27, 
2006, at 1, 8. 
382 See INSIDE EPA WEEKLY, June 10, 2005, at 1, 10. The Clean Air Act Interstate Rule was promulgated in 
2005.  Rule To Reduce Interstate Transport of Fine Particulate Matter and Ozone (Clean Air Interstate 
Rule); Revisions to Acid Rain Program; Revisions to the NOx SIP Call; Final rule, 70 Fed. Reg. 25,162 
(May 12, 2005). 
383 See Groups Charge EPA Stormwater Rule May Undermine State Authority, INSIDE EPA WEEKLY, Mar. 
10, 2006, at 5. 
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EPA is not the only federal agency that has taken the position that its actions 
preempt state efforts to protect health and the environment that extend beyond federal 
requirements.  The National Highway Traffic Safety Administration (NHTSA), for 
example, stated in the preamble to a proposed rule establishing corporate average fuel 
economy standards for light trucks that, pursuant to the Energy Policy and Conservation 
Act (EPCA),384 “a state may not impose a legal requirement relating to fuel economy, 
whether by statute, regulation or otherwise, that conflicts with this rule. A state law that 
seeks to reduce motor vehicle carbon dioxide emissions is both expressly and impliedly 
preempted.”385  Further, the federal government has supported suits by industry attacking 
state environmental, health, and safety regulations on the ground that they are preempted 
by federal legislation.386
 In the federal lands context, several state governors have objected to the Forest 
Service’s replacement of the virtual ban on road construction and timber harvesting in 
roadless areas of the national forests that was adopted during the Clinton Administration 
with the state petitions approach adopted in regulations issued by the Forest Service 
during the Bush Administration in 2005.387  The petition process created under the 2005 
regulations requires that the states incur the costs of developing a petition requesting the 
imposition of use restrictions on roadless acreage found in the national forests in their 
states and of creating a plan in the event the Secretary of Agriculture grants a petition.  
These burdens, as well as the possibility that the Secretary will deny petitions, have 
dissuaded some states from even trying to secure roadless area protections under the 
petitions process.388  The Governors of Oregon and Washington have requested that the 
Forest Service allow them to protect roadless areas within their states more quickly than 
is possible under the petitions process, but the Forest Service has rebuffed these 
efforts.389  Several states, including California, New Mexico, Oregon, and Washington, 
384 49 U.S.C. 32919(a) (providing that, “[w]hen an average fuel economy standard prescribed under this 
chapter is in effect, a State or a political subdivision of a State may not adopt or enforce a law or regulation 
related to fuel economy standards or average fuel economy standards for automobiles covered by an 
average fuel economy standard under [EPCA]”). 
385 Average Fuel Economy Standards for Light Trucks; Model Years 2008-2011; Notice of Proposed 
Rulemaking, 70 Fed. Reg. 51,414, 51,457 (2005).   
386 See, e.g., Bog Egelko, FDA opposing state warnings on canned tuna; Top official sides with firms in 
mercury suit, S.F. CHRONICLE, Aug. 20, 2005, at B1 (describing the Bush Administration’s decision to side 
with tuna companies challenging California labeling requirements on the ground that regulation by the 
Federal Food and Drug Administration bars supplemental state regulation).  For discussion of the Bush 
Administration’s efforts to use federal regulations to preempt more stringent state regulations in a wide 
variety of areas, see Myron Levin & Alan C. Miller, Industries Get quiet Protection From lawsuits; 
Federal agencies use arcane regulations and legal opinions to shield automakers and others challenged by 
consumers and states, L.A. TIMES, Feb. 19, 2006, at A1. 
387 For further discussion of the two approaches, see supra notes 288-91 and accompanying text. 
388 Western states mull options under new roadless rule, 10 LAND LETTER # 9, June 23, 2005 (quoting 
analyst at the Wilderness Society, who characterized states as reluctant to use the petition process). 
389 See Dan Berman, Enviros urge Democrats to join states’ lawsuit against Bush roadless plan,
GREENWIRE, Nov. 2, 2005, available at
http://www.eenews.net/Greenwire/Backissues/110205/110205gw.htm#1:  11/2/05.d 
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filed suit challenging the Forest Service’s decision to replace the Clinton roadless rule 
with the petitions process.390
The other federal land management agencies also have sought to scuttle state and 
local efforts to protect natural resources from development.  The BLM, for example, has 
taken the position that a Wyoming statute that provides compensation for surface owners 
for losses in land value caused by mineral development imposes inappropriate economic 
burdens on mineral developers.  The BLM itself owns the mineral rights to about 12.5-
million acres of split-estate lands in Wyoming.391
4. Self-Imposed Restraints on State Regulatory Authority
Section IVA above explored the reasons why state and local governments may be 
willing to adopt environmental protection measures that go beyond those required by 
federal law.  In some jurisdictions, however, movement beyond federal minimum 
standards is legally impossible.  As far back as the 1970s, some state legislatures 
restrained their environmental agencies from adopting measures more stringent than the 
regulations in effect at the federal level.  The incidence of such legislation increased 
during the late 1980s and 1990s.392  Some of these state statutes apply only to specified 
environmental media (air, water, or land)393 or industries,394 while others impose across-
the-board prohibitions on the promulgation of any regulations more stringent than those 
adopted by Congress or federal agencies.395  Some state regulators have even sought to 
roll back state standards issued before the promulgation of more lenient federal 
390 See California ex rel. Lockyer v. United States Dep’t of Agric., 2006 WL 708914 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 16, 
2006) describing state suit); Washington joins roadless rule suit to prohibit development in wild areas, 30 
PLATTS COAL OUTLOOK # 7, at 13.  The suit, filed in the federal district court for the Northern District of 
California, contends, among other things, that the Forest Service violated NEPA.  Id.  Montana and Maine 
filed briefs in support of the challenge.  Quarter-Million Americans Petition for Roadless Rule 
Reinstatement, ENVIRONMENT NEWS SERVICE, Mar. 3, 2006, available at http://www.ens-
newswire.com/ens/mar2006/2006-03-03-09.asp. 
391 See Matt Micheli, Showdown at the OK Corral – Wyoming's Challenge to U.S. Supremacy on Federal 
Split Estate Lands, 6 WYO. L. REV. 31 (2006); John Pendergrass, Can’t We All Just Get Along Here?, 22 
ENVTL. F. 8 (Sept./Oct. 2005). 
392 See Jerome M. Organ, Limitations on State Agency Authority to Adopt Environmental Standards More 
Stringent than Federal Standards:  Policy Considerations and Interpretive Problems, 54 MD. L. REV.
1373, 1377 (1995). 
393 See, e.g., R.I. GEN. LAWS § 23-23-5(12) (limiting state environmental agency’s authority to regulate 
emission characteristics of fuels in a manner that is more stringent than mandatory federal standards); 
WISC. STAT. ANN. § 285.21(1)(a) (prohibiting, with limited exceptions, state environmental agency from 
promulgating an ambient air quality standard that is more restrictive than the federal standard); WISC.
STAT. ANN. § 285.27(1) (same with respect to emission standards for new stationary sources of air 
pollution); WYO. STAT. ANN. § 35-11-1416 (authorizing agency to adopt regulations governing 
underground storage tanks that “shall be no less or no more stringent than the federal standards”). 
394 See, e.g., OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 3746.04(e) (stating that state cleanup standards for the petroleum 
industry “shall be consistent with and equivalent in scope, content, and coverage to any applicable 
standards established by federal environmental laws and regulations,” including the CWA, TSCA, 
CERCLA, and the SDWA). 
395 Organ, supra note 392, at 1377, 1380 (citing S.D. CODIFIED LAWS ANN. § 1-40-4.1 (1993)) (prohibiting 
issuance of any rules that are “more stringent than any corresponding federal law, rule, or regulation 
governing an essentially similar subject or issue”). 
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controls.396  Industry continues to support legislation to strip state regulators of the 
authority to exceed federal standards in specific contexts.397
These kinds of statutes may be the result of a desire to minimize the commitment 
of state budgetary resources to environmental measures perceived of as the outgrowth of 
unfunded federal mandates.398  They also may reflect a desire by state legislators to 
protect industry within the state from the need to incur additional compliance costs, 
particularly if such costs will place local industries at a competitive disadvantage vis-à-
vis industries located in states lacking requirements that go beyond minimum federal 
environmental standards.399  Finally, statutes that preclude state agencies from adopting 
environmental requirements stricter than the federal requirements may make sense if the 
industries protected by the legislation provide significant social and economic benefits 
within the state but create externalities experienced primarily in other states.400
State statutes that prohibit or restrict the adoption by state agencies or local 
governments of environmental measures more stringent than minimum federal 
requirements transform the federal standards into ceilings rather than floors.  Such 
statutes would preclude affected states, for example, from regulating development in 
wetlands excluded from the scope of the CWA’s dredge and fill permit program if the 
courts adopt narrow interpretations of the scope of federal regulatory authority.401  Such 
legislation also may provide support for the thesis that a federal presence in the 
environmental protection arena is necessary to mitigate the race-to-the-bottom in which 
the states would otherwise engage.402
Regardless of the effect that these preclusive statutes may have on the continuing 
debate over the proper normative role of the federal and state governments as 
environmental policymakers in a federal system, it is clear that statutes that disable state 
environmental initiatives that go beyond federal law prevent the states from acting as 
“laboratories” of experimentation in the environmental policy arena.  If the federal 
government continues to shrink its own authority to regulate activities that pollute and to 
manage natural resources to achieve sustainable use, the effect of these state statutes will 
be to contribute to a decline in the institutional capacity of government at all levels to 
address threats to public health and the environment. 
396 See, e.g., WISC. STAT. ANN. § 283.11(d) (authorizing state agency to modify effluent limitations to 
conform with subsequently issued federal limitations); Wisconsin’s Paradoxical Steps on Mercury Rule 
Underscores State Limits, INSIDE EPA WEEKLY, Dec. 2, 2005, at 7 (referring to promise made by state 
environmental agency to state legislature that it would revise plan for controlling mercury emissions to 
match EPA’s regulations). 
397 See, e.g., Industry Makes Landmark Bid to Strip Ohio of Toxics Authority, INSIDE EPA WEEKLY, June 3, 
2005, at 3 (describing industry efforts to divest Ohio EPA of authority to regulate air toxics other than those 
regulated by EPA under the CAA). 
398 Organ, supra note 392, at 1388, 1389-90. 
399 Id at 1388-89. 
400 Id. at 1389. 
401 See States Face Hurdles in Event High Court Scales Back Water Act Scope, INSIDE EPA WEEKLY, Mar. 
10, 2006, at 20. 
402 Organ, supra note 392, at 1392-93. 
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One more self-imposed restraint that has the potential to significantly impair the 
ability of states and localities to protect the environment through regulation deserves 
mention.  Some states have enacted laws that require the government to compensate 
landowners whose properties are adversely affected by regulation, even in circumstances 
when neither the federal nor state constitutions require them to do so.  Perhaps the most 
far-reaching of these measures is an Oregon statute, adopted by ballot measure in 2004.  
The Oregon legislation provides, among other things, that “[i]f a public entity enacts or 
enforces a new land use regulation . . . that restricts the use of real property . . . and has 
the effect of reducing the fair market value of the property . . . , then the owner of the 
property shall be paid just compensation.”403  The Supreme Court has never interpreted 
the Fifth Amendment’s takings clause to require the payment of just compensation 
merely because regulation results in a decline in the value of the regulated property.  The 
Oregon Supreme Court rejected a series of attacks on the statute, holding that it does not 
impose unconstitutional limitations on the governments’ plenary power to regulate land 
use or the Oregon Constitution’s separation of powers principles and that it does not 
amount to an impermissible waiver of the state’s sovereign immunity.404  If other states 
follow Oregon’s lead, state and local regulators will likely refrain from adopting some 
land use controls they would otherwise deem desirable as a means of protecting the 
environment due to the financial impact of the compensation requirement. 
C. Devolution of Authority to Weaken Federal Environmental Protection 
Programs
 One final aspect of the perverse mutation of cooperative federalism discussed in 
this article involves affirmative delegation by the federal government to the state of the 
power to weaken federal regulatory programs.  As indicated above, both Congress and 
the Executive Branch have taken steps to preclude states from adopting environmental 
protection measures that are more stringent than those adopted by Congress or federal 
agencies.  At the same time, Congress on occasion has delegated to the states the 
authority to undercut federal standards or processes designed to protect the environment.  
The Safe, Accountable, Flexible, Efficient Transportation Equity Act: A Legacy for 
Users (SAFETEA-LU) provides one example of Congress’s willingness to devolve 
power to the states in a manner that weakens environmental protection programs rather 
than supplementing federal protective measures.405  SAFETEA-LU authorizes the 
Secretary of Transportation to assign to a state the responsibility for determining whether 
certain activities are categorically excluded from NEPA because they fall within classes 
of action identified by the Secretary.406  A state that assumes responsibility for making a 
403 OR. REV. STAT. § 197.532(1) (2004).  That requirement does not apply, however, to land use regulations 
that restrict or prohibit activities that are “commonly and historically recognized as public nuisances under 
common law,” or activities for the protection of public health and safety, including “solid or hazardous 
waste regulations, and pollution control regulations.”  Id. § 197.532 (3)(A)-(B).  
404 MacPherson v. Dep’t of Admin. Serv., 340 Or. 117, 130 P.3d 308 (2006). 
405 Pub. L. No. 109-59, § 6004(a), 119 Stat. 1144, 1867 (2005) (to be codified at 23 U.S.C. § 326).. 
406 23 U.S.C.A. § 326(a)(1).  A state’s determination that an activity qualifies for a categorical exclusion 
must be consistent with criteria established by the Secretary.  Id. § 326(a)(2). 
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categorical exclusion determination is solely responsible for complying with and carrying 
out any federal laws applicable to the activity.407
 Another example of the delegation of authority to weaken the impact of federal 
environmental legislation is provided by recent efforts to amend the ESA.  Legislation 
that was introduced in Congress but that has not yet been adopted would delegate to the 
states the authority to issue incidental take permits to landowners whose activities affect 
endangered species without any requirement that the states consult with or receive the 
prior approval of any federal agency.408
 A third example of federal willingness to allow states to weaken federal 
environmental protection laws involves proposed federal legislation that would empower 
the states, rather than the federal government, to authorize energy exploration within 125 
miles of their coasts (rather than limiting that power to activities that take place within 
only a few miles of their coasts, as under current law).  Supporters of the legislation seek 
to remove existing restrictions on exploration that stem from a federal moratorium on 
drilling in parts of the Outer Continental Shelf that has been in place since the 1980s.409
D. The Lost Opportunity of Cooperative Federalism
 For a variety of reasons discussed above,410 in recent years the states and their 
political subdivisions have embarked upon a series of environmental protection initiatives 
that is probably unparalleled since the beginning of the modern environmental era in the 
United States.  Acting alone and on regional bases, the states have taken aim at the 
generation of greenhouse gases thought to be contributing to global climate change, 
largely because the federal government completely abdicated its responsibility to tackle 
the problem.  Although the global warming initiatives adopted by state and local 
governments have been the most prominent examples of the capacity and willingness of 
these levels of government to undertake innovative environmental programs at least 
under certain circumstances, state and local efforts have extended to other areas.411
 This flurry of state and local activity provided an opportunity to achieve a new 
level of cooperation among federal, state, and local actors in the pursuit of a cleaner, 
healthier environment and the protection of a stock of natural resources that would 
407 23 U.S.C.A. § 326(b)(2). 
408 See Senators Seek to Overhaul Species Law With Greater State Role, New Incentives, 36 ENV’T REP.
(BNA) 2645 (Dec. 23, 2005) (citing S. 2110, 109th Cong., The Collaboration for the Recovery of 
Endangered Species Act). 
409 Michael Janofsky, Offshore Drilling Plan Widens Rifts Over Energy Policy, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 6, 2006, 
at 16 (nat’l ed.); Lynn Garner, House Members Urge Interior Appropriators to Continue Moratorium on 
Offshore Drilling, 37 ENV’T REP. (BNA) 699 (2006). 
410 See supra notes 303-14 and accompanying text. 
411 See Christopher H. Schroeder, Federalism’s Values in Programs to Protect the Environment, in
STRATEGIES FOR ENVIRONMENTAL SUCCESS 249 (Michael Allan Wolf ed., 2005) (indicating that “[s]tate 
governments have been filling the policy vacuum” created by the environmental policy paralysis that 
characterized the federal government “in a number of important areas, including global warming, local air 
pollution problems, alternative energy development, land conservation, wetlands management, and 
problems of urban sprawl”). 
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sustain future generations.  Although the more visible state and local commitment to 
environmental protection has been welcome to some, it has been greeted rudely by 
others.  In particular, the federal government — through a variety of judicial decisions, 
legislative enactments, and agency regulations — has reduced state and local regulatory 
power, thereby thwarting some of the newly minted state and local initiatives.  Indeed, in 
a few instances, Congress has delegated (or contemplated delegating) increased authority 
to the states, not to protect the environment but to water down federal regulatory 
programs such as NEPA and the ESA. 
V. CONCLUSION
The purpose of this article is not to endorse federal regulation on the one hand or 
state and local regulation on the other as the superior mode of setting and achieving 
environmental protection goals.  Persuasive arguments exist to justify the existence at 
each level of government of the authority to establish environmental law and policy, and 
both levels of government have played an important role in the development of 
environmental law and policy in the United States.  Before 1970, the states dominated the 
environmental policy landscape, while the federal government was content to provide 
technical and financial assistance to the states.  When a sufficient number of members of 
Congress concluded that the states had not appropriately taken up the reins, Congress 
embarked upon an ambitious agenda of cleaning up the nation’s air, water, and land, and 
constraining destructive uses of the federally owned lands and resources. 
The new federal role did not put an end to state involvement, however.  Instead, 
statutes such as the CAA and the CWA reflected a commitment to cooperative 
federalism.  The federal government would set the nation’s minimal environmental goals 
but would allow the states to determine in many contexts the appropriate ways to achieve 
those goals through administration of permit programs like the CWA’s NPDES program, 
to share the responsibility to enforce state requirements adopted to implement federal 
regulatory programs, and to adopt regulatory standards more stringent than the federal 
government has seen fit to adopt.  Although the pattern of cooperative federalism has not 
been as uniform in the federal lands context, the statutes governing the management and 
use of those lands also provide opportunities for both the federal government and the 
states to contribute to the preservation of a sustainable federal resource base. 
In recent years, various new state environmental programs have provided concrete 
evidence of the ability of the states to make meaningful contributions to environmental 
protection.  These programs highlight the value of what Chris Schroeder has referred to 
as “the availability of concurrent governments capable of providing a meaningful forum 
for public concerns.”412  The existence of overlapping federal and state authority to adopt 
environmental protection programs allows citizens to have access to multiple forums for 
seeking government assistance in promoting the protection of health, safety, and the 
environment.413
412 Id. at 252. 
413 Id.
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Despite the rise of environmental activism at the state level, the model of 
cooperative federalism reflected in federal environmental and natural resource 
management legislation has faltered, not flourished.  On the one hand, the authority of the 
federal government (or the willingness of the federal government to exercise that 
authority) has declined as a result of the combined effects of the decisions of the courts, 
Congress, and federal administrative agencies.  On the other hand, these same actors have 
placed significant obstacles in the path of state or local efforts to pick up the slack created 
by the federal government’s withdrawal from its previous role as prime environmental 
policymaker.  Through doctrines such as the dormant Commerce Clause, preemption, and 
regulatory takings, the federal courts have constrained the ability of state and local 
governments to achieve levels of environmental and resource protection that exceed those 
required by federal legislation.  Congress has blocked supplemental state and local 
measures in some instances.  Federal agencies have interpreted their enabling acts to have 
that effect even if the statutes do not explicitly so provide.  Perhaps the most perverse 
trend of all completely turns cooperative environmental federalism on its head by 
delegating to the states the authority to carve out exceptions from federal environmental 
mandates. 
Before the 1960s, the United States relied on a system in which the states had 
virtually exclusive authority to control activities with potentially damaging 
environmental consequences.  Congress found that system to be wanting, and adopted a 
spurt of environmental legislation that vested in the federal government an environmental 
leadership role.  Despite recognition that a federal leadership role was appropriate, the 
nation has not tried to create a system in which the federal government exercises 
exclusive authority to protect the environment (or even exclusive authority to determine 
the fate of the federal government’s own land and resources).  Given the respect due to 
state sovereignty under our federal system of government, there is little if any chance that 
such a system will ever be tried as a means of adopting and implementing environmental 
protection measures.  Accordingly, the question since 1970 has not been whether to vest 
exclusive authority to control environmentally damaging activities in either the federal 
government or the states.  Nor has the United States tried during the modern 
environmental era to create a system in which neither level of government has the 
requisite authority to protect the nation’s people and resources from environmental 
threats.  Recent trends in environmental federalism — during which inroads have been 
made into the authority of all levels of government to protect health, safety, and the 
environment — make it clear just how unattractive an option that is. 
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